DECEPTION

The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA

Edward Jay Epstein

Author of *Legend* and *Inquest*

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The Invisible War Between
the KGB and the CIA

By Edward Jay Epstein

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James Jesus Angleton: Was He Right?
New From Nowhere Redux

This book was first published by G.P. Putnam in 1989

"Deception is a state of mind —and the mind of the state."
—James Jesus Angleton

CONTENTS

PART ONE
The State of Mind

CHAPTER ONE
Through the Looking Glass

On May 14, 1987, some of the most powerful men in Washington,
including senators, ambassadors, cabinet officers, generals, and
two former directors of Central Intelligence, jammed into a small
Congregational Church in Arlington, Virginia, to pay their last
respects to James Jesus Angleton. They stared at a wreath of giant
purple orchids. The orchids had been sent by Angleton's former
comrades in the OSS, the organization where forty-four

years
earlier he had begun his career as a spy; the poem, written by his
friend T. S. Eliot, described the "wilderness of mirrors," which had
come to represent for him the war of deception between the CIA
and the KGB. The memorial service for the poet-spy was over in
less than forty minutes.
It was eleven years earlier that I had met James Jesus Angle-ton.
At that time, in 1976, I knew nothing about his secret world of
deception. Nor had I even heard of concepts such as "disinformation,"
"dangles," "false flags," "penetrations," or "control," which were central elements in it. I had come to see him about
Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who had defected to the United
States two months after the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy.
I had just begun a book on Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged
assassin. Although Oswald had been investigated by the Warren

Commission, the FBI, and other intelligence services, there was
still a missing piece in the jigsaw puzzle—the nearly two years that
he spent in the Soviet Union before he returned to the United States
in 1962 and proceeded to Dallas. What had happened to Oswald
during this period? Had he had any connection with Soviet
intelligence? Had the KGB sponsored his return to the United
States? Had he been given any mission?

When the editors of Reader's Digest proposed the idea of this
book to me in 1976, they also offered to arrange for me to
interview a source who was in a position to furnish definitive
answers to all these questions—Nosenko. Nosenko, as an officer of
the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, which is responsible for
Soviet counterespionage, reported he had been assigned to
Oswald's case in Moscow in 1959. And then, in December 1963,
after the assassination, he reported he had also reviewed Oswald's
entire KGB file before he defected to the CIA.

I began my interviews with Nosenko in January 1976. After I
had questioned him for six hours, I found his answers not only
imprecise and evasive but troubling. Several of the assertions he
made about the KGB's treatment of Oswald were clearly inconsistent
with other facts established by the Warren Commission. He
categorically insisted, for example, that the KGB had never
contacted Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union. But there
was considerable evidence, including intercepted letters and the
reports of U.S. Embassy officials concerning offers Oswald had
made to turn over to the Soviets secret U.S. data of "special
interest," which made Nosenko's version difficult to swallow.
After the interview was over, I discussed these inconsistencies
with Donald Jameson, the CIA contact that Reader's Digest had
provided for my dealings with Nosenko. Jamie, as he preferred to

be called, was in a wheelchair, having lost the use of his legs in
some way that he could not openly discuss. He explained that he
was a close friend of Nosenko's, and he was sure any problems
stemmed from Nosenko's faltering command of the English lan-
guage. "Nosenko is utterly reliable on the subject of Oswald. He
had full access to KGB records," he assured me, as he wheeled
himself off.

My concern was not entirely alleviated, however. I had lunch
later that week with a Soviet diplomat in Washington, Igor Agou,
to facilitate getting a visa for going to Moscow and Minsk. I
explained to Agou that I wanted to interview some of the Russian
citizens who had been acquaintances of Oswald's. Agou shook his
head, saying, "Just between us . . . there is no need for you to go to
Russia. The best source on Oswald's visit there is in America . . .
Yuri Nosenko." I found it curious that the Soviet Embassy

would

recommend that I see a Soviet traitor—indeed, the same traitor the

CIA had also recommended to me.

Disquieted further by this coincidence, I went back to see Jameson. I pressed him as to why the Warren Commission had not

used Nosenko as a witness if he was so reliable. After all, there

was no secret that he had defected: the KGB must have known that

he had access to the Oswald file. Calling him would not have

compromised any secret intelligence.

Jamie then told me, for the first time, that initially there had been

some "minor problem" with Nosenko. "It took a year or so to clear

up the confusion over his defection—all minor details, of course."

When I asked about the nature of the "details," Jamie said that it

was "too sensitive" to be discussed. He closed the issue by saying,

"In any case, it is not relevant to your book. Don't worry about it."

But I did. Moreover, I found that the CIA and FBI officers I had

been put in contact with flatly refused to talk about Nosenko. The
only remaining alternative was to find an ex-officer of the CIA
who would have been involved in the case of this defector. Earlier
that year, a number of CIA executives had been publicly fired after
Seymour Hersh published in The New York Times an expose of
the CIA's illicit activities. The most prominent of these men was
the chief of the counterintelligence staff— James Jesus Angleton.
His name rang a bell since his staff had
served in 1964 as liaison between the CIA and the Warren Commission,
which suggested he might be able to explain why Nosenko
was never used by the Commission as a witness.
Making contact with Angleton was not difficult: he was listed in
the Virginia telephone directory. When I told him I had interviewed
Nosenko, he said, "I wouldn't have thought they would
be letting him out so soon—but I would be very interested in what
he says." I had no idea who "they" were or what "letting

him out"
meant, but I invited him to dinner to hear more about Nosenko. He
suggested the restaurant in the Madison Hotel in Washington
which he said would be convenient because it had "a secure
garage."
I did some research on him before the meeting; although his
name appeared in the clip file, the Who's Who entry was intriguingly
brief. James Jesus Angleton was born on December 9,
1917, in Boise, Idaho. His father James Hugh Angleton, a cavalry
officer in the Idaho National Guard, had met, and carried away, his
mother on General John J. Pershing's celebrated punitive raid into
Mexico. She was Carmen Jesus Moreno, a seventeen-year-old
Mexican beauty (which accounted for his middle name). When
Angleton was fifteen, his father, becoming the European
representative for the National Cash Register Company, moved
him to Milan. After a year in Italy he was sent to school at
Malvern, an elite public school in Worcestershire,

England. Then,
in 1937, with war tensions building in Europe, he went on
to Yale.
There, together with Reed Whittemore, he founded
Furioso, a
quarterly devoted to original poetry, and persuaded such
leading
poets as Ezra Pound, Archibald MacLeish, e. e.
cummings, and T.
S. Eliot to contribute. After he graduated in 1941, he went
on to
Harvard Law School; but he never got his law degree.
Instead, he
volunteered for the OSS—America's first centralized
intelligence
service (nicknamed "Oh-So-Social"
because it drew its recruits from Ivy League colleges). His
father
was already in the OSS.
Angleton was almost immediately assigned to the
counterintelligence
unit, called appropriately X-2, and ended the war in
Rome. When the CIA was formed in 1947, he joined it.
He then
virtually disappeared from public view—until he was
fired in 1974.
He arrived at the hotel in a black homburg, looking like
someone

that Central Casting might have chosen for the part of a
counterintelligence chief. Even though he was over six feet tall, he
shuffled down the corridor with a stoop that made him seem
shorter—and older. He was ghostly thin, with deepset eyes accentuated
by arched eyebrows. He had an enigmatic smile, and a finely sculptured face which, I later learned, had been proposed
half-facetiously as an appropriate logo for the CIA.
He lit a long Virginia Slims cigarette as we sat down at the
table—and coughed. He explained that he suffered from both
emphysema and an ulcer, but that didn't stop him from chain smoking
or drinking. A quarter of a century in counterintelligence had evidently exacted some toll.
I had no idea at this first meeting that the defector I wanted to
speak to Angleton about had helped bring about his downfall. Or
that Nosenko had been the center of a bitter battle within the CIA
that had been buried, along with a half-dozen careers, but not
settled. I merely wanted to know at this point whether

there was

any reason to doubt Nosenko's account of Oswald's activities in

Russia. I began by asking Angleton what his position was in the

CIA in January 1964 when Nosenko defected.

"I was chief of the counterintelligence staff—that's now part of

the public record, thanks to Seymour Hersh and The New York

Times," he said with a tinge of real bitterness. "But for twenty

years, what I did was so secret that not even my wife knew what

my job was."

"Did it concern defectors?" I asked.

"We had the responsibility, at least then, of establishing the

bona fides of intelligence defectors." He explained that "bona

fides" was a term of art the CIA used when it accepted that a

defector, or other intelligence source, had permanently left the

service of a foreign power and was no longer under its control. A

bona fide defector was, in other words, deemed an authentic

source.

"But are there false defectors?" The alternative was that the
person in question was a false defector—only pretending to switch
sides while remaining under the control of another intelligence
service.

Angleton answered quietly, "Truth is always complicated when
it comes to defectors." He added, with a trace of a smile, "There
are defectors whose bona fides cannot be established."

"Was there any problem with Nosenko's bona fides?" I pressed.

"I can't discuss specific cases," he said with a shrug. With that,
he abruptly cut off the conversation about Nosenko and effortlessly
moved on to a subject of which I had no understanding at all:
orchids.

"There are over ten thousand identified species of orchids,
divided into tribes," I heard him say. He finished off a second
bottle of premier cru Chablis as he began describing orchid tribes,
growing at different levels of the jungle, with such exotic

names as
Dendrobium, Phalaenopsis, Cattleya, Cymbidium, Brassia, and
Odontoglossum. While half-listening to this esoterica, I tried,
without success, to get him back to the subject at hand: Was the
Soviet defector on whom I was about to base a book some kind of
fraud?
Angleton simply waved off these interruptions like bothersome
flies. When he got up to leave, he said, "You might do well looking
at some of these orchids . . . if you want to see how deception
works in the real world."
The next week I met Angleton again—this time in the steamy
main greenhouse of Kensington Orchids in Maryland. He talked,
as we walked through the greenhouse, as if he were conducting a
lecture tour.
"With most species of orchids, it is not the fittest but the most
deceptive ones that survive." The problem is that most orchids are

too dispersed through the jungle for the wind to carry pollen to
them; they depend on insects or birds for this crucial service. But
since they do not provide any food or other nutrients for these
carriers, orchids have to trick them into perpetuating their species.
Angleton seemed to take particular delight in elaborately describing
these modes of deception. "They can play on greed, lust, or fear." He pointed to a tubelike column surrounded by five-inch
spidery-looking petals that belonged, according to its label, to
the Epidendrum tribe. "This orchid deceives mosquitoes." He
described the deception, level by level. First, the orchid emits a
fragrance that simulates the nectar the mosquito feeds on. Then the
mosquito, following the scent, is lured from the flower petals into
the narrow tube. Here it runs into the orchid's pollen pod, gets
jammed in the eye, and is blinded. Finally, leaving the orchid, the
blinded mosquito flies on until it passes another orchid of

the
Epidendrum tribe and gets a whiff of the same false nectar odor.
Again, it pushes its way into the orchid's narrow tunnel, only this
time it deposits the pollen that has stuck to its eye.
"Other orchids use what is called pseudo-copulation," Angle-ton
continued, "to trigger the sexual instincts of an insect." He
described how the Tricerus orchid has on its flower a three-dimensional
replica of the underside of a female fly. It even bristles
with the hairs—and odors—of a fly. When the male fly sees this
replica, he lands on it and attempts to have sex with it. In doing so,
he comes in contact with the pollen pod, which attaches itself to his
underside. Eventually, he flies off. If he then passes another
Tricerus orchid, he repeats the frustrating process, and delivers the
pollen.
Angleton then directed my attention to an amazing orchid
that had on its flower a picture of a bee's head. He explained that
when a wasp sees this image, it assumes its mortal enemy is just

below it, and instinctively attacks. The wasp's stinger plunges
through the picture of the bee petal into the pollen pod, which
sticks to it. By repeating this "pseudo-attack" when it passes another
such orchid, it pollinates it.
Angleton said these deceptions depended on "a process of
provocation." The victims are duped because they are keyed to
respond to certain information in nature. Insects do not have the
ability to discriminate between what is real and what is mimicked.
The orchid house was an odd sort of education. But it was clear
that he was not talking just about orchids, or insects. They were a
metaphor for a world in which he saw deception as a norm rather
than an aberration. It was a world in which intelligence services
could be provoked, seduced, lured into false trails, blinded, and
turned into unwitting agents—through the same failure to
discriminate between real and simulated information.
Angleton finally got to Nosenko as we lingered in the greenhouse.

"Why do you think Nosenko, after all these years of silence,
decided to tell his story to you—now?"
I explained that, as best I knew, he had just walked into the
Washington office of Reader's Digest and befriended an editor
there. He then suggested he would be willing to discuss Oswald,
and the editor contacted me. I hesitated, seeing that Angleton, with
his cocked smile, looked skeptical.
"I know that a journalist might not want to look a gift horse in
the mouth," he continued, "but did you assume he walked in on a
whim?"
I had no immediate answer. The idea that a Soviet defector
would selflessly provide an author with material of great public
interest seemed far less implausible to me at the time. Instead, I
asked defensively whether he believed Nosenko did not contact the
Digest of his own free will.
"I'm only suggesting you make some inquiries about his motive."

He added, with conspicuous understatement, "I don't know
what Nosenko's status is, but some defectors have contractual
obligations to the Agency that might prevent them from just
walking into the office of a magazine and volunteering an interview."
His point was evident.
When I returned to Washington, I began asking about the
Digest's connection with Nosenko. I found, as Angleton indirectly
suggested, that Nosenko indeed was under contract to the CIA. The
contract, which I later located a copy of, prohibited discussion of
any aspect of the intelligence relationship except with an
"authorized government representative or such other persons as he
may specifically approve." Nosenko therefore presumably had CIA
approval to make his contact with the Digest editor—and provide
information to me. Such approved information was called a brief.
Jamie Jameson, the "mutual friend" who arranged for my
meeting with Nosenko, turned out to be a CIA consultant. Although

nominally detached from the CIA itself, Jameson had the
job of bringing Soviet bloc defectors like Nosenko
together with
journalists so that they could deliver their authorized
briefs. It was
a way of getting stories into magazines, newspapers, and
books. I
subsequently learned that this CIA program of
surreptitiously
planting news stories even involved writing entire books
and
publishing them under defectors' names. The Penkovsky
Papers, a
best seller published by Doubleday in 1966, was the most
successful of these "operations." One defector, a former
Czech
general, told me that the CIA handed him a completed
"autobiographical"
manuscript to be published under his name; when he
asked for the right to make changes, it was taken away
from him
and the identical manuscript was later published under the
name of
another Czech defector.
This program of surreptitious authorship had disturbing
implications.
It meant that much of the material in the public record
on the history of the spy war that came from first-hand

wit-
nesses—i.e., defectors—had been authorized and selected, if not
written, by an interested party: the CIA.
Angleton showed little surprise when I told him at our next
meeting at the Madison that Nosenko had been sent to me. He had
known that, of course, from the start. I reasoned, perhaps overly
defensively, that the fact that Nosenko's story was authorized by
the CIA, and possibly censored by his CIA briefing officer, did not
necessarily mean it was untrue.
"Right," Angleton agreed. He paused, as if to weigh what else he
could tell me, and in the interval ordered a large snifter of
Armagnac brandy from the waiter. Then he continued, "What that
means is that the Agency has now decided to go public with Yuri
Nosenko. I would expect that his autobiography is already in the
works." (As it turned out, he was right. Jameson had already
mentioned the book to a Digest editor.)
"Why shouldn't his story be made public?" After a month

of
looking at orchids, I decided that the time had come to force an
answer. "What was wrong with his information?"
He explained in a quiet but precise voice: "Up until the time I
left the Agency, all reports based on what Nosenko said carried a
label I had insisted on. That label specified 'From a source whose
bona fides have not been established.' "
It seemed incredible to me that Nosenko, who had defected in
1964, still was not considered a bona fide defector ten years later.
"Are you saying that Nosenko was a false defector?"
"I am stating a fact: As of December 31, 1974, my staff was
unable to certify Nosenko's bona fides, and by agreement with the
Director, all information provided by him was so labeled." He
finished his Armagnac, then added, with what appeared to be some
strain in his voice, "This policy has obviously changed."
It was becoming increasingly evident that the issue of Nosenko's
label was just the tip of the iceberg. What still remained

submerged

was the real dispute that had led to the abrupt departure of Angleton and his staff. "Did the problem proceed from what

Nosenko said about Oswald?" I continued.

He looked at his watch, signaling it was time for him to leave.

"It was much more than Oswald . . . All I can say for now is that

the problem concerned defining the basic concept of Soviet deception."

Since I planned to continue my interview with Nosenko —if the

CIA permitted him to meet with me again—I asked Angleton what

sort of questions might get at this concept. He excused himself at

that point and returned from the cloakroom with his coat on. Just as

I assumed the interview was over, he motioned me to pick up a

pencil and, without further hesitation, he rattled off thirteen

questions for Nosenko.*

Angleton's questions contained specific Soviet names, relationships,

and KGB departments, all of which were completely unfamiliar to me. Nor did the questions seem relevant to

the issue

of Oswald, at least at the time. (Only years later, rereading Angleton's questions in my notebook, would I realize that they

obliquely contained in them Angleton's theory of the Kennedy

assassination. See Appendix A)

When I finished writing down the thirteen questions, I asked

him to explain how they related to Nosenko. Was Nosenko not

who he said he was? Had he misinformed the Warren Commission

about Oswald? Did Angleton believe he might still be under KGB

control—after more than a decade? Could the CIA, with all its

resources, be duped by a single man?

Angleton answered this spate of questions by asking one of his

own. "Do you know about the Trust?"

I looked blankly at him. I had never heard of the Trust before.

"If you want to understand Soviet deception, you have to go

back to the Trust. It is the prototype." He added, as he walked to

his parked Mercedes, "Talk to the Rock. He knows more

about the
Trust than anyone else outside of Russia."

CHAPTER TWO
The Trust

The Rock was Raymond Rocca, a tall, bearded man in his
early
sixties who looked more like a professor than an
intelligence
officer. Angleton had told me that he had been his Chief
of
Research for over a quarter of century. He had first met
"the Rock"
when they were in the same counterintelligence unit in the
OSS in
Italy during World War II. Angleton, impressed by
Rocca's
monk-like devotion to filtering through voluminous
archival
records, kept him, as he put it, "by his side" for the rest of
his
career in intelligence. In the CIA, Angleton gave Rocca
the
Herculean task of keeping the "serials," which were the
fragmentary
bits of unresolved intelligence, initially scrawled on 3 by
5

cards, which Angleton tried to fit into different jigsaw puzzles.

"The problem was that we never could be sure which puzzle which

piece belonged to," Angleton explained. When the day of reckoning came in December 1974 and Angleton was fired, the

Rock left with him.

Rocca lived in a trim suburban house in Falls Church, Virginia—

not far from Angleton's home in Arlington. When I arrived

there, I couldn't help noticing two giant Cattleya orchids which,

like his mentor, he took great pride in breeding. He explained that

he was just recovering from a serious heart operation and was too

weak to go out, but would be glad to answer

my questions. I presumed, without ever asking him, that Angle-ton

had called him on my behalf.

"The Trust," he explained, as he lit his pipe, "was the basic

deception operation the Soviet state was built on." The story,

which he had pieced together over twenty years, went

back a half
century.
It began, as far as Western intelligence services were
concerned,
in late August 1921. At that time, a high-ranking Soviet
official
named Aleksandr Yakushev, on his way to attend an
international
trade conference in Norway, slipped away from his
delegation in
Estonia, then an independent republic, and sought out an
anti-
Soviet exile he had known before the Revolution. He said
that he,
and other Soviet officials, had come to the conclusion that
the
Communist experiment in Russia had totally failed. The
Soviet
economy was on the verge of collapse, farmers were not
delivering
crops, and the army was on the point of mutiny. Lenin's
Bolshevik
government would fall of its own weight in a matter of
months.
This news greatly excited the exile. He asked about
Yakushev's
plans: Would he defect?
Yakushev told him that there was no need to defect. He

planned
instead, with a close circle of other officials and
technocrats, to
seize power when the Bolsheviks faltered. Because they
had
recruited other disillusioned officials in the secret police,
army, and
key ministries, he and his co-conspirators had little to fear
from the
Bolsheviks. Though still underground, his group had
become the
equivalent of a de facto government.
After Yakushev left, the anti-Soviet exile immediately
reported
this astounding information to other exile groups which,
in turn,
passed it to British, French, and other intelligence services
that
were supporting their anti-Soviet activities. Yakushev's
assertion
that the Russian economy was failing seemed eminently
plausible
and fit in with assessments made by Western observers in
Russia.
His claim that the Bolsheviks were in disarray also
dovetailed
with conventional wisdom in the West. Earlier that year,
Lenin had

appeared to reverse communism by instituting his New Economic
Policy, which legitimized free enterprise, private farms, banking,
and foreign industrial concessions in Russia. There was even an
underground dissident press springing up in Soviet cities. The issue
was whether the Yakushev conspiracy was as far-reaching as he
claimed—or whether he had exaggerated its power.
In the months ahead, a half-dozen other Soviet officials, diplomats,
and military officers, temporarily defecting from their
missions, made contact with other anti-Soviet dissidents in Europe,
and told similar stories about the disintegration of the Bolshevik
regime. They also claimed to be part of the same conspiracy to
overthrow the government, which called itself the Monarchist
Union of Central Russia. Bit by bit, it also emerged from these
temporary defectors that they used as a cover for their
conspiratorial activities an office building in downtown Moscow
called the Municipal Credit Association Building, and, in

case they
were overheard, the group was referred to as "the Trust."
When he reappeared in Berlin in 1922, Yakushev asked to
be
put in touch with other leaders of the anti-Soviet
movement in
Europe. He suggested that the Trust could be of great use
to them.
It could act as their "service organization" inside Russia,
arranging
through its network of collaborators to smuggle out their
relatives,
possessions, other dissidents, and whatever secret
documents these
exile groups needed. Within a year, this offer was relayed
to all the
principal dissident groups in Europe. Yakushev, the
Trust's
ambassador, then made it possible for anti-Soviet groups
in Paris,
Berlin, Vienna, and Helsinki to use the Trust's facilities in
Russia.
Initially, some of these exiles remained skeptical of the
Trust,
despite the freedom of movement Yakushev and his co-
conspirators
seemed to have. They demanded proof it had the
influence it

claimed. To demonstrate its worth, the Trust smuggled the families of dissidents out of Russia. It also delivered arms and
supplies to their partisans inside Russia and contracted to undertake
sabotage and assassination missions for them in Moscow and Petrograd. It even furnished exile leaders with fake passports
and visas, which allowed them to sneak back into Russia to
participate in these clandestine missions. As they saw with their
own eyes police stations blown up and escapes arranged from
prisons, these exiled leaders came to accept the Trust. Then, they began receiving from the Trust secret documents on
the Soviet economy and military, which they turned over to
Western intelligence services. They found that these documents
were of great interest to the intelligence services of France, Germany,
Great Britain, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, which also paid them handsomely for the information. In the triangular trade
that developed, Soviet secrets went from the Trust to the Soviet

dissidents to a half-dozen Western intelligence services.
By the mid-1920s, no fewer than eleven Western intelligence
services had become almost completely dependent on the Trust for
information about Russia. The Trust even arranged tours of the
underground for emigre writers, in which they attended dissident
meetings in Moscow and met with editors of dissident journals.
When fitted together, the pieces of intelligence gathered through
the Trust reinforced the view that communism was over in Russia
and that, whether by Yakushev's awaited coup or through a less
dramatic accommodation, such as the New Economic Policy, the
Soviet Union would abandon its revolutionary goals.
By the late 1920s, however, problems developed with the Trust.
Exile leaders were suddenly kidnapped or vanished on their
missions to Moscow. Top agents, such as Sydney Reilly and Boris
Savinkov, brought back to Russia under the protection of the Trust,

were arrested, given show trials, and executed. Secret documents
proved to be unreliable—or false—the New Economic Policy
faded away, and underground journals disappeared.
The Soviet regime, instead of collapsing as predicted,
turned out to have consolidated its power.
Finally, in 1929, a top Trust official called Edward Opperput
defected to Finland. During his debriefings in Helsinki, he revealed
that he had organized the Trust, not as a dissident but as a Soviet
intelligence officer, taking his orders directly from Feliks
Dzierzhinski, Lenin's intelligence chief. He admitted that
Yakushev, as well as all his co-conspirators, had only feigned to be
disloyal: they all had been his agents, under the control of the
secret police. The Trust building, rather than being the cover for a
subversive conspiracy, was the secret police headquarters for this
seven-year sting. It fed out all the secret documents, briefed all the
false defectors, published the dissident newspapers, made all the
passport and travel arrangements, and even blew up

Soviet
buildings to make the deception more credible. Since the secret
police was running the show, it could also guarantee the success of
the smuggling, jail breaks, and assassinations. Opperput also told
how Soviet intelligence used the money it received from Western
intelligence services for the documents to finance spies in the
West, forced labor camps in Siberia, and other activities. He
provided so many specific details—including dates and times of
contacts going all the way back to Yakushev's original meeting in
Estonia—that there could be no remaining doubt that the Trust had
been a brilliant creation of Soviet intelligence.
So ended the Trust. The exile leaders, now realizing they had
been duped, were discredited—and demoralized. The Trust had
sown massive distrust among dissidents. These revelations also left
Western intelligence services in a state of confusion and disbelief.

They had to explain to their foreign ministries how they had
allowed themselves to be gulled and manipulated by the Soviets for
eight years.

The final shock came when Opperput, after making all these
revelations, quietly redefected to Moscow—and, under a different
name, returned to work for Soviet intelligence. "He had been
a dispatched defector," Rocca coolly concluded. Once he had
accomplished his mission of blowing the secret of the Trust, he
returned.

"But why," I interrupted, "would Soviet intelligence expose its
own deception?"

"That was the final coup," he answered, with evident admiration
for the ingenuity of his enemies. Since the deception had worn thin
by 1929, and, with the abandonment of the New Economic Policy,
no longer had a strategic objective, the Soviets decided to liquidate
it in the most advantageous way. "The idea was to focus

the
attention of the West on this past fiasco, so as to distract it
from the
operations that replaced it."
Did this mean that there had been other Trusts? I asked.
Rocca now switched to a more conditional and
hypothetical
tone. "Soviet intelligence had demonstrated with the Trust
a
capacity for future deceptions." He spoke almost proudly
of the
Soviet adversary, as if he were discussing what a
magician had
proven he could do in earlier tricks. "It demonstrated it
could
control double agents, like Yakushev, in foreign countries
and over
extended periods of time." Yakushev was the classic
"dangle"
which, in the invisible intelligence war, is someone who,
while
loyally taking orders from his own intelligence service,
feigns
disloyalty to his country to attract the attention of the
other side,
like the bait on a fish hook. The dangle may even pretend
to
defect—in which case he is called a "dispatched agent."

"Soviet
intelligence also showed it could orchestrate events over the better
part of a decade so as to turn these controlled agents into sources
on which the West relied." This "orchestration" involved
simulating evidence to make a fake underground credible — which
meant staging assassinations, bombings, car chases, and jail breaks.
It also involved creating "false flags"—organizations like the Trust
and other dissident groups that purposely mis-identified their true
political affiliation to lure their enemies into a trap. The "false flag"
could be designed by intelligence services to appeal to virtually
any interest since the invisible war, by its
very nature, afforded few reference points to check the authenticity
of credentials.
Finally, and most important to Rocca, Soviet intelligence demonstrated
that it could artfully use this network of double agents to
feed out to the West secret reports, clues, and documents that
provided a false picture of the Soviet Union. This

"disinformation"
was carefully calculated to dupe the West into believing the
Communist revolution was moribund—and therefore no threat. It
resulted in Britain, France, and other European nations extending
trade credits, technological transfers, and diplomatic recognition to
what they assumed would quickly evolve into a non-Communist
Soviet Union. "They were of course deceived," Rocca said, tapping
out his pipe. It was clear that the seminar on the Trust was coming
to an end.
"But what about Nosenko?" I asked, still trying to understand
how this half-century-old deception could connect to the Kennedy
assassination. "Was he delivering some kind of disinformation
message?"
"I thought you only wanted a historical perspective," Rocca
shrugged. "I wasn't involved in operational cases like Nosenko."
He would not discuss the matter further. If I wanted an

answer, I
had to go back to Angleton.
Angleton invited me to Tucson, Arizona, later that month. He
suggested I might like to see "his desert."
I was surprised to find that Angleton lived in what amounted to
a private park in downtown Tucson. From the porch of his ranch
house, one couldn't see another house or sign of the city. He
proudly showed me the furniture which he had himself designed
and built; he had even commissioned the recording of the music on
the stereo he had made. He evidently enjoyed designing his own
world.
I told him that I had not been allowed to see Nosenko again. I
had submitted Angleton's thirteen questions to him through the
medium of Jamie Jameson, but had not received a reply.
"You never will," Angleton predicted confidently. "It is not part
of his brief." We sat on his terrace. Looking into the darkness, he
told me that had I arrived earlier, while it was still light, I

could
have seen the Superstition Mountains. He then proceeded to sketch
out for me with his finger, peak by peak, the view I might have
seen.
There were numerous fireflies blinking their lights in the distance.
Calling my attention to them, he pointed out that the female
firefly uses a sort of Morse code of flashes to signal males of their
availability. He then added, lest I assume it was a chance
observation, "Of course one can't be sure it's a firefly." He explained
that the assassination beetle, which was the firefly's natural
predator, had learned over time to replicate this code of flashes.
"The firefly responds to this mating call, and instead of finding a
mate ... is devoured by a beetle." It was part of the war of disinformation.
This was a subject that Angleton had been grappling with for a
quarter of a century, and which he wanted to discuss. "The essence
of disinformation is provocation, not lying." The

assassination
beetle did not lie when it sent out its flashes of light—
they were
what they appeared to be—but it nevertheless provoked
the firefly,
keyed to responding to this signal, into flying into the
fatal trap.
Angleton saw this as neither moral nor immoral in itself.
He
pointed out that when a homeowner leaves his lights on in
his
absence to ward off burglars, he is not falsifying reality;
he is
trying to protect himself by provoking, through this
signal,
potential thieves into assuming that the house is occupied.
"When
disinformation becomes the art of the state, as in the case
of the
Trust," he continued, "nations use their intelligence
services to
paint, brush stroke by brush stroke, a picture that will
provoke its
adversaries to make the wrong judgments." This "state
art"
involved intelligence services in the job of giving away
selected
secrets to the enemy. He suggested, "In peacetime,

disinformation
might be the chief job of an intelligence service."
I asked whether planting defectors was part of this job. Was this
how Nosenko fit in?
"What you must understand is that dangles, false defectors, false
flags are only part of the problem." He abruptly came to the point:
false defectors were only the outside men who transmitted the
messages. "A deception is a complex organism ... to sustain it, the
deceiver needs feedback. He must enter the mind of the victim."
He explained that for deception to succeed, intelligence services
had not only to pass disinformation, which was "the easy part," but
to determine if it was being accepted or rejected, and, if held in
abeyance, what additional messages were required to make it more
credible.
This latter task required what Angleton called a "penetration" of
this adversary's intelligence service. Such a penetration was usually

a mole, or an intelligence officer who had been recruited years
before and maneuvered into a position where he had access to the
"mind" of his intelligence service—the unit that evaluated foreign
intelligence.
It now was becoming apparent why the Nosenko case was such a
sensitive subject in the CIA. If he had been a pawn in a grand
Soviet disinformation scheme, it would suggest that the KGB had
also established one or more "inside men," or moles, in American
intelligence who could feed back to the KGB the CIA's
assessments of the case. The question of Nosenko thus involved far
more than the credibility of his information about Lee Harvey
Oswald.
The connection between deception and penetration proved to be
of more than hypothetical interest to Angleton. It had caused him
great pain early in his intelligence career. Over the course of the
next two days, he told me of how he had been introduced

into this
special universe of deception by Kim Philby.

CHAPTER THREE
Kim and Jim

Jim met Kim on a rainy day in early October 1949 at Harvey's
Seafood House in downtown Washington, only a few blocks from
his office at the CIA. He had fleetingly known Philby during his
counterintelligence training in London five years ago, and he
barely recognized the haggard but still handsome man who was
now reputed to be the West's top expert on anti-Soviet intelligence.
Angleton had been extensively briefed at the CIA on him. Harold
Adrian Russell Philby had been born on New Year's Day, 1912, in
Ambala, India. His father, Harry St. John Philby, a British
administrator in India, called him Kim after the character in the
book by Rudyard Kipling. Philby went to school at Westminster in

London, where he was captain of the school, as his father had been.
Then, at the age of seventeen, he went on to Trinity College,
Cambridge, where he graduated with honors in 1933. He worked as
a special correspondent for The Times in Spain during the Civil
War, and then covered the British Expeditionary Force in France
before it was evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940. In February 1941,
he joined MI6, the British espionage service, where he was put in
charge of counterintelligence for the Iberian Peninsula, evaluating
the credibility of the reams of intelligence from German diplomats
in Spain and Portugal. Here he had remarkable success exposing
German ruses and double agents. When MI6 revived its anti-Soviet
unit,"Section IX," toward the end of the war, Philby was chosen to head
its counterintelligence staff. Working against Soviet intelligence
officers in Europe and Turkey, Philby demonstrated an almost

unerring ability to spot phony approaches by Soviet diplomats and
military officers. Over and over again he was proven right by the
subsequent actions of the Soviets. In light of this string of
triumphs, Philby became head of the anti-Soviet section.
As the Cold War heated up, he also was placed in charge of the
effort to coordinate anti-Soviet activities with the United States and
Canada. He would take over the duties as liaison between MI6, on
the one hand, and the CIA, FBI, and Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, on the other. Angleton, who had himself only returned from Europe three
months earlier, had also become a leading specialist in counterintelligence.
As one of a small elite group of recruits from Yale, Harvard, and Princeton who were handpicked to learn the most
arcane part of espionage, counterintelligence, he had risen rapidly
through the ranks of X-2. By the end of the war, at the age of
twenty-seven, he had become the youngest division chief in X-2.
He was responsible for counterintelligence for all of Italy,

and was
singled out by William Donovan, the Director of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) as its star counterintelligence officer.
After the OSS was dissolved, Angleton remained in a holding unit
called the Central Intelligence Group, which became, in July 1947,
the core of the newly formed CIA. When Colonel Donald H.
Galloway created a "Soviet Division" that November to recruit
Communist diplomats as sources, and organized other espionage
activities, Angleton became his special assistant. His job involved
maintaining 3 by 5 cards in the registry on those diplomats who,
because of their possible collaboration with the Nazis or other
problems in their past, were potential candidates for recruitment.
To do this job, he maintained close relations with top officers in
French, Italian, and West German intelligence. He also served as
station chief in Rome.

In May 1949, at the age of thirty-one, Angleton returned to
Washington to take over, among other things, the liaison with other
Allied intelligence services. Since the CIA still relied heavily on
the British, French, Germans, and other "partners" to do much of
the recruitments and covert actions in postwar Europe, these so-called
liaisons were the very mechanism through which the CIA organized the secret war against Soviet Russia.
Angleton thus had much in common with his luncheon partner.
They both had been educated in England, spent much of their life
abroad, and had similar literary and epicurean tastes. They liked
English poetry, French wine, German music, and discussing
cabbages and kings. They both also shared a common interest in a
field that few outsiders knew existed: anti-Soviet counterintelligence.
Angleton also knew from that morning's briefing that Philby's
assignment to Washington was anything but routine. Philby was

not just another British intelligence executive furloughed to
America; he was, as MI6 had informed the CIA, next in line to
head the British Secret Service. His mission was temporary but
critical. It concerned what was to be the major, though secret,
American initiative of that era.
With the Cold War reaching a glacial impasse after the Communist
coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the U.S. government, with
bipartisan support in Congress, had committed itself to rolling back
Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Yet it wanted to achieve this
strategic objective by means short of war, which meant covert
action. The mechanism for undertaking this secret offensive was
the so-called Office of Policy Coordination, which was the CIA's
paramilitary arm, staffed by former OSS and Army subversion
experts, and headed by Frank Wisner. It was charged by the
President with developing anti-Communist undergrounds

in
Communist countries in Eastern Europe. They would have their
own guerrilla forces, saboteurs, and political front groups — all
orchestrated and coordinated by the CIA. They would be used to disrupt communications, paralyze the economy, harass
Soviet forces, provoke general strikes and, through this orchestrated
dissidence, undermine Soviet control.
Britain, with its half-century experience in East European espionage
and its control over emigre groups in exile, was to be America's silent partner in this ambitious undertaking. MI6 would
furnish what agents and other intelligence assets it had still
operating in Eastern Europe, and help coordinate their activities
with those of the CIA. And it had thus provided its best and
brightest—Kim Philby—to work directly with the American policy
planners.
The centerpiece of the offensive was the underground in Poland,
which was called WIN, the acronym in Polish for

"Freedom and
Independence." Earlier that year, its representatives had made
contact with Polish emigres in London; WIN claimed that it had
wide support in Poland and could now mobilize thirty thousand
guerrilla fighters. It had become, in this respect, the successor to
the Polish Home Army that had bitterly fought the Germans to a
standstill in 1944.
Although Wisner's Office of Policy Coordination was at first
skeptical of these claims, WIN gradually provided concrete evidence
of its ability to undertake guerrilla actions. It attacked police
stations, blew up military installations, and even fought a pitched
battle against Soviet tanks—the aftermath of which could be
documented by photographs. Wisner insisted that all WIN needed
was antitank weapons "to drive the Red Army out of Warsaw."
Then WIN began smuggling out of Poland reports and documents

revealing the Soviet order of battle and its military capabilities in
Eastern Europe. This intelligence apparently came from WIN
moles inside the Defense Ministry.
By the time Philby had arrived in Washington, the CIA's Office
of Policy Coordination had begun parachuting arms and gold coins
into WIN. It was also pressing British intelligence to get the Polish
government-in-exile in London to fully support WIN as its inside
arm in Poland, and to help put all its agents into
direct contact with its operatives. Other dissident movements in the
Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Albania, and Hungary would be used
to divert and distract Soviet attention from the main target: Poland.
That, at least, was the plan at the time of the lunch at Harvey's.
Philby, after gossiping briefly about their old colleagues in
London and his rough crossing of the Atlantic on the S.S. Caronia
the week before, began complaining about his first order of business.

He called it "vetting the old Nazis." He explained that he had
been given, among his other duties, the dirty job of checking
through the files and locating the group of German counterintelligence
officers who had been secretly relocated in Canada.
These men were of great importance to the planned offensive in
Eastern Europe because they had the only available pool of
potential agents. They were Polish and other Eastern European
citizens who had been secretly turned into informers during the
German occupation. Many had betrayed their comrades in the
resistance to save their own lives, and, under German aegis,
elevated themselves in the Communist underground. Some had
been exposed, and were presumably dead or in prison, but others,
who had managed to conceal their deadly secret, had gone on to
work for the Communist regimes in their countries. Since they now
could be possibly coerced into cooperating—or else face

the
consequences of exposure—they could be reactivated as agents (so
long as the Soviets did not also find out). These "assets" could then
be employed to help WIN and other undergrounds stage an
effective uprising. Philby was on his way to see the Royal Mounted
Police, which would presumably put him in touch with, or at least
furnish the records of, the cadre of Hitler's ex-intelligence officers
in Canada.
Over the course of the next eighteen months, Angleton continued
to lunch with Philby on a weekly basis—sometimes at
Harvey's, sometimes at the Army and Navy Club. By this time,
Philby had been appointed as the British representative to the
Special Policy Committee, which assessed the general progress of
the covert action offensive in Eastern Europe, and its intelligence
product, and he recounted the problems it was encountering— as if
Angleton was not himself fully apprised of these

developments.

For his part, Angleton couldn't help being amused by Philby's waspish humor about naive Americans and his cynical view of world politics. At times, Philby got down to business by presenting questions about CIA activities of interest to MI6; and, as CIA liaison, it was Angleton's job to give him answers for his service (unless the information was specifically embargoed from the British). They also discussed the more general problem of intelligence: guarding against deception. It was a very friendly relationship.

Meanwhile, the CIA was building up the capacity of WIN to challenge Soviet power. The ex-German counterintelligence officers, many of whom had been vetted by Philby, provided a long list of their candidates with hidden pasts in Poland and other satellite countries, and many of them were duly recruited by the CIA and put in contact with WIN and other Balkan

undergrounds.

The Agency also parachuted in special clandestine radios for WIN
to transmit messages back to CIA bases in Germany—and
sophisticated explosives and timers for its sabotage targets. Field
reports suggested that WIN controlled entire regions, and its "home
army" was growing every day. With help from its British
colleagues, the CIA marshaled virtually the entire Polish emigre
movement abroad in support of WIN. In return, WIN sent back so
much intelligence that the CIA had to set up a special unit to
process it. These fragmentary bits of data, as they were fitted
together and analyzed, strongly suggested that Stalin, who was in
trouble in Russia, was rapidly losing his grip on the Soviet
satellites.

In the late spring of 1951, however, the CIA was thrown into
turmoil. The problem began when the Army Security Agency
accidentally obtained part of a Soviet World War II code book, and

found that the Soviets had reused the same ciphers, appar-
ently having run short of code books. This unexpected break
allowed Army codebreakers to decipher sporadic Soviet messages
sent from Moscow to its embassy in Washington. They contained
shocking evidence that U.S. secrets that had been given to the
British had been passed on to Soviet intelligence. The leak emanated
directly from the British Embassy—and had continued into
the postwar years. In a series of tense meetings in the Shore-ham
Hotel, attended by representatives of the FBI, CIA, Army Security
Agency, and the British security service, MI5, British officials
admitted that a British diplomat who had served in Washington in
1945 was suspected of being a Soviet agent. His name was Donald
Maclean, and he was scheduled to be interrogated.
Then, three weeks later, on May 25, 1951, Maclean disappeared
from London. He turned up in Moscow a few days afterwards with

another former British intelligence officer, Guy Burgess. Both
Burgess and Maclean were Soviet spies. Further, Burgess had been
living in Philby's house in Washington—at the time Philby was
told of the investigation. After re-analyzing the Soviet messages,
both the CIA and the FBI became convinced that there had to be
someone else besides Maclean and Burgess, and that the third spy
was none other than Kim Philby.
As the pieces fitted together, British intelligence also came to
the conclusion that Philby had been the leak—although the evidence
was circumstantial at best, and the cryptographic evidence
could not be revealed. In August 1951, Philby was recalled to
London, and after an inconclusive interrogation, he was secretly
cashiered from MI6.
Angleton was temporarily stunned by this turn of events. If
Philby was indeed a mole, what had happened during the past
eighteen months? As CIA liaison, answering the wide

range of
queries put to him, Angleton had been Philby's source. The
implications were shattering. At the very minimum, the Soviets
would have been able to determine the CIA order of battle. They
would now know who was who in the world of American intel-
ligence, and they would have personality assessments of the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the major players. They would also
know a good deal about the CIA's most prized methods, and the
procedures it used for analyzing and checking reports from its
sources. And they would have learned about the inner workings of
its liaison relations, which Angleton was in charge of, with the
intelligence organization of Reinhard Gehlen, which had formerly
served Hitler, French counterintelligence, and the Italian security
service. He knew that many of these foreign connections, if made
public, were potentially embarrassing. And, of course,

Philby
entirely compromised British intelligence, which had been
America's mentor in the spy war.
Angleton was therefore not surprised by the problems that
began
to develop in the intelligence coming out of WIN. He had
reason to
suspect that WIN was another Trust. The facts it reported
about
Eastern Europe did not check out with intelligence
obtained
through aerial reconnaissance, communication intercepts,
and other
sources. Moreover, its claims of military victories became
less and
less plausible in light of other evidence. Emigre agents,
put in
contact with WIN, were also not heard from again; and
their radio
transmissions became increasingly suspect. Despite these
disturbing difficulties, WIN began in 1952 escalating its
requests
for weapons, radios, money, and names of agents it could
contact
in Poland. It even asked the CIA to parachute an
American general
into Poland to lead the uprising.
At this point, Angleton intervened, although he had no

authority
to do so. He went directly to General Walter Bedell
Smith, who
was then the Director of Central Intelligence, and told him
why, in
his opinion, American officers should not be air-dropped
into
Poland.
He reasoned that if Philby was a Soviet agent, as all the
evidence
now indicated, WIN and the other clandestine
undergrounds
that were being supplied by the Office of Policy
Coordination were
probably being run by Soviet intelligence— rather than by
dissidents. How could it be otherwise? Philby,
after all, knew all about the agents for this offensive that
had been
supplied by ex-German counterintelligence officers—he,
in fact,
had vetted the files—and therefore it had to be assumed
that the
identities of these agents were also known to the Soviets
by the
time the CIA was approached to assist WIN and the other
groups.
Under these circumstances, the Soviets would only allow
them to

help WIN if it was under Soviet control.

Bedell Smith listened carefully to Angleton, who was, among
other things, his trout-fishing partner. He then called in Frank
Wisner, who was still the driving force behind the covert action
offensive.

Wisner, even though he had been a rival of Angleton's, seemed
genuinely shaken by this logic. He clung nevertheless to the hope
that Philby had never conveyed the information to Soviet intelligence—
which, after all, was a possibility, since British counterintelligence
had not broken Philby. If so, Wisner argued, WIN
should still be viewed as a legitimate resistance organization. He
agreed, however, not to parachute in an American general.

But that December the question of WIN was definitively settled
in a way that shocked even Angleton. In a move that was reminiscent
of the purposeful blowing of the Trust twenty-three years
earlier, the Polish government told the story of WIN in a two-hour
radio broadcast. It explained that the real Polish Home

Army had
been eliminated by security forces in 1947. In its place had been
substituted the fictitious WIN, staffed by Communist officers. So
that there could be no doubt that WIN had been a deception from
the outset, the broadcast gave a full accounting of all the monies
and weapons that had been sent to WIN from the first contact on.
Then it went on to mock the CIA for its misplaced trust in this
sham organization. It turned out that Polish security forces had
staged mock battles, leaving burnt-out tank hulls to be photographed, to give WIN credibility. They had also taken over
and operated the clandestine radios that the CIA had supplied, and
used the CIA's gold coins to finance the deception.
By early 1953, the CIA determined that its agents had been
identified from the outset, and arrested or brought under control, as
were other true Polish dissidents who were lured into the trap by
this fake underground.

It gradually emerged that WIN was not the only such fraud. A
half-dozen other supposedly anti-Soviet undergrounds turned out
to be creatures of Soviet intelligence. Some of these groups, such
as the guerrilla army in the Carpathian Mountains in the Ukraine,
had been authentic resistance movements until they were
penetrated and eliminated by Soviet security forces. Others, such
as the Estonian resistance, had been created de novo to manipulate
exiles abroad.
The "intelligence" that WIN spoon-fed the CIA turned out, on
reexamination, to be disinformation, cleverly contrived to dovetail
with that from the other undergrounds and, in two cases, from
reports of false defectors. The purpose of the disinformation, as
Angleton now mirror-read it, was to distract the United States from
the real weaknesses in the Soviet system of control in Eastern
Europe, and to focus its attention as well as its limited intelligence

resources on fake weaknesses instead.

Wisner was shattered by the revelations about WIN. Clearly, his

Office of Policy Coordination had been led disastrously astray by

Soviet deception planners and, more important, neither he nor his

staff was able to recognize the deception—until the Poles had

publicly revealed it. Both Bedell Smith and his deputy Allen Welsh

Dulles now saw that Wisner's covert actions had been totally

manipulated by the Soviet Union.

Angleton was assigned the job of analyzing how Soviet intelligence

succeeded in falsifying a reality so completely. What were the conditions under which one side could fabricate dissident

groups and underground movements and sustain the illusion over

nearly four years? He brought in Ray Rocca, at this point, to

reconstruct the Trust—and the deceptions that followed.

When Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence in 1953,

he turned to Angleton, whom he had known since the days of

the OSS. Angleton, whose suspicions about WIN had proven to be
right, was given "No Knock" privileges—he could enter Dulles's
office any time, day or night, without prior appointment —and
assigned the job of organizing a unit, directly under the control of
the Director, which could guard against systematic Soviet deceptions such as WIN. The result was a new "counterintelligence
staff established in January 1954. At one level, it was to be a
liaison—the CIA's connection with a dozen other intelligence
services including the FBI, the National Security Agency, the
British Secret Service, French counterintelligence, and the Israeli
Mossad. At another level, it was given the responsibility for
keeping the CIA's central registry of foreign agents, and determining which of the double agents were "bona fide" sources.
But its true function, which not even many high executives in the
CIA were told about, was, as Angleton explained it, "to provide the

highest form of counterintelligence: a picture of the enemy's
thinking." Angleton became its chief. He had thus ascended to the
commanding heights of the CIA, while Philby went on to Beirut as
a journalist, and then, in 1963, facing further interrogation,
defected to Moscow, where he published a book, My Silent War,
finally admitting he had worked all along for Soviet intelligence.
Even as he told the story, Angleton seemed obsessed by the
deception perpetrated by his one-time friend. When I asked him
about Philby's book (in which he describes Angleton as "one of the
thinnest men I ever met, and one of the biggest eaters"), Angleton
replied: "Book? It was the final card played in the deception. Every
word was written under the strict control of the KGB, as were
those in the 'interviews' he gave journalists."
The idea of My Silent War, he explained, was to "further muddy
the waters." In reconstructing Philby's career with the

advantage of
hindsight, Angleton found that many of his successes against first
the Germans and then the Soviets proceeded from Philby's having
available to him secret information unavailable to other British
intelligence officers. The most likely
explanation, given what his connections turned out to be, was that
these successes had been provided by Soviet intelligence. In other
words, the Soviets had sacrificed agents and sources, like pawns in
a chess game, to advance Philby's rapid rise in British intelligence.
If so, his promotion to the head of Section IX, the center of anti-
Soviet espionage, and then his posting in Washington, involved far
more than the work of one man; it was part of a Soviet design. He
added: "If Philby could be moved into such positions by Soviet
intelligence, so could other of their agents."
Angleton also questioned Philby's boast about betraying the
Albanian anti-Communists who were infiltrated into

Albania under
the auspices of the CIA. Many of these dissidents were in fact
captured but, as Angleton determined, their organization had been
compromised, and penetrated by Soviet agents, well before Philby
was briefed on the operation. "By taking credit for a betrayal for
which he wasn't responsible, Philby again attempted to divert from
his real job in Washington."
This crucial mission was "feedback." Philby had not given away
WIN. It had been a creature of Soviet intelligence years before
Philby came to Washington. What Philby provided was feedback
about the CIA's reactions to it. Angleton explained that up until
"the Philby incident," he had never realized how vital feedback was
to sustaining a deception. Without their inside man, who reported
back on how the CIA was reacting to the activities of their bogus
undergrounds, Soviet deception planners could not have
continually modified their messages to keep them

credible. But

with Philby in place, they could accurately determine whether or

not the reports fed to the CIA were believed or not, and what

additions or revisions would make them credible. They could also

find out the preconceived picture that the CIA had of anti-Communist groups, and then fit their messages to it. "The point

was not that these movements were betrayed," Angleton said, "it

was that they were made credible to the CIA."

CHAPTER FOUR
The Nosenko Incubus

After nearly a year of research, I still had not resolved the mystery

of Nosenko, and the editors of Reader's Digest, who were financing

my research, were understandably concerned. I was spending far

more time questioning the authenticity of the firsthand source they

had provided than with the assassination case that was the subject

of my book. But the Digest's editor-in-chief, Edward

Thompson, to
his credit was willing to proceed with the Nosenko
investigation,
even if it discredited another Digest book for which
Nosenko
provided information. Still, he wanted some reassurance
from
someone, other than Angleton, that it was not a wild-
goose chase.
I suggested Richard M. Helms. Helms, who had been the
director of the CIA's clandestine operations at the time of
the
Nosenko defection and then Director of the Central
Intelligence
Agency, had certainly been in a position to clear up the
confusion.
Thompson agreed. The only problem was that Helms was
then
Ambassador to Iran, and in Teheran.
I had been introduced to Helms three years earlier at a
diplomatic
reception at his residence in Teheran. At the time, I found
him to be an elegant man with a quiet voice, who could
come right
to the point. Helms told me, moments after I met him, "I
know
you're a journalist but please don't ask me about the CIA."
Toward

the end of the evening, as I lingered in the
doorway, he said, "Please feel free to either stay and have a brandy
or leave—but don't ooze in the doorway." I remained for another
hour, and listened to his shrewd analysis of the political situation in
Iran.
Now I needed to discuss with him the subject he had previously
embargoed, and I knew that it was one of the CIA's most sensitive
cases—one that impinged directly on the Kennedy assassination.
When I called him and told him that I needed to ask him about the
Nosenko affair, I expected him to politely hang up. Instead, he
suggested I come to Teheran.
Helms then cabled me: "Would be delighted to see you in
Teheran but must confess my memory has become decidedly hazy
on matters in which you are interested. I can give you leads to
other individuals if that would be helpful, but I don't want to
mislead you into thinking I am a treasure trove while in Teheran

with no documents from the past." He also invited me to stay at the
embassy residence.
It was a long flight, and, with resistance to the Shah's rule increasing every day, the embassy compound was surrounded by
an army of Iranian troops. After a leisurely dinner in his residence
with Helms and his wife Cynthia, we went to his study to talk
about Nosenko.
I told him that I had interviewed Nosenko—and that it had
apparently been arranged by the CIA. I explained the problems I
had had with his story about Oswald.
Helms shook his head, visibly distressed that this case was
resurfacing. He said that the CIA "had no business giving you
Nosenko in this way." He assumed (correctly) that Nosenko had
been given a carefully rehearsed brief by the CIA to pass on to me.
This message-passing might, he feared, reopen "old wounds"
within the intelligence community.
"Angleton's?" I asked. I told him about my conversations

with
Angleton, and the thirteen questions he had dictated to me. "He
insists that Nosenko did not get his bona fides."
"It goes much deeper." There was pain in his voice as he
recalled the case. In June 1964, Helms said, "Nosenko's reliability
was key to determining what the KGB had to do with Oswald."
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy knew this, as did Chief
Justice Earl Warren, who was considering calling Nosenko as a
witness before the Commission he headed on President Kennedy's
assassination. This added tremendous urgency to the situation.
Finally, Helms went to see the Chief Justice in his chambers. It was
a private meeting with no notes taken. He warned Warren then that
there were two schools of thought on Nosenko within the CIA. The
first held that he was a legitimate defector and could be believed
about Oswald; the second held that he was still a KGB agent, under
instructions to misinform the Commission about Oswald.

Until the
matter was resolved, he advised the Chief Justice not to see
Nosenko—or base any of his conclusions on his information.
Warren nodded his assent.
The Warren Commission issued its report without referring to
Nosenko, but that did not end the matter. Helms said, with a crack
of real anguish in his voice, "It hung over the CIA like an incubus."
I thought over his simile a moment. An incubus, in folklore, is
an evil spirit that descends on a woman while she is fast asleep and
has sexual intercourse with her—without her being aware of the
rape. Was he suggesting at some level that Nosenko had caught the
CIA unaware?
"All I am saying is the case was a nightmare—a nightmare that
still won't go away." He explained that just before I had called him,
he had had a visit from a CIA officer named John Hart, who told
him he was reinvestigating "the Nosenko affair." He

wanted,
twelve years after Nosenko's defection, to settle the case.
"What did you tell him?" I asked.
"Just what I'm going to tell you," he answered, with a smile. "I
have no memory of the details of the case." He paused, watching
my face drop. Then he said, more sympathetically, "You'll have to
speak to the officers who actually handled it." He jotted
down a number of names on a piece of paper. "See them. If you
can make sense of what they say, it's more than we did."
At the top of Helms's list was Tennent Peter Bagley. It was a
name I had not heard before.
Helms explained that Pete Bagley had been one of the most
promising officers in the CIA, the "golden boy" of its all-important
Soviet Bloc Division, which recruits spies. At the age of thirty, he
had become deputy director of his division, and was being
considered a candidate to be a future Director of Central
Intelligence.
"That was when he arranged Nosenko's defection from
Switzerland." Bagley became Nosenko's case officer and chief

interrogator.

I asked what had happened to Bagley.

"I understand he has retired from the Agency," Helms cryptically

concluded. He wrote down an address for me in Brussels; he

said Hart had given it to him.

When I returned to New York, I immediately sent a letter to

Bagley explaining that Helms had suggested I speak to him about

Nosenko. When he did not reply, I sent him a follow-up note, then

a cable. Weeks went by, and the deadline for the book drew nearer.

Finally, I phoned his home number. His wife answered, and told

me courteously that he would not return the call or speak to me—

ever.

I had given up on Bagley when I received a phone call from a

stranger, which provided me with an unexpected bargaining chip.

The stranger was William C. Sullivan, the former Assistant

Director of the FBI, in charge of counterespionage investigations.

He was a man imbued with hatred for J. Edgar Hoover, who had
not only fired him in 1971 but humiliated him by locking him out
of his office.
Sullivan explained on the phone that he had been told about my
investigation by a Digest editor, and that he knew "some
background on the Nosenko case" he believed I might find useful.
I met Sullivan, as he requested, at a coffee shop in a large and

anonymous shopping mall in Boxboro, Massachusetts. I had no
difficulty recognizing him.
As he walked toward the table with a distinct limp, I could see
that he was a wreck of a man. Since leaving the FBI he had had
two serious car accidents from which, he said, he had not fully
recovered. He also had been given a "rough time" by the Church
Committee in its grueling hearings on the FBI's domestic counterintelligence
program, which he had headed. Here was another

ruined career, I thought, as he bitterly told how Hoover had turned
him into the FBI's "fall guy."
Sullivan traced his "problem with Hoover" back to an investigation
he had conducted of possible Soviet manipulation of the
FBI's counterespionage staff in the late 1960s. He explained that it
had all begun in the winter of 1962 when two Soviet diplomats
stationed at the United Nations in New York separately approached
American diplomats. Both men were Soviet intelligence officers,
working under diplomatic cover. Both said that they had been
unable to fulfill their espionage missions and were therefore in
grave potential trouble with their superiors in Soviet intelligence.
Each then offered to betray their country in return for the eventual
opportunity to defect to the United States.
When these approaches were brought to his attention, Sullivan
suspected that they might be Soviet "dangles," who had made their
contacts at the behest and under the control of the KGB.

"It all
seemed too pat, too contrived," he explained.
Nevertheless, Hoover
decided to accept their offer and use them as double
agents, which
meant that, while nominally continuing to spy for Soviet
intelligence in the United States, they would secretly
report all
these activities to the FBI. The first of these volunteers
was codenamed
"Fedora," the second "Top Hat."
Both Fedora and Top Hat then asked the FBI to help them
answer the questionnaires supplied to them by Moscow
—which
meant that the FBI had to do their espionage for them in
order to
help them maintain their credibility in the eyes of their
superiors.
To "play out this game," as Sullivan put it, Hoover had
to give each of them American sources who could provide
them
with classified military documents. These "notional
agents," as
they are called in the intelligence business, are fictitious
sources
who are in a plausible position to copy and pass on
classified
documents needed to fulfill the spies' questionnaires. The

data were
then cleared by a special interagency review board, which decided
what secrets the United States could afford to give away to the
KGB. At first, the data were "chicken feed," but gradually Fedora
and Top Hat began pressing for increasingly sensitive data,
claiming that any delay or false information would make Moscow
suspicious of their performance.
The game was getting out of control, as far as Sullivan was
concerned. Hoover was becoming dependent on the suspect intelligence
these two Soviets were providing, and was even taking
some of Fedora's tidbits directly to the President. Convinced that
they were phony through the result of various surveillance techniques,
Sullivan recommended that rather than furnishing them
with more U.S. secrets, the contacts be terminated. Again, he was
overruled. "Fedora and Top Hat went on for another five years
misleading us," he said gruffly. "All because Hoover wouldn't

admit he had been duped."

I listened with great interest as Sullivan described the curious
relationship that had developed between the FBI office and the
KGB in New York. The FBI, by making the convenient assumption
that Fedora and Top Hat were ultimately working under
its control, could take credit for having developed two major spies;
the KGB, meanwhile, could get the FBI to do much of its illicit
research for it, by merely forwarding the questions it wanted
answered. This game of deception reminded me of the scene in
Peter Ustinov's comedy Romanoff and Juliet, in which the Prime
Minister of a small European nation tells the Soviet Ambassador
that the United States knows about a secret operation. The Soviet
Ambassador replies, "We know they know." The Prime Minister
next tells the American Ambassador, "They know you know," and
he retorts, "We know they know we know."
He then returns to the Soviet Ambassador, who explains,

"We
know they know we know they know." When the
American hears
that, counting the levels of deception on his fingers, he
suddenly
throws his hands up in shock, and shouts, "What? They
know
that..."
But I still did not see what connection there was between
Fedora
and Top Hat, who contacted the FBI in New York in
1962, and
Yuri Nosenko, who had defected to the CIA in Geneva in
1964.
Finally, I asked Sullivan, "How does Nosenko fit in?"
He shook his head as if I had missed the central point.
"Don't
you understand? They were part and parcel of the same
thing.
That's what got Hoover in an uproar." He explained that
when
Nosenko defected in Geneva, Fedora gave the FBI
specific details
about the reaction of the KGB that tended to corroborate,
point by
point, Nosenko's story. Sullivan reasoned that if Fedora
was
providing the FBI with information on behalf of the KGB,

as he
assumed was the case, then the KGB was deliberately attempting
to make Nosenko seem credible. Since the KGB would have no
interest in helping Nosenko if he was a traitor, Sullivan concluded
that he was "another dangle."
When Sullivan informed Hoover about this development, and
that the CIA had prepared a set of forty-four questions about
Oswald aimed at exposing Nosenko, Hoover "blew his top." He
ordered Sullivan not to pursue the Fedora issue any further, and,
protesting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence that the
FBI was the agency charged with investigating the Kennedy
assassination, Hoover prevented Bagley from asking Nosenko
these questions. Sullivan concluded, "As far as I know, the coverup
is still going on."
That was the last time I saw Sullivan. He was killed six months
later when a hunter, apparently mistaking him for a deer,

shot him
in a wood near his home.
The Fedora story was exactly the revelation I needed to interest
Bagley in seeing me. I therefore made one final effort to get his
side of the story by sending him a specially prepared
outline of the Nosenko chapter, prominently mentioning Fedora's
role. I also enclosed a copy of the list of Bagley's forty-four
unasked questions that I had got under the Freedom of Information
Act after Sullivan told me of their existence. In the covering note, I
informed him that I would be in Brussels the following month, and
asked him to contact me at my hotel.
When I arrived in Brussels, I was relieved to see that Fedora—
or the questionnaire—had apparently done the trick. There was a
message from Bagley. He proposed meeting me the next day at the
Waterloo battlefield outside of Brussels. He said he would be
standing in front of the circular mural in the museum.
I had no trouble recognizing Bagley from Helms's

description of
him. He was a rugged, good-looking man in his early fifties. As we
walked around the battlefield, he told me about his life. He was born in 1925, one of three sons in a prominent family in
North Carolina. His two elder brothers both were fleet admirals in
the U.S. Navy, and his cousin had served as a press secretary to
President Roosevelt.
After serving three years in the Marines during the war, he then
graduated from Princeton University, and went on to get a Ph.D. in
political science at the University of Geneva in Switzerland. In
1950, he joined the CIA. He was assigned to the Soviet Division,
which, at the heart of the CIA's espionage activity, had the job of
recruiting Soviet citizens as American spies. Here he became a top
recruiter, leading a team of Soviet specialists to international
conferences or wherever a potentially vulnerable Soviet diplomat
could be approached. By 1962, he had been put in charge

of the
division's counterintelligence, and in 1965, he had become deputy
director of the division. That was his high point. Even though he
still looked in his prime, he had retired from the CIA five years
earlier—at the age of forty-seven.
He showed an impressive grasp of Napoleon's order of battle,
taking me from position to position, and explaining the futility of
Napoleon's last stand. He then turned to me, and said with
what appeared to be carefully calculated naivete that he did not
understand the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that secret
documents could be released to an outsider was "inconceivable."
He expressed indignation that the CIA would make available the
questionnaire, especially since it identified him by name.
He told me he had read the Nosenko outline I had sent him. He
then added abruptly, "You've got it wrong."
"In what way?" I asked, trying to open up the discussion.
"Unfortunately, I can't tell you anything more."
I then asked him why John Hart was reinvestigating the

case.

Why had he seen Helms? And why had he been to Brussels?

He glared at me for a moment, then acknowledged that Hart had been to see him, but added, "I threw him out of my room." If this was all he had to tell me, I wondered why he met me at all. Trying again, I suggested that he might point out the error I had made.

"If I told you that, I'd have to tell you everything," he answered.

He then said matter-of-factly that he had made a reservation at the Villa Lorraine, a very expensive three-star restaurant outside of Brussels. He asked if I would like to join him. I again assumed he had more to tell me, and accepted.

At dinner, he apologized for not being able to correct my error. He explained: "Nosenko was not just another case. It was at the heart of everything that happened at the CIA for a decade."

He seemed still obsessed—and angered—by Nosenko. I asked if

he would be interested in seeing other material on the case that had

been released under the Freedom of Information Act.
He couldn't resist the offer. It had been, after all, his case. He

suggested that we meet the following day in a medieval nunnery at

Bruges, thirty miles west of Brussels, and asked me to bring the

entire Nosenko file.

It was as quiet a place as one could find. As I wandered around

the cloisters looking at the stonework, Bagley sat on a bench,

efficiently speed-reading through the file. When he finished, he

handed it back, and whispered, with a bit of melodrama: "I've made

my decision." He tersely explained that from what he had seen, the

case had "already been blown." He further believed that it had been

"selectively" released to me in such a way that it might permanently "confuse the record." Since he realized I was going to

publish the Nosenko story, he had a duty to make sure it didn't

have "egregious errors" in it. As it would take some time

to
reconstruct the case, he suggested that I find a "discreet location"
for our future meetings.
I rented a house in the village of Gassin in southern France.
Bagley arrived a week later and stayed for six days. After making
all these arrangements, I wanted to know what the error was that I
had made.
He replied: "Where you went wrong was that you assumed that
it was after Kennedy had been assassinated in November 1963 that
Nosenko first contacted the CIA."
I rechecked my notes, mystified by his point. The date I had
been given was January 23, 1964, nine weeks after the assassination.
I had assumed that Nosenko had contacted the CIA because
of what he knew about the assassin—Oswald. I answered
defensively, "That is what I was told by Angleton."
He shot back, "Angleton omitted telling you that Nosenko was
supposedly working for us before the assassination. He was our

man in Moscow." He added, "I should know, I recruited him." That
was the missing piece—or at least one of them.
Bagley's story began in Switzerland in the summer of 1962.
Officially, he was the Second Secretary at the American Embassy
in Berne; unofficially, he was a CIA case officer, working in the
Soviet Russia Division. In it, he headed the recruitment team that
went after REDTOPS. REDTOPS were Soviet diplomats, military
attaches, intelligence officers, or other government officials who
were traveling through or temporarily stationed in
the West. Bagley's mission was to arrange for these REDTOPS to
be approached by a so-called access agent, usually some diplomat
with a plausible excuse to meet them. Once contact was
established, he would then use other agents to induce or persuade
them to steal secrets for the CIA when they returned to the Soviet
Union. It was not an easy job.
On June 8, he got an urgent call from Geneva. A Soviet security

officer named Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, who was at the
Disarmament Conference there, had passed a note to an
American
diplomat at the meeting. It said only that he wanted to be
put in
touch with a "representative" of the U.S. government,
which meant
the CIA.
Bagley caught the next plane to Geneva. Working through
the
American diplomat, he passed a message back to
Nosenko
containing only a time and an address. The address was
that of a
"safe house" that the CIA maintained in Geneva for just
such a
contingency. It was a small apartment with a terrace in an
inconspicuous block of flats that would be used only for
Nosenko,
and then abandoned.
As he waited for Nosenko to show up, Bagley was joined
in the
apartment by another case officer in the Soviet Division,
George
Kisvalter. Kisvalter, who was born in Russia, spoke
perfect
Russian. He had just flown in that afternoon from
Washington to

assist Bagley with the interrogation.

Nosenko arrived about an hour and a half late, claiming that he

had to make sure he wasn't followed. He was a powerfully built

man, about six feet tall, with a massive jaw. He acted very

professionally, and, without any resistance, rattled off answers to

the questions as if he were there for a job interview. He also

seemed to know that it was being taped.

The first question was mandated by CIA regulations for all

REDTOPS. Kisvalter asked Nosenko whether he knew of any

imminent Soviet plans to launch a military attack.

Nosenko smiled, as if he was expecting the question, then shook

his head.

He was next asked why he had contacted the CIA. Hostile

intelligence services previously had sent "dangles" to the CIA, as

the secret Central Intelligence Directive on Defectors warned, "to

penetrate or convey false or deceptive information to U.S. Intelligence services."

Nosenko replied that his motive was economic. He had spent

900 Swiss francs (or about $200) of KGB funds on a drinking
binge and needed to replace it. In return, he offered to furnish the
CIA with a KGB manual on its techniques for following Western
diplomats in Moscow. He said it would explain how the KGB had
caught one of the CIA's top agents.
Bagley then asked Nosenko if he wanted to defect to the West.
If he did, crash arrangements would have to be made to get him out
of Geneva.
Nosenko again said no. He had no intention of defecting; he had
a wife and children in Moscow to whom he planned to return. He
only wanted 900 Swiss francs.
This was the answer Bagley hoped to hear. The object of the
exercise was not to encourage REDTOPS to defect but to get them
to spy for the CIA. He handed Nosenko the 900 francs. He
explained to Nosenko, who had already shown an interest in
money, that the CIA would pay him handsomely if he

assisted
them by supplying information. He would, for example, be given
an additional $25,000 for every Soviet source in the West his
information helped to expose. The money could be deposited in a
Swiss account for whenever he eventually decided to defect. He
would, moreover, be given assistance in getting his family out of
Russia.
Nosenko betrayed no emotional reaction at this offer to commit
treason. He shrugged and said he would consider it.
Bagley still didn't know with whom he was dealing. In response
to his "flash" cable, CIA files had no information, or "traces," on
Nosenko. The only Nosenko in them was Ivan Nosenko, the Soviet
Minister of Shipbuilding and a member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, who had died six years earlier.
Nosenko explained that he was Ivan Nosenko's son. He had
been born October 20, 1927, in Nikolaev, Russia, and, as the son of

a minister, had attended the elite Frunze Military Academy. In
1953, after serving briefly in naval intelligence, he joined the
KGB. He was assigned to its Second Chief Directorate, which had
the primary responsibility for recruiting foreigners in Russia and
mounting counterintelligence initiatives against the West. He
worked in both its "American Department," which attempted to
recruit U.S. Embassy employees in Moscow, and the "Tourist
Department," which attempted to recruit American tourists in
Russia. He had been given the Geneva duty to watch over the
Soviet delegation purely as a perk.

Bagley immediately realized that Nosenko, if his story checked
out, was an incredible catch. Not only was he the son of a hero of
the Soviet Union—Khrushchev himself had been a guard of honor
at Ivan Nosenko's funeral bier—but he was in a key section of a
part of the KGB which the CIA knew virtually nothing

about—the
Second Chief Directorate. Until two years before, the CIA had not
even known of its existence. No one had ever been recruited from
this directorate before. If Nosenko now could be induced to go
back to Moscow and work as an "agent in place," the CIA would
have a mole in the heart of KGB counterintelligence.
As the debriefing proceeded, Nosenko provided a wealth of
clues to identify Soviet agents in the United States and England.
He also revealed how the KGB had planted microphones in the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He then left two hours after he arrived,
and, as Bagley watched, he vanished into the night.
Two days later, he returned for another session. This time he
brought with him the promised documents on surveillance. They
revealed that the KGB had a chemical substance to be sprayed on
the shoes of American diplomats in Moscow so that they could
be invisibly followed by surveillance teams with dogs.

Nosenko
then agreed to act as a mole for the CIA in Moscow (although he
refused to allow the CIA to contact him, because it would be too
dangerous).
On June 11, Bagley cabled the CIA in Washington: "Subject has
conclusively proved his bona fides. He has provided info of
importance and sensitivity. Willing to meet when abroad." The
CIA responded by providing Nosenko with a cryptonym —AE
FOXTROT. Bagley was authorized to provide AE FOXTROT with
a secret writing kit, a password, and a means of communicating
with the CIA. Four days later, Nosenko (or AE FOXTROT, as he
was now known in the CIA) returned to Moscow.
Bagley flew to Washington the next week believing he had
"hooked the biggest fish yet." When he arrived at CIA headquarters
that Saturday, he was personally commended by his superior,
David Murphy, the chief of the Soviet Division, who

believed
Nosenko's career in the KGB could be systematically advanced by
the CIA by arranging a string of dramatic successes in his
counterintelligence work. As his case officer, Bagley's career
would also be advanced.
Bagley also had a message that Angleton wanted to see him.
There had always been some tension between Angleton, who had
no "operational" responsibilities for agents but second-guessed
their value, and the division that actually ran and supported agents
in the Soviet Union. It was not unlike the competition that goes on
in a news magazine between reporters, who find sources, and fact
checkers, who question their reliability. Although Angleton had no
direct authority over him or the division, Bagley decided it would
be "politically wise" to see the counterintelligence staff chief right
away.
When he arrived at Angleton's office, Angleton handed him a

file to read, which he said pointedly was too sensitive to leave his

office. It concerned another REDTOP defector who had fled a

Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in 1961—a defector Bagley called

"Mr. X." Angleton suggested he review it before making any

further judgments about AE FOXTROT.

As he pored over it that June weekend, Bagley was astounded.

Each point in Nosenko's story paralleled information given by this

earlier defector. When the two stories were compared, it became

clear that Nosenko was a "provocation," sent to Bagley in Geneva

by the KGB to supply clues that would divert from and confuse the

intelligence the CIA already had from the real defector. The CIA

called the practice "painting false tracks." Bagley understood, even

before Angleton told him, that he had been duped by Nosenko.

Angleton seemed far less concerned about this turn of events. He

suggested that now the division knew it was dealing with

a KGB
"controlled source," it could use him to the CIA's
advantage. He
would be treated as a "mailbox," in which the CIA would
deposit
messages of its choosing for the KGB. As far as any
information
that came from AE FOXTROT (and presumably the
KGB), it
would be labeled disinformation.
Bagley returned to Switzerland crestfallen. The mole he
had
recruited turned out to be a Soviet plant. Whether or not
he would
reemerge was problematical.
Then, on November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was
assassinated.
Less than a week later, the CIA established that the
alleged
assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had attempted to contact
Soviet
intelligence in Moscow during his stay there. The
question was
asked of CIA procedure experts: If Oswald had made
contact with
the KGB during that period, what unit of Soviet
intelligence would
have handled his case? The answer that came back was

the Second
Chief Directorate's Tourist Department. By coincidence, it was the
one unit in which the CIA had, on paper at least, an agent —AE
FOXTROT.
Some six weeks later, Nosenko sent a cable to an innocuous sounding
address in Europe. It was the prearranged signal that he had been given by the CIA. He indicated he would be arriving
in Geneva the following week, where he would again be acting as
the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. He
wanted a meeting with "George," the name by which he knew
Bagley.
Bagley, now stationed in Washington, had risen to a central
position in the Soviet Division. He headed its counterintelligence
operations (which had no connection with Angleton's counterintelligence
staff), and he was slated to be the deputy chief of the
whole division. He still remained the case officer of the mystery
agent AE FOXTROT. As soon as Nosenko's signal was

flashed to
Washington, Bagley booked a flight to Geneva. He assumed the
rendezvous with Nosenko would lead to a few tidbits of
disinformation. He had no idea of what was in store for him.
On January 23, Nosenko sauntered into the safe house, taking
few precautions about security. He greeted Bagley like an old
friend. As he poured himself a drink, he casually told Bagley he
had made a "decision." Instead of returning to Russia, he would
defect to the United States.
Bagley was speechless. Even if he believed Nosenko were genuine,
CIA policy would be to discourage defections and to persuade
REDTOPS to return to the Soviet Union, where they could
do some good as spies. Since he believed Nosenko was controlled
by the KGB, such a defection would be ludicrous. But before
Bagley could question this decision, Nosenko brought up another
surprise—Lee Harvey Oswald. He reported that he had

information
about Oswald that could be crucial to the United States.
Bagley asked how he knew about Oswald.
Nosenko explained that he had been the KGB officer assigned to
Oswald's case when he arrived in Moscow. He was consulted on
Oswald after Oswald returned to the United States. Then, after the
assassination, he had been asked to read through Oswald's entire
KGB file and act for the KGB as a sort of inspector general in the
case. He in fact "signed off" on the case for the KGB. This put him
in a unique position: he could testify to the relationship between
Oswald and the KGB.
Bagley was totally unprepared for this turn of events. He didn't
believe Nosenko, but he had to forward his report to Washington.
He knew that Nosenko's claims of being Oswald's case officer
would set off "bells" in the CIA. The President might even have to
be briefed on the case. But there was nothing Bagley could do but

continue the interrogation session and hope that the label on the
file would alert headquarters to the danger of disinformation.
He asked the key question: What interest did the KGB have in
Oswald?
"It was decided Oswald was of no interest whatsoever, so the
KGB recommended he go home to the United States," Nosenko
answered.
Bagley listened keenly, as he tried to figure out Nosenko's game.
It appeared the KGB wanted its man in Washington. But why?
Changing the subject, he asked him why he now wanted to defect.
Nosenko had a ready answer. He said that he had come under
suspicion and feared he would be arrested if he returned to Russia.
He said he had just received a telegram ordering him to return to
Moscow on February 4. He had less than a week. He needed help
from the CIA.
When the transcript of this interrogation was cabled to

CIA
headquarters, Helms had no choice but to authorize a "crash"
defection for Nosenko. If he had done otherwise, the CIA could be
accused of suppressing potentially important evidence on the
Kennedy assassination; he was too proficient a bureaucrat to fall
into that trap. So Helms gave Bagley the "go" signal. He specified
Nosenko was to be taken out of Switzerland "black," without
revealing his identity to the Swiss, which meant that military
attache planes, not open to border inspection, would be used.
After a brief stop at the U.S. debriefing center in Frankfurt,
Nosenko arrived in Washington on a military transport on February
11, 1964. He was ensconced in a CIA safe house outside of
Washington. This was the easy part.
The issue was what to do with him. Bagley's investigators
quickly discovered that communications interceptions done by the
National Security Agency contradicted Nosenko's claim

that he had
received in Switzerland a recall cable from Moscow. Its analysis
showed that no Moscow telegram sent to Geneva on the day in
question had the correct number of characters. Moreover, CIA
document experts determined that Nosenko could not have held the
rank or position he claimed in the KGB and that the travel papers
he had in his possession had been concocted to give his defection
credibility. And, under interrogation, Nosenko admitted these
"mistakes."
The idea that these might be innocent errors might have been
entertained by Bagley—if it were not for Fedora. Bagley took the
fact that other KGB agents were going to great lengths to
corroborate Nosenko's story as a powerful indication that the KGB
was orchestrating the entire defection from Moscow. His chief,
David Murphy, agreed, after reviewing Nosenko's biography, that
it was most probably a "legend."

Murphy believed, moreover, that the KGB might have instructed
Nosenko to break away at his earliest opportunity and go to a
Soviet Embassy. He could then denounce the CIA for attempting to
kidnap him. He might even claim the CIA was attempting to
suppress his Oswald story. On February 17, less than a week after
Nosenko's arrival, Murphy wrote Helms: ". . . there is greater
evidence now I believe for the view that this operation is designed
for long-term goals of utmost importance to the Soviets. One of
these is probably a massive propaganda assault on the CIA in
which Subject, most probably as a 're-defected CIA agent,' will
play a major . . . role." In addition, he expressed concern that
Nosenko's mission also was the "penetration of our operational
effort," which could be accomplished by Nosenko's learning CIA
procedures, and the "protection of past or possibly existing

sources," which he could do by confusing ongoing investigations
with false clues. Because of all this damage that Nosenko could do,
Murphy recommended that preparations
should be made to imprison him to prevent him from redefect-ing.
He noted that "the big problem is one of timing: How long can we
keep subject, or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our awareness of
this operation?" At some point, Nosenko would have to be
confronted and broken through a process of "hostile interrogation."
Bagley knew that this inevitable confrontation was strongly
opposed by Angleton, who wanted to keep playing Nosenko and
his KGB controllers like a fish on a line. But while Angleton might
have inexhaustible patience, Murphy wanted results. Nosenko had
involved himself in the investigation of Oswald, which had brought
the issue of his status to the attention of the FBI, the Attorney
General, and the Warren Commission. Helms, with the
concurrence of the Department of Justice, had authorized

the
"hostile interrogation." It was only a matter of time.
To lull Nosenko into a false sense of confidence, the CIA
paid
him $60,000 for the information he supplied, began
making
arrangements for him to become a U.S. citizen, and even
sent him
on a vacation to Hawaii with Bagley. All the while he was
cavorting on the beach, the CIA was constructing a
"vault" for him
in the basement of what looked like a ranch house a few
miles
from downtown Washington.
Then, on April 4, 1964, Nosenko was strapped into a lie
detector.
It was all a carefully rehearsed drama designed to break
him. His interrogators told him over and over again that
his
answers were lies. He asked for Bagley. Bagley came in,
examined
the lie-detector results, then ordered him stripped and put
in a cell.
It was only the beginning of his ordeal.
Nosenko spent the next three and a half years in a
windowless
cell in solitary confinement. He was the prisoner of the
CIA. Day

and night, the light remained on in his eight-foot-square cell, with
guards keeping him under constant visual observation. Every three
or four days he was brought in front of interrogators and grilled
relentlessly about details of his story. As the weeks dragged on
without results, they tried various disorientation
techniques, such as gradually setting clocks back and manipulating
lighting conditions to convince him it was day when it was really
night, thereby confusing his sense of time. At one point, Bagley
was convinced that Nosenko was about to break and admit his
entire biography was a KGB invention. He muttered something
indicating that he could not have held any of the positions in the
KGB he had claimed to hold. Bagley held his breath, anticipating
that a full confession would follow. When it didn't, he repeated the
question. After a long pause, Nosenko replied, "You misunderstood me." He then pulled himself together and stuck

monotonously to his story.

The battle went on year after year—Bagley versus Nosenko.

Bagley set forth the case against Nosenko in a 900-page report in

1966. "But he never broke," Bagley said, as he ended his story.

Nosenko obviously was out of prison now. When I interviewed

him, he was cocky and in high spirits. Not only had the CIA sent

him to the Reader's Digest, but he said he was working for it as a

counterintelligence consultant. What had happened to transform

him, in the eyes of the CIA, from a provocateur on a KGB-directed

mission, who had been imprisoned, to an accredited defector?

Bagley answered glumly, "I wish I knew." He explained that in

late 1967 the Soviet Division was "restaffed." Murphy was

abruptly removed as chief and sent to Paris to be station chief

there. Bagley, who was then deputy chief, was not promoted;

instead, he was transferred to Belgium. Other top officers

who had
been involved in the Nosenko affair were also switched to other
divisions. In the months that followed, the entire case seemed to be
turned inside out. The insiders who had developed the indictment
against Nosenko were turned out; the outsiders came in. It all
happened without warning or explanation. Nosenko, who had been
the division's responsibility, was suddenly turned over to the CIA's
Office of Security.
Then, when John Hart came to see him, Bagley learned that
Nosenko had been "rehabilitated." He realized that Hart's job was
to rewrite the history of the case in order to expunge any suspicion
about Nosenko. He had come to see him to pressure him to recant,
which Bagley had refused to do. He then learned that the Office of
Security man who had handled Nosenko had received a CIA
medal.
"For what?" I interrupted.

"The whitewash," he answered bitterly.

It seemed that almost every intelligence official who had been
involved with the Nosenko case had had his career wrecked.
Angleton, Rocca, Sullivan, Bagley, Murphy: each had been fired or
forced into early retirement. The entire counterintelligence staff by
now had been scattered to the four winds. Some of these
investigators, I also learned, were themselves investigated for their
role in the affair. I wanted to know more about this purge
— if that
is what it was.

In the fall of 1977, even as my book on Oswald was going into
final editing, I continued interviewing, and reinterviewing, the CIA
officials on Helms's list, which included everyone from the
Inspector General who had reviewed Bagley's report to the Deputy
Director, who had ordered Nosenko rehabilitated. Now that Bagley
had told me the story of the man the CIA had kept locked in a vault
for nearly three years, they were willing to give me their

versions
of what had happened in the inner sanctum of the Soviet
Division.
Like some medieval palimpsest, which monks constantly
rubbed
out and rewrote, the Nosenko case was recast over and
over again
in different reports and revisions between the 1965
Bagley Report
and the John Hart report. They had evidently provided
different
aspects—or were they layers?—to the story, without
ending it. All
they agreed on was that Nosenko's story about Oswald
—the very
story that Nosenko had offered to me, with CIA approval
—could
not be believed.
The reason that the Nosenko affair had hung like an
incubus
over the CIA for fifteen years was that its central issue,
Soviet
deception, had never been resolved. Could the Soviets
deceive and
use for their own purposes American intelligence? What
emerged
from my interviews was that this question was still
lodged, like a

paralyzing fish bone, in the CIA's throat.

After my book was published, Bagley gave me one final clue to

this mystery. He suggested, almost as if it was an afterthought, that

Angleton had not been "completely forthright" with me on one

issue.

"What issue?" I asked.

"His prize defector." He explained that the REDTOP who had

defected six months before Nosenko in Helsinki had been treated

by the CIA differently from any other Soviet defector. Whereas

every other defector remained the charge of the Soviet Russia

Division, this man had been turned over to the counterintelligence

staff. He had become Angleton's personal charge—and source.

Angleton believed Nosenko was sent by the KGB to discredit this

defector's information, which he had confided to Bag-ley was

crucial to understanding KGB deception. This defector then, not

Nosenko, was at the heart of the real mystery. His name

was
Anatoly Golitsyn.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Golitsyn Secret

For nearly two years, I had been pursuing the shadow of Golitsyn
without much success. Then, in the spring of 1980, at an academic
conference in Washington, I stumbled onto an unlikely Frenchman
who knew all about Golitsyn. He was Philippe de Vosjoli, a former
aide-de-camp to General Charles de Gaulle, and, between January
1960 and November 1963, the liaison between SDECE, the French
intelligence service, and the CIA in Washington. He introduced
himself by saying that he was probably the only French
intelligence officer in history "to defect to the United States."
Golitsyn was the proximate cause.
He explained that Angleton, with whom he had worked closely,
began supplying French intelligence in 1962 with reports that came
from SDECE's own secret files. They had been supplied,

Angleton
explained, by a recent defector from the KGB. This leak
meant, as
de Vosjoli instantly realized, that the KGB had one or
more
sources in French intelligence. The defector then provided
data
suggesting that the penetration not only was widespread
but
involved de Vosjoli's superiors in SDECE. Then, in
November
1963, de Vosjoli was tipped off by a colleague in Paris
that he
himself would be assassinated on his return to France. De
Vosjoli
resigned from SDECE, went into hiding, and, with
Angleton's help,
relocated himself in the United States. The defector who
exposed
this French conspiracy was Anatoly Golitsyn.
De Vosjoli had not only been fully briefed on Golitsyn, he
also
retained many of the files about him which the CIA had
supplied to
SDECE. When I asked whether I could see this material,
he
suggested that I come to Lighthouse Point, Florida, where
he now

lives. It was there that I learned the details that helped me reconstruct Golitsyn's story.

Golitsyn organized his defection in Finland on December 22, 1961. He arrived at the American Embassy in Helsinki in the midst of a blinding snowstorm, bundled in a heavy overcoat. He told the Marine on duty that he was a Soviet Embassy official, which was true, and he then asked to see the station chief by name. The request, coming from a Soviet officer, immediately set off alarm bells.

The procedures for dealing with a potential defector were put in effect. After escorting the Russian visitor to an isolated room, the Marine guard alerted the desk officer at the embassy, who relayed the "Mayday" message to the CIA station. Within minutes, the station chief rushed downstairs to meet this short, stocky Soviet "walk-in."

Golitsyn came right to the point. He identified himself as a

major in the KGB. To leave no doubt in the mind of his CIA
counterpart, he handed over a sheath of secret documents from the
files of the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. He said he would make
further information available about the Soviet espionage apparatus
if the CIA immediately arranged his safe passage to the United
States, along with that of his wife and daughter.
It was an extraordinary offer. The station chief asked Golitsyn if
he would consider returning to the Soviet Embassy and acting as
an agent in place for the CIA. The standard procedure in the CIA
was to do everything possible to persuade REDTOPS not to defect
but to become moles.
Golitsyn was adamant. He replied he would not survive if he
returned. The KGB had means of identifying CIA agents in
place—and he could disclose them after he was safely in America.
The station chief realized that Golitsyn was suggesting not only

that there was a penetration in the CIA but that he could expose it.

Unable to persuade him to work as a mole, the chief asked Golitsyn how much time he had to arrange defection. Golitsyn replied that he had to be out by Christmas Day. After that, his wife and daughter would be expected back in Moscow, and Soviet security personnel, who were being rotated over the holiday, would be back on active duty. This gave them a maximum of forty-eight hours.

In Washington, the frantic search through the CIA's central registry of records produced only a single "trace" on Golitsyn. Peter Deriabin, a KGB officer who had been stationed in Vienna before defecting in 1954, had mentioned Golitsyn to his CIA debriefers as a KGB officer who might be potentially disloyal to the Soviet Union. But before this lead could be followed up in Vienna, Golitsyn was recalled to Moscow.

Now the CIA had been given a second chance. The Soviet Division authorized Golitsyn's immediate evacuation

from Helsinki.

No matter what diplomatic complications it would cause, it

wanted to get this KGB officer in the palm of its hand, and use him

to identify and possibly approach other potential defectors in the

Soviet diplomatic corps.

On Christmas Day, a U.S. Air Force courier plane landed at

Helsinski's snow-covered airport. Servicing military attaches stationed

abroad, such flights are routinely exempted from foreign customs and immigration inspection. This was, however, not a

routine mission. While the plane waited on the runway, a car

pulled up beside it. Its passengers, who carried no luggage, quickly

climbed on board. Among them were Golitsyn, his wife, and

daughter. Minutes later the plane was airborne again, en route to

West Germany.

The first round of interrogations took place at the U.S. Army

defector center outside of Frankfurt. Golitsyn was required to

write out by hand his entire career in the KGB, from the day he

joined in 1948 to the day he defected—listing all the positions he

held, promotions he received, and KGB officers with whom he

came in contact. Unlike most previous defectors, who had been

field agents with limited knowledge about the central apparatus of

the KGB, Golitsyn claimed to have been assigned to the KGB's

headquarters in Moscow and also to its "think tank," the KGB

institute, where intelligence operations were related to overall

Soviet strategy.

To determine if his story was true, Golitsyn was next strapped

into a stress-analyzing machine, used by the CIA as a lie detector,

and relentlessly quizzed about various details of his story —a

process known in the CIA as "fluttering." After each session,

counterintelligence experts also compared each bit of information

he provided with what was already known. By the end of

the first

week, the CIA was fully persuaded that Golitsyn was a bona fide

defector who had indeed held the positions in the KGB he claimed.

Arrangements were then made to bring him and his family to the

United States.

In February 1962, in an isolated and heavily guarded CIA

compound overlooking the Choptank River in Talbot County,

Maryland, Golitsyn began an extensive debriefing. To the amazement

of his debriefers, he not only revealed knowledge of a wide

range of secret NATO documents but identified them by their code

numbers. He explained that for convenience the KGB used the

NATO numbering system to request specific documents, which

would then arrive from their source in France in seventy-two

hours.

President John F. Kennedy, apprised of the Golitsyn revelations,

dispatched a personal courier to Paris with a letter for President

Charles de Gaulle. In it, he warned that the KGB had recruited at
least four top French intelligence officers as agents and had then
maneuvered them to key positions.
A few weeks later, six French intelligence officers, handpicked
by de Gaulle, arrived in Washington. They carried with them
specially devised ciphers that bypassed the normal channels of
French intelligence, and kept their very presence in the United
States a secret from even their own embassy. Their tape-recorded
interrogation of Golitsyn, whom they code-named "Martel," took
fourteen days, and left them in a paralyzing quandary.
The French intelligence secrets Golitsyn had provided came
from the highest echelon of the French government. When the list
of those having access to them was narrowed down, suspicion was
focused on both the head of French counterintelligence and de
Gaulle's personal intelligence adviser. Both were eventually

suspended—but no legal case was ever brought against them.

Golitsyn also told of a KGB plan to use the French intelligence
service to spy on missile sites in the American Midwest. French
intelligence officers who were accredited in Washington would be
ordered by SDECE in Paris to use their contacts to gather data—
for the benefit of Moscow.

De Vosjoli recalled that he was initially skeptical about this
allegation. It implied that the KGB had sufficient control over his
own intelligence agency that it could use it as a "false flag" to
recruit unwitting agents. He even discussed with Angleton the
possibility that Golitsyn was a dispatched defector, sent by the
KGB to disrupt U.S.-French relations.

But three months later he received an order from SDECE
headquarters in Paris that confirmed, to his dismay, what Golitsyn
had asserted. It told him to begin recruiting agents in the United
States in a position to report on developments in

American missile
weaponry.
As de Vosjoli reread the order, he could not believe his
eyes.
Since he knew that France itself had no need for such
information
about U.S. bases, and recruiting spies was a very risky
business, he
queried Paris for further clarification.
The answer instructed him to implement the plan without
further
delay. He was also warned that it was an "eyes only"
operation—
and all telegrams concerning the topic must be burned
after they
were decoded.
At this point, he found out that Golitsyn's other assertions
also
were proving correct. Angleton told him that the CIA had
positively
identified through Golitsyn's leads a central figure in a
spy
ring, code-named "Sapphire." He was considered one of
the most
promising executives in French intelligence who was
working for
Soviet intelligence. Days after de Vosjoli passed this
information

on through channels, this double agent was thrown to his death
from a window. De Vosjoli assumed the murder was done to
protect others in the ring.

De Gaulle's intelligence advisers became concerned, at this
point, that unless the scandal was contained, it would explode into
the public domain and possibly bring down the government. It had
already caused great strains in NATO. De Vosjoli got the message:
they wanted reports, or even gossip, that questioned Golitsyn's
credibility.

De Vosjoli reported back to Paris that Golitsyn was becoming
increasingly short-tempered with the nonstop debriefings. He heard
from Angleton that tensions had arisen over Golitsyn's treatment
by the Soviet Division. His case officers there had been determined
to have Golitsyn identify as many of the KGB officers who worked
in embassies as possible from snapshots they had of Soviet

diplomats, but Golitsyn, finding the exercise trivial and demeaning,
was refusing to look at any more books of CIA photographs. He
also refused the CIA request that he call former KGB
acquaintances and attempt to recruit them. He argued that such
attempts would be futile because the CIA's Soviet Division itself
leaks. The CIA took these problems as signs that Golitsyn was not
cooperating.

De Vosjoli next heard that Golitsyn had asked to personally
brief President Kennedy on Soviet deception. When informed that
such an audience was impossible, Golitsyn became further
discouraged that his information was not being taken seriously.

Golitsyn then told the CIA that he wanted to be resettled abroad
under a new identity. The CIA's Soviet Division, believing
it had "squeezed" Golitsyn of all the information he knew, agreed
to this request, provided it could still question him. In early 1963,

he left for England. "We were still analyzing his information," de
Vosjoli recalled, "when all the trouble began in London."
When I asked about this "trouble," de Vosjoli shrugged. "I heard
only echoes." After he resigned from SDECE, he explained, he lost
track of Golitsyn. He suggested that I go over to England and ask
Stephen de Mowbray about "the trouble." De Mowbray had been
the MI6 liaison with the CIA in 1963 and, through Angleton, had
become deeply involved in the Golitsyn case.
De Mowbray agreed to see me with surprisingly little hesitation.
Subsequently, I learned that Angleton, who apparently no longer
wanted Golitsyn to remain a secret, recommended that he talk to
me about Golitsyn.
I met him at his country home in Kent, where he had retired
after leaving the British Secret Service in 1977. He was a tall, soft-spoken
man, with an acid wit and deep contempt for those who
didn't understand his intellectual positions. He had joined MI6 in

1958 on the recommendation of Isaiah Berlin, his tutor at Oxford.
After he was posted to Washington, he went to work for MI6
counterintelligence, which he called "the queen on the chessboard."
I noted that he had returned to London at about the same time
that Golitsyn temporarily moved to London in 1962. Their careers
then became intertwined. Had de Mowbray gone back to London
to debrief Golitsyn about matters he had not told the CIA or were
these two Atlantic crossings pure coincidence?
De Mowbray answered in a mocking tone, "In counterintelligence,
we are not supposed to believe in coincidences." He then
said, so as to clearly establish his point of view at the outset of the
interview, "Golitsyn was not merely another defector. He was, as
far as British intelligence was concerned, probably the most
important defector in recent history."
I wanted to know why Golitsyn, who had been working at the
Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, would be in possession of

information
that would be so valuable to Britain.
De Mowbray explained that Golitsyn, before being stationed in
Helsinki, had been assigned to the division of the First Chief
Directorate of the KGB responsible for conducting espionage
operations against Britain and other NATO countries in Northern
Europe. In preparing for his defection, Golitsyn had memorized
English as well as French documents. Many of these documents
came directly from the files of MI5, the British equivalent of the
FBI. The most troubling of these reports described the breaking of
a Soviet code by British intelligence. According to the "bigot list,"
which identifies those with access to a particular secret document,
the contents had been circulated to only five high-ranking officers
of MI5. How then could Golitsyn have seen it in Moscow?
De Mowbray concluded that there was only one possible answer:

One of these five executives had provided the KGB with the
report. The search for that executive, which turned into a mole hunt
that was never satisfactorily resolved, began with a secret task
force, innocuously called the "Fluency Committee." De Mowbray
was one of its seven members (who changed constantly).
Over the course of the next ten years, it gradually eliminated
four out of five names on the "bigot list." The remaining suspect
was Sir Roger Hollis, the Director of MI5.
Although the Fluency Committee never was able to find direct
evidence implicating Sir Roger, such as unexplained contacts with
Soviet intelligence, de Mowbray was convinced that he was the
traitor. De Mowbray went personally, without any authorization, to
10 Downing Street, identified himself, and asked to see the Prime
Minister. To his surprise, he received an immediate appointment.
He came right to the point and told him that there was reason to

believe the head of the British security service was a
Soviet agent.
He recognized that this initiative would be the
end of his career—and it was. No case was ever made
against Sir
Roger.
Golitsyn had set this nasty investigation in motion years
earlier.
During his interrogation by British MI5 officers, he
suggested that
he had demonstrated to the CIA that it had also been
penetrated.
But he claimed that the CIA's Soviet Division had never
zeroed in
on his leads. He had to assume his CIA case officers were
either
incompetent or unwilling to find a mole in the CIA.
After listening to Golitsyn's story about CIA
incompetence,
Arthur Martin, who was in charge of Soviet
counterintelligence for
MI5, called Angleton. Angleton agreed that the Soviet
Division
had not got the full story from Golitsyn.
Angleton then arranged with Helms to have the
responsibility
for Golitsyn transferred from the division to his
counterintelligence

staff. It never had been done before—or since.

Getting Golitsyn back to America was not difficult. A leak was

arranged by MI5 to the Daily Telegraph revealing that Golitsyn

was in England. It had the calculated effect of persuading Golitsyn

that his security could not be assured by the British. Three weeks

later, in August 1963, Golitsyn returned to Washington.

Angleton was now in charge. His method was not to be a

debriefing, but an "elicitation," as he called it. There would be no

more exhaustive grillings or repetitive snapshots of Soviet

diplomats. Unlike the Soviet Division, Angleton was not concerned

with identifying KGB personnel per se or the organization's "order

of battle." His primary interest was using Golitsyn to unravel what

he called the "logic of Soviet penetration." The need to understand

the Soviet method was made all the more relevant by the defection

of his old friend Kim Philby to Moscow in November 1963—

barely three months after Golitsyn's return.

To assist him with this elicitation, Angleton brought in his

new
chief of operations, Newton "Scotty" Miler. As his nickname
implied, Miler was a dedicated Scotsman, with a reputation for
being unflappable. He also had fourteen years of experience as
a CIA case officer, recruiting and handling informants in Asia and
Europe. While Rocca did research on Angleton's staff and
pondered the historical significance of the pieces in the puzzle,
Scotty was the man of action, who moved them around the board
to test the theories. He was Angleton's right hand. He had worked
on the Golitsyn case for ten years, and, in de Mowbray's opinion,
he knew "the operational details of the Golitsyn case better than
anyone else."
When Angleton had been fired in 1974, Miler had also been
forced out of the CIA. He moved to the remote desert township of
Placido in New Mexico, where he would be, as he put it, "as far
from Washington as possible."

I had interviewed him there previously about Nosenko, but he
studiously avoided the subject of Golitsyn. When I called him this
time, however, he seemed far more open. Even over the telephone
he made no effort to conceal his bitterness toward the new
leadership at the CIA. He told me he had been informed that it was
"shredding" the yellow sheets of notes he had left behind. Even if it
was not intentional, the shredding had the effect of expunging the
"institutional memory" of the CIA. After hearing the outlines of
what de Mowbray had told me, he agreed to fill in the missing
parts of Golitsyn's story.
I arrived at his home in Placido in the late afternoon. Miler had
just returned from hunting rabbits in the desert. He had a rugged
face, and in his denim jacket he looked more like a cowboy than a
counterintelligence expert. We talked briefly about Nosenko. He
had just become involved with Golitsyn when Nosenko defected in

the winter of 1964.

I asked, "Did Golitsyn know about Nosenko?"

"Know?" he replied coolly. "Golitsyn predicted the KGB would

send a man out to discredit him in his first debriefing in January

1962." He pointed out that Nosenko had made his contact with

Bagley that June. Nosenko, in turn, had been supported by the

stories of a half-dozen other KGB "dangles"—including Fedora

and Top Hat.

Miler explained that these Soviet dangles involved nothing more

than "an exercise in experimentation—and patience." They worked

on the same trial-and-error principle as the fly-fishing lure, he

suggested. "If one fly doesn't work, you simply try another kind—

until you get one that the fish you are after will snap at in a

particular locale." He said that the Soviets had tried numerous

lures. "They put one in our path in Paris earlier that year, a drunken

diplomat. That didn't work. They then sent another to our

embassy

in Moscow, but that got screwed up. So they tried Nosenko."

Unlike Angleton, who talked in metaphors, Miler didn't mince

words. He came right to the point: "The KGB was afraid that

Golitsyn could blow everything they were working on. If they

couldn't kill him, they had to discredit him or at least muddy the

waters. Nosenko, Fedora, Top Hat were all part of that mission."

While Bagley tried to break Nosenko, Angleton's staff focused

on Golitsyn's secrets. To build up Golitsyn's confidence that he was

now being taken seriously, Angleton arranged for him to brief

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on the KGB threat. He also

invited him to dinners where they would discuss Soviet politics

into the early hours of the morning. He treated Golitsyn as a full

intellectual partner, and to facilitate the rapport, he had Miler

prepare sanitized copies of his prize "serials" for Golitsyn,

and then
allowed Golitsyn to search for connections between these clues
from CIA cases that spanned two decades. He also took Golitsyn
with him on trips to Europe and Israel to speak to allied
intelligence executives. Golitsyn, encouraged by this attention,
proposed organizing a new counterintelligence service outside the
CIA.
Miler, meanwhile, was gradually drawing out Golitsyn on the
subject of the putative leaks in American intelligence. Golitsyn
insisted that the wealth of CIA material he had seen in KGB files
could not have come from any single mole or source. He compared
the Soviet penetration to a "cancer," saying, "When the patient
refuses to recognize it exists, it grows and spreads, with
bad cells infecting good cells." The "patient" in this case was both
the FBI and the CIA. The "bad cells," he suggested in his analogy,
had begun with the Army and CIA recruitment of Hitler's former

intelligence officers. He asserted that the CIA had mistakenly
assumed that their sources in Eastern Europe were not known to
the Soviets, but, in reality, they had been compromised by
Germans playing a double game. Instead of arresting these World
War II traitors, the Soviets used them as bait to entice CIA case
officers into situations where their careers could be jeopardized
and they could be compromised. Some of these officers were then
recruited, and they produced biographical data on other officers in
the CIA, which helped the KGB play on their weaknesses. Golitsyn
held that, by the time he had defected, the KGB had maneuvered
its "inside men" into key positions in both the CIA's Soviet
Division and the FBI's counterespionage office.
Angleton's interest, however, went well beyond the security
problem arising from the recruitment of Western case officers by
the KGB. He wanted to know why the KGB had focused its

attention on particular units of the CIA, such as the operational side
of the Soviet Division. The real issue to Angleton was what
purposes these penetrations advanced.
Golitsyn explained that they were a necessary part of the deception
machinery that had been in place in 1959. Their main job
was to report back on how the CIA was evaluating material it was
receiving from other KGB agents. With them in place,
disinformation became a game of "show and tell" for the KGB.
The dispatched defectors, double agents, and other provocateurs,
who could be anyone from a Soviet diplomat to a touring scientist,
"showed" the CIA a Soviet secret. Then its penetrations would tell
the KGB how the CIA had interpreted it. This combination of an
inside and outside man, a mole and a fake defector, allowed the
KGB to continuously manipulate its adversary.
The immediate remedy was to find the penetrations. With the
assistance of the CIA's Office of Security, which has responsibility

for ferreting out moles, Angleton arranged a series of "marked

cards" for the Soviet Division to test Golitsyn's assertion. The

"marked card" is to counterintelligence what the barium test is to

medical diagnosis. Information that can be followed, like a bent

card, is passed through an intelligence channel to see where it ends

up.

One "marked card" in Angleton's series was the exact time and

place of a CIA approach made to a Soviet diplomat stationed in

Ottawa, Canada. No one else knew about this "approach" except

the unit in the Soviet Division to whom this card was passed. The

meeting itself was a pure invention.

A surveillance crew was then placed in a position where they

could watch the site without themselves being observed. Then, on

the day of the contrived meeting, they recorded Soviet security

officers watching the site from a car. So this marked card had

wound up in the hands of the KGB.

Through a process of elimination, subsequent marked cards

narrowed down the possible leak to a handful of CIA officers

involved with recruiting REDTOPS and preparing reports on them.

Yet, no matter how the cards were dealt out, no single individual

could be pinpointed. This development suggested to Angleton that

the Soviets had more than one mole in the Soviet Division.

Angleton, moreover, was convinced by these tests that the penetration was in continual contact with the KGB. Time after

time, when the division was told about a new operation, the

information seemed to reach Moscow in a matter of days. Nosenko

himself seemed to have a means of updating his story—even though he was supposedly in isolation. Suspicion fell first on

David Murphy. Could the chief of the Soviet Division be a Soviet

agent? After he was transferred to Paris, Bagley was investigated

and transferred. Five other division officers were

considered as
candidates for being the mole and reshuffled. Yet the leaks
continued. The Philby problem, which had so affected Angleton in
1951, now seemed like just the outcropping of a far
deeper phenomenon. Finally, in 1967, Angleton recommended to
Helms that he temporarily cut the entire division out of sensitive
cases. Helms reluctantly complied.
Angleton, finding that the Soviets were continuing their double agent
operation, advised that the CIA should operate on the premise that it would remain partially penetrated until Soviet
methodology was better understood. This advice caused what
Miler termed "real strains within the intelligence community."
By the time Miler had finished telling of this fallout from the
Nosenko case, it seemed quite an understatement. By 1968,
American intelligence was, as Helms described the situation, "a
house divided against itself." The Soviet Division was paralyzed

by charges and accusations over the Nosenko case. The FBI had
broken off its liaison with the CIA. The British security service
was in disarray, with its own Director under suspicion as a mole.
German, French, and Dutch intelligence were rated "insecure" by
the CIA. Pressure was building in the CIA to dissolve Angle-ton's
staff. J. Edgar Hoover characterized Golitsyn as "paranoid" and a
possible "provocateur." Why had all this tension flowed from this
single defector?
I went back to Angleton for an answer. By then, it was the fall
of 1982. He had just given up both smoking and drinking for health
reasons and he seemed nervous, if not distracted. After telling him
that I had seen his former colleagues, as if he didn't already know, I
asked him why there had been so much animosity generated by
Golitsyn.
Angleton explained, as if he had been waiting for the question,

that Golitsyn delivered a message that the CIA, MI5, SDECE, and
other Western intelligence services had great difficulties in
accepting. It was that the primary mission of the KGB had been
changed in 1959 from conventional espionage, or stealing other
nations' state secrets, to an extraordinary form of covert statecraft,
where it used its agents and other hidden mechanism to help
achieve the geopolitical goals of the Soviet Union. The pen-
etrations and double agents, according to Golitsyn, were all means
to a political end. It was this search for political ends, not his
revelations about moles, that touched on raw nerves.
These tensions began soon after Golitsyn returned to the United
States. He broke off a meeting with Bagley during a discussion
about Nosenko, claiming that Bagley, then deputy director of the
Soviet Division, "did not begin to understand" what the KGB did.
Golitsyn also came into direct conflict with the division's

Covert

Action unit, which was writing a book to be issued under the name

of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence. Colonel Penkovsky had been a double agent from

1961 to 1963 for the CIA and MI6. In 1962, he supplied the CIA

with a cache of documents about Soviet rockets that helped the

United States assess the military capabilities of the Soviet Union

during the Cuban missile crisis that October. Soon after the crisis

was resolved, Penkovsky was arrested publicly and presumably

executed. Then, under the prodding of Attorney General Robert

Kennedy, the CIA began preparing The Penkovsky Papers, which,

when released as a commercial book, would purport to be a diary

the colonel had kept of his spying activities. This project had

tremendous support within the CIA because the "diary" would

show how the CIA, by recruiting a Soviet colonel, helped President

Kennedy accomplish a great triumph: getting Soviet missiles out of
Cuba. Golitsyn provided information that undermined this project.
He demonstrated, by diagraming hidden Soviet microphones in the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow, that Penkovsky's early debriefing had to
have been monitored by the KGB. Even if he had been a legitimate
traitor then, Golitsyn argued, he would have been forced, in a deal
that he could not refuse, to deliver the documents the Soviets
wanted delivered to the CIA. He was, in other words, a Soviet
postman at the time of the missile crisis.
Angleton agreed with this assessment. There was no question
that at some point Penkovsky had come under Soviet control;
the question was when. MI6 counterintelligence meanwhile developed
its own analysis pointing to the same conclusion. Even
Bagley had doubts about the case.
But Golitsyn went further than merely supplying evidence that
Penkovsky, who was about to be turned into an American

hero,
was a KGB fraud. He attempted to relate the "Penkovsky provocation,"
as he called it, to a "political end." He suggested that the Penkovsky messages were used to provoke and control the
reactions of the Kennedy administration. The missiles were put in
Cuba to be bargained away. Khrushchev's strategical goal —
manipulating President Kennedy into giving up the Monroe
Doctrine by accepting a hostile regime in Cuba, allied with the
Soviet Union—had been achieved, according to Golitsyn. The
assertion that the United States had lost, not won, did not sit well
with the CIA executives who had managed the Penkovsky case—
and the book (which became a best-seller in 1966).
Tensions were racheted up nearly to breaking point when in
1964 Golitsyn focused suspicions about British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson. The problem began in January 1963, when Hugh
Gaitskell, the leader of the right wing of the British Labor

Party,
died unexpectedly at the age of fifty-six of a rare form of lupus
infection. His doctor became suspicious because the symptoms
appeared just after Gaitskell had ingested coffee and cookies at the
Soviet Consulate in London, and he informed MI5, which brought
the case to the CIA's attention. It then developed that Soviet
scientists had been experimenting on rats with this particular lupus
virus.

Angleton asked Golitsyn whether it was possible that the KGB
would engage in this form of political assassination. Golitsyn, after
all, had contact in Moscow with the KGB's Department Thirteen,
which undertook assassination missions.

"I've already answered that question," Golitsyn said. He referred
Angleton back to his original briefing in 1962, which took place
before Gaitskell was assassinated.

It turned out, to the amazement of Angleton's staff, that Gol-

itsyn was right. Although it may have seemed of little relevance at
the time, Golitsyn had explicitly told his debriefer in 1962 that the
KGB was in the process of organizing special actions, including
untraceable assassinations. The purpose was to advance Soviet
agents of influence in selected European democracies. He also had
related how, just before he defected, he had been told by the chief
of the Northern European Division of the KGB that "General
Rodin" was involved in such an operation. He wasn't sure whether
it was to be in England or a Scandinavian country.
Angleton immediately ran a "trace" on Rodin. He was identified
as a top officer in the KGB's Department Thirteen. Even more
disturbing to Angleton, Rodin was, at the time of Gaitskell's visit to
the Soviet Consulate, stationed in London.
Golitsyn, when questioned by Angleton, recalled that he was
also told by his chief that the objective was the elimination of an

"opposition leader." He reasoned that since Gaitskell was the main
opposition to Harold Wilson's leadership of the Labor Party,
Wilson would have been, in the eyes of the KGB, the intended
beneficiary of the plot. He suggested further, based on his
experience, that the KGB would carry out such an intervention in
only two circumstances: first, if Wilson was their man, or, second,
if someone in Wilson's entourage was their man.
Angleton opened a file on the British Prime Minister, codenamed
"Oatsheaf." He concentrated on the activities of Wilson's
close associates who had made frequent business trips to Moscow.
He found out, through his liaison with the National Security
Agency, that when these men were in Moscow, some of their
telephone conversations from hotels and limousines had been
routinely intercepted. An analysis of these intercepts showed that
they had been in contact with well-known KGB case officers. This
connection was not in itself incriminating, since Soviet

officials put
in contact with important Western visitors are often KGB
recruiters. But two of these businessmen had become part
of
Wilson's entourage.
Angleton decided to pass on his Oatsheaf file to the
Director
of MI5 in case they had additional material on these two
advisers.
He expected a discreet investigation into the backgrounds
of these
two associates of Wilson. Instead, he found MI5 was "out
of
control." Some MI5 officers, including those who
opposed
Wilson's politics, demanded that he be put under
surveillance.
Others were appalled at the idea that British intelligence
would spy
on a Prime Minister. In the end, MI5, after going through
this
crisis, rejected the proposed investigation.
I understood why the bearer of such messages would not
be
popular with intelligence agencies, or the governments he
served.
He was a disturber of the peace. What I found more
difficult to

understand was why he had presented such a radically different

view of the KGB from other sources.

Angleton replied that Golitsyn had been one of a small group of

young analysts in a KGB "think tank" who prepared the plans for

the massive reorganization of Soviet intelligence that took place in

1959. Aleksandr Shelepin, who then became Chairman of the

KGB, was given the mandate to return the KGB to the political

mission it originally had under Lenin. Whereas Soviet intelligence

had become, under Stalin, an organization mainly concerned with

maintaining state security, which involved it in purging dissidents,

protecting secrets, and preventing the CIA from recruiting sources,

it now was to become an organization capable of manipulating the

actions of the United States. Its model was to be the Trust,

according to what Shelepin told Golitsyn. This radical change

meant that conventional espionage was to be subordinated to

deception goals. Rather than blocking contacts with the
West, the
new KGB would allow the CIA and other Western
services to
recruit agents, dissidents, and other sources of secrets. But
it would
use these channels to pass disinformation messages.
Golitsyn's think tank realized that this design, as plausible
as it
might appear on paper, in practice contained an intrinsic,
and
potentially dangerous, weakness. KGB officers had to be
in con-
tinuous contact with CIA officers, either as bait to attract
their
attention, as postmen to deliver messages, or as double
agents
pretending to defect. This gave the CIA the opportunity to
compromise, entrap, recruit, or even drug the
disinformation agent.
The answer it came up with, which then became part of
the
"Shelepin Plan," was to divide Soviet intelligence into
two distinct
entities: an outer and an inner KGB.
The "outer" KGB was made up of personnel who, of
necessity,
had to be in contact with foreigners and were therefore

vulnerable
to being compromised. It included KGB recruiters and spotters
posted to embassies and missions, military attaches, propaganda
agents, and case officers who worked abroad. Since they had to be
in touch with Westerners, if only to attempt to recruit them as
spies, they were assumed to be "doomed spies." A certain
percentage of them, by the law of probability, would be
compromised—and talk. Golitsyn compared "doomed spies" to
pilots sent on raids over enemy territory during World War II who
not only were restricted from knowing any state secrets but were
purposefully misbriefed in case they were captured and interrogated.
The "inner" KGB was to be where the deceptions were planned,
orchestrated, and assessed. It was limited to a small number of
trusted officers, under the direct supervision of the Politburo, who
planned, orchestrated, controlled, and analyzed the operations.
Potential security risks, including officers of Jewish

descent, were
transferred into the outer service in preparation for the
reorganization.
A "China Wall" existed between these two levels. No
personnel
from the outer service would ever be transferred to the
inner
service, or vice versa. Nor would any personnel in the
outer service
ever be exposed to strategic secrets other than what had
been
prepared for them to divulge as disinformation.
"Consider the implications," Angleton said, pausing for
effect.
"If Golitsyn was correct, it meant that we knew virtually
nothing
about the KGB's capacity for deception."
The idea of two KGBs was indeed staggering. It meant
that
many targets the CIA were going after as potential
recruits—
including diplomats, military attaches, journalists,
dissidents, and
intelligence officers—had little useful information or had
been
deliberately misbriefed, like World War II pilots. All they
would
have access to, aside from trivial details about their own

espionage
apparatus, was disinformation. The same would be true of
many
"walk-in" defectors. And it meant that the microphones
the CIA
planted in Soviet embassies would be also eavesdropping
on
diplomats excluded from the real strategic secrets of the
inner
KGB. Seen through the new perspective provided by
Golitsyn, the
KGB turned out to be a different and much more
dangerous
instrument of Soviet policy.
"It would be impossible to understand the KGB without
understanding
what changed in this reorganization," Angleton said.
He referred me to a 1200-page manuscript that Golitsyn
had
written, explaining that it was based on a report Golitsyn
had
prepared for the CIA in 1969. He then added that he could
arrange
for me to read it.
I spent nearly a week reading the Golitsyn manuscript. It
was a
remarkably convoluted piece of scholarship. It traced out,
in

excruciating detail, the multitudinous preparations that had to be
made in the Soviet government, the Communist Party, the KGB,
and foreign liaison services to facilitate the 1959 reorganization.
Golitsyn moved in his narrative, layer by layer, through all the
hidden corridors of the Soviet apparatus. He described the
personnel that was transferred, the offices that were relocated, and
the cover stories that were released to obscure these moves from
Western eyes.
What became clear to me as I read through this typescript was
that Golitsyn had finally provided Angleton with the great white
whale he had been searching for ever since the Philby episode. Yet,
over the years, the CIA sources produced no real signs of any
Leviathan Soviet deception. Now, with the 1959 reorganization,
Angleton had an explanation why it had failed to surface. Like
Captain Ahab, Angleton continued to search in an endless sea of

data for this Soviet deception—until he was fired in 1974.

CHAPTER SIX

The Last Days of Angleton

On November 9, 1979, when a mob of Iranian students broke into
the American Embassy in Teheran, CIA security guards
desperately rushed to shred the voluminous classified directives,
telegraphs, and other secret memoranda from Washington that had
been stored in the intelligence vault there for twenty years. They
failed, however, to adequately destroy most of them because the
embassy, for financial reasons, used low-budget shredders that cut
the paper in only one direction. Iranian women, skilled at weaving
Persian carpets, were able to piece most of them back together,
though it took over two years of eye-straining work. The Iranian
government then published these "Documents from the U.S.
Espionage Den" in sixty volumes. The result was that for the first
time in history a secret archive of CIA records was made

public
without its consent. Unlike the material the CIA
voluntarily
releases, under its own name or through briefed defectors
it has put
in contact with journalists, these internal directives show
the actual
method used by the CIA over the years to recruit spies
within
Soviet bloc governments.
I had never seen anything like these documents. Some
were
stamped not only SECRET and TOP SECRET but with such
exotic
labels as NOFORN, which meant they could not be shown
to any
foreign national whatsoever, not even an allied service;
NOCONTRACT,
which meant they could not be shown to CIA subcon-
tractors; and ORCON, which meant that they could not be
shown to
anyone even within the CIA without the written approval
of the
unit in the CIA that had prepared them. These documents
discussed
the nitty-gritty of the CIA's espionage business. It was a
secret
universe in which American diplomats were precisely

instructed to

report their Soviet counterparts' dining habits, children's schooling,

hobbies, sexual proclivities, and even their chronic medical

ailments; in which Americans were chosen on their language "fit,"

medical training, or even height to serve as witting or unwitting

"access agents" to steer targeted diplomats into contacts with CIA

recruiters; and in which new clandestine skills, such as using

invisible ink or other secret chemicals, were taught like school

subjects.

I was particularly intrigued by one ORCON, NOFORN directive

that had been sent by the chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia Division

in January 1973. It was a six-page document entitled "Turning

Around REDTOP Walk-ins."* From the context, it was clear that

REDTOPS was the CIA's shorthand name for Soviet bloc officials.

It directed CIA stations in American embassies abroad to recruit

them as spies rather than allowing them to defect, noting that the

CIA, through a unit code-named BK HERALD:

can and does run many resident agents inside the REDTOP

countries. We have the capability to mount and support such

operations over an indefinite period, and we currently are able to

exfiltrate agents, in most cases with their families, from the

REDTOP countries when it is time for them to leave.

If the REDTOP was not working where he had access to secrets of

interest to the United States, it noted:

we are prepared to guide and assist him in his career [in the Soviet

government], running him in place until he develops the access we

need. Our ultimate objective is to have the walk-

*See Appendix B.

in return to his home country and continue his agent relationship

while working inside.

Angleton read the directive I had brought him with apparent

interest. He was always interested in knowing what had leaked out

into the "public realm," as he called the non-clandestine world, if
only because it expanded the areas he could discuss.
"What is BK HERALD?" I asked, as Angleton put the document
down.
"That is of no importance, it is just a code name that changes all
the time," he answered in an impatient tone. "It is the part of the
CIA that works against the Soviet bloc."
"By 'work,' do you mean espionage?" I asked.
He nodded, explaining that "espionage tends to be a much unappreciated form of knowledge." It aims not just at acquiring
secrets but in doing so in such a way that the theft cannot be
anticipated, detected after the fact, or therefore remedied. If it
succeeds with this double job, it produces what Angleton called
"unexpected intelligence."
In practice, there is only one way that an espionage service can
both steal documents and cover all traces of the theft. It must
recruit an agent who has legitimate access to the secret data. As

Angleton described it, "He must be able to enter the room where it
is kept and copy it, without arousing suspicion."
Similarly, in the
case of intercepted conversations, the agent must be in a position to
plant an electronic bugging device—and retrieve it—unnoticed.
These requirements usually could be filled only by an enemy
national with impressive enough credentials to pass through his
own security. In the case of the Soviet bloc, this means a trusted
government official has to be secretly hired.
"Think of an espionage service as a highly specialized employment
service," Angleton suggested. Like the more conventional
"headhunters," an espionage service determines the positions
that need to be filled, consults its biographical files, which are well
stocked with resumes and photographs, selects
potential candidates, and then approaches them with offers that
they find either tempting or exceedingly difficult to refuse. But
since, unlike their counterparts in the private sectors,

these recruiters
are asking government officials not merely to change their
loyalties to their employers but to betray their nations,
they must
keep secret the real job they have in mind for the
candidates until
after they are employed. So they may have to work under
an
elaborate disguise, or "false flag." The other difference is
that when
a candidate accepts the offer, he is not allowed to quit his
present
employer. Instead, as explained in the 1973 BK HERALD
directive, he is encouraged to work at two jobs
simultaneously: one
for his own government and one for his new employer.
Angleton explained that this espionage task is far less
difficult
than it might seem to an "outsider." It is based on the
premise that
whereas few individuals would elect to commit treason if
they
knew what they were doing, not everyone can resist
breaking
minor rules and regulations when presented with the right
set of
temptations. It involves not a single conscious decision to
betray

state secrets but an incremental entrapment. What Angleton called
"a subtle web of irresistible compromises."
It took me over a month to finish reading the CIA documents in
the Teheran Archive. They illuminated more than the arcane
techniques of espionage. When read in chronological order, these
documents reveal the extraordinary revisions that took place in
1973, revisions so radical that they appeared to be nothing less than
a conceptual revolution in the way that the CIA envisioned its
enemy—and itself.
It began in January 1973, when Richard Helms left as the
Director of Central Intelligence, and William E. Colby, as executive
comptroller, took charge of the Directorate of Plans—
which is the clandestine side of the CIA. Colby, who had come
from the covert action side of the CIA, not secret intelligence, and
who had headed the CIA's Pacification Program in Vietnam,
almost immediately instituted a switch in the CIA's policy determining

how Soviet bloc officials were recruited.

Up until 1973, CIA directives had assumed that Soviet intelligence
services commonly used "provocations." In practice, this meant that Soviet Embassy officials who approached American
intelligence officers offering to sell or give away Soviet secrets had
some probability of being KGB-controlled dangles. The danger
was that they could lead the CIA on a wild-goose chase, expose its
sources or methods, or simply embarrass it by contriving an
incident. The CIA had thus previously required in its instructions
that the bona fides of a REDTOP walk-in be established before he
was treated as a source of intelligence.

This procedure was explicitly defined in "Director of Central
Intelligence Directive 4/2," signed by Allen Dulles. It states:

The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be
given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of
defector channels by hostile services to penetrate or

convey false or
deceptive information to U.S. Intelligence services.
Since 1954, that responsibility for determining "bona fides" had
been assigned to Angleton's counterintelligence staff. Now,
however, this doctrine was reversed. The top secret directive
entitled "Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins" was telexed to all
CIA stations on January 3, 1973. It ordered that REDTOPS,
primarily Soviet bloc diplomats, intelligence officers, and military
attaches, be treated differently. It explained:
Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that
REDTOP services have not been seriously using sophisticated and
serious walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of
provocations has been more responsible for bad handling than any
other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a disservice if
we shy away from promising cases because of fear of provocation.
We are confident that we are capable of determining

whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information.
This new policy meant that case officers in the Soviet Bloc
Division could make REDTOP recruitments that were not dependent
on any prior determination of whether they were provocateurs
or not. The assumption was that the value of a "producing agent" could be established from the information he himself
furnished.
Further, these new directives reflected a confidence in the CIA's
ability to run networks inside the Soviet Union. Previously, the
CIA had considered such contacts behind enemy lines to be a
dangerous enterprise. Not only did the KGB maintain a full-court
press of surveillance, especially around the embassy, but it was
known to use double agents to entrap intermediaries who might be
used as couriers. But now it appeared the CIA believed it could use
these untested REDTOP volunteers as "resident agents" in Moscow. The Soviet Division chief advised all stations:

"We have the capability to mount and support such operations over an indefinite period, and we currently are able to exfiltrate agents, in most cases with their families, from the REDTOP countries when it is time for them to leave."

This new confidence seemed to completely override the concerns about Soviet deception. Why did the CIA now believe that REDTOP volunteers were no longer dangles? How could it accept their information, even if it perfectly dovetailed with other such intelligence, if the CIA still believed the KGB had the capacity of orchestrating disinformation messages so that they would appear credible? How could the CIA run networks in Moscow if it still believed that the KGB had penetrations in its Soviet Bloc Division? And why had the job of assessing bona fides been taken away from Angleton's counterintelligence staff? What had happened to Golitsyn?

I decided to raise these questions along with the

chronology
with Angleton. He had invited me to dine with him at his Army
Navy Club in Washington, where he took great pride in the fact
that he had held the rank of major in the Army during the brief
interregnum between the end of the OSS and creation of the CIA.
I brought the documents from the Teheran Archive with me.
When I began to read him the relevant passages from these CIA
directives, he stopped me mid-sentence, as if he feared these once
top secret words would be overheard. "I'm familiar with those
directives."
I asked him what had happened in 1973 to make the CIA so
abruptly alter its appreciation of the KGB. "Was there a coup d'etat
at the CIA?"
"It was more a coup de grace," he said with a quick chuckle. "It
certainly ended the battle over epistemology—for me."
By "epistemology," he meant the theory which allows an investigator

to believe that information is either true or false. He explained that in other fields, such as biology, the investigator can
safely assume that what he sees through a microscope has not been
put there for his benefit (although he might, in keeping with
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, assume that the observer had an
effect on the observee). But in the business of secret intelligence an
investigator cannot automatically make that assumption. Spies,
unlike microbes, do conspire at times to dupe outside observers.
Angleton conceived of deception as the "mirror image of intelligence."
They were so closely related that they were like identical twins. The resemblance between these twins was no accident.
As Angleton had pointed out with orchids, deception must mimic
reality enough to be accepted. Both had the same superficial
appearance in what they produced, whether it was a photocopied
document, an intercepted conversation, or a report from a defector.

Both had the same provenance. And both claimed to have defected
from the same parent—the enemy. What made one of these twins
legitimate and the other illegitimate was a quality that
was not readily ascertainable: the enemy's state of mind. If the
enemy was unaware that this information had been taken and
turned over, it was bona fide intelligence. But if the enemy had
intended it to be turned over, it was disinformation.
An intelligence service works in this view as a kind of adoption
service. It attempts to pick out the legitimate twin, provide it with
its certificate of genuineness, and then nurture it as a source of
information. If it succeeds in choosing the right one, its government
will be acting on intelligence that its adversary does not
know it possesses. If it fails and chooses the wrong twin, it will
become the unwitting ally of its enemy in passing disinformation to
its own government. The problem that Angleton had wrestled with
for two decades was this crucial choice: How could the

CIA know
with certainty that secrets it had stolen from its Soviet sources had
not been made purposely available to it, to provoke and mislead the
American government?
Angleton believed that information could not be its own test. Its
validity as intelligence depended on "control," which meant
whether or not the Soviets knew the secret had been passed to the
CIA. And "control" could only be determined by tracing, and
logically testing, every turn in the path the information took in
getting to the CIA. In other words, in Angleton's epistemology, the
container as well as the contents had to be investigated. This was
the issue that had split the CIA into warring camps.
Others in the CIA, such as those Soviet Division executives who
wrote the 1973 directive, had a far less complex epistemological
approach. They believed that intelligence could be distinguished
from deception by judging how well it fit in with other

intelligence
reports. If it neatly dovetailed with other reports, it was assumed to
be valid intelligence.

Angleton traced the dispute back to 1964, when Nosenko was
imprisoned and interrogated by the Soviet Division. He had opposed
this "hostile interrogation," he explained, not because he believed Nosenko was a legitimate defector, but because he considered
it advantageous that the KGB believe Nosenko had been accepted. He viewed Nosenko simply as a Soviet postman, delivering
a message. He assumed that he would not have been dispatched on such a mission by the KGB if it did not have an
"inside man" in the CIA to feed back to it the CIA's assessment of
Nosenko. He had hoped to play the game out, seeing where it
might lead.

But Bagley, Murphy, and others in the Soviet Division refused
to go along with this cat and mouse game. They believed that they
could psychologically break Nosenko and force him to confess he

was a disinformation agent. By doing that, they would have settled
the epistemology question to their own satisfaction. They would
have demonstrated that they were fully capable of telling the good
from the counterfeit by brute force.
When his incarceration failed to produce the desired result, the
Director, Richard Helms, was left with the incubus, and the messy
problem of what to do with a suspect defector. The Soviet Division
had divided into factions on this question. Bagley wanted to return
him to Russia. Others, especially those in the Report Section who
wanted to use the information he had provided, argued that if he
turned out to have been a real defector and the Soviets executed
him, the CIA would have blood on its hands (as it did in the case of
an earlier Polish defector it returned).
Helms finally cut the Gordian knot in 1967 by ordering Nosenko
to be "rehabilitated," and assigned the job to the Office of Security,

not the Soviet Division. He also ordered, to satisfy Angleton, that
all information from Nosenko be labeled that the source was still
suspect. To avoid any leaks to the press of the imprisonment, he
decided to put Nosenko under contract as a counterintelligence
consultant and to pay him for the years he spent in a vault. This
compensation rubbed still more salt in the open wounds of Bagley
and his supporters—all of whom were transferred out of the
division. Bagley groused, when he heard about the payoff:
"Nosenko, who came to the CIA at the direction of the KGB, had
received $160,000 for deceiving the CIA, while
the division officers who had exposed him had been given early
retirement, with pensions of one tenth that sum." Their replacements,
most of whom were brought in from Vietnam, coined the
term "sick think" to describe their colleagues who still believed
Nosenko was part of a Soviet deception.
Meanwhile the Golitsyn thesis, which was being developed by

the counterintelligence staff, was bringing the epistemological
question to a very ugly head. It held that because of the 1959
reorganization, even legitimate defectors and double agents unwittingly
could be supplying disinformation if they were excluded from the inner KGB. Golitsyn specifically identified the Soviet
bloc UN diplomats, embassy staffs, and military attaches who had
been the main target for CIA and FBI recruitment as the group with
the least likelihood of having access to real secrets.
This view, if accepted, had serious implications for the case officers
who had recruited more than a half-dozen Soviet bloc diplomats at the United Nations who claimed to have access to
strategic secrets. If they could not have had such access, as Golitsyn
asserted, they had to be redefined as disinformation agents.
This made the CIA case officers, who had built careers on these
sources since 1960, accomplices, albeit unwitting, of Soviet deception
planners. And it converted information that had been

passed upward to the President into disinformation. In this new
light, heroes became villains and victories became defeats. It was
the equivalent of, as Angleton put it "stepping through a looking
glass."
At the FBI, the Golitsyn thesis was rejected out of hand by J.
Edgar Hoover. He had Fedora and Top Hat to think about, both of
whom were recruited after the reorganization. They not only
claimed that they had access to secrets from the decision-making
level of the Politburo, but they furnished them on demand to the
FBI. Hoover had personally passed some of this material directly
to Lyndon Baines Johnson—he was not about to accept an
interpretation that would render this data KGB disinformation. He
suggested that the KGB had sent Golitsyn to discredit
the FBI. He then refused any further cooperation with the CIA
aimed at substantiating Golitsyn's story, even going so far as to

withdraw an FBI surveillance team that had been watching a
suspect round-the-clock on behalf of the CIA. Eventually, as the
recriminations over Golitsyn increased, Hoover broke off all liaison
relations with the CIA, which, as Angleton conceded, "damaged"
him, since until then his close relations with FBI
counterintelligence had been one of his main sources of power in
the CIA. Ironically, in 1978, after Hoover's death, events proved
Golitsyn was right—at least about Fedora. After it was determined
by the FBI that the Soviets had to know Fedora was supplying the
FBI with Soviet secrets, he returned to the Soviet Union and
received a promotion, which caused the FBI to conclude he had
been a KGB-controlled disinformation agent during the years he
was supposedly working under FBI control.
The Soviet Division also took strong exception to the Golitsyn
thesis, which defined much of its conventional intelligence-gathering

process, such as debriefing agents and defectors, as a likely
channel for Soviet disinformation. When Bagley wrote his 900-
page report on Nosenko, he questioned whether Golitsyn could be
believed on information which was not in his original debriefing by
the division but which was later developed by the counterintelligence
staff. He tried to separate the "vintage" from the
"diluted" Golitsyn—especially as it pertained to Nosenko. Angleton
strongly objected to this section of the report, which Bag-
ley
eventually excised in the final version. The frustration of these
division officers was intensified by the secrecy surrounding the
dispute. Few of them were briefed on the Golitsyn thesis. All they
knew was that their work was being called into question by
Angleton and his staff. It had, from their point of view, all but
paralyzed normal intelligence operations.
Meanwhile, Angleton was being pressed by Helms to show

some "positive results" with Golitsyn. Helms pointed out that he
had given Angleton the money and resources he had requested but
the result had been more a "mouse" than the expected "elephant."
He suggested the test of the investigation should be utility.
Could Golitsyn's thesis be used to identify the deceptions of the
Kremlin?
Golitsyn himself had never claimed to have participated in any
of the actual deception planning. He had only seen the mechanism
for executing it being put in place. He did recall, however, that
Shelepin gave a lecture in 1958 explaining how the deception
machinery could be used to create fake "splits" between members
of the Communist bloc. The United States would then be drawn
into believing that by helping one side, it could weaken the Soviet
Union. After that lecture, Shelepin let it slip that China would be
the perfect candidate for such a deception.

Angleton's staff immediately began exploring the Sino-Soviet
split that had developed in 1960, just after the KGB reorganization.
Could it be a sham, designed to throw the West off balance? The
National Security Agency meanwhile produced intercepts, which
Golitsyn could not have known about, showing that Soviet
intelligence was picking up U.S. bomber data through its space
satellites and then relaying it to Chinese intelligence. Using an
electronic form of the "marked card" technique, the NSA was able
to trace this information moving from the Soviets to the Chinese
and then from the Chinese to the North Vietnamese. This evidence
meant only that the Soviet Union and China, during the Vietnam
War, were coordinating activities on behalf of their mutual ally,
North Vietnam. But Angleton took it a step further. He reasoned
that if the KGB was able to work with the Chinese in this area, it

could do the same in other areas. He asked Golitsyn to set out in
writing the case that the Sino-Soviet schism was a strategic
deception.
It took Golitsyn until 1968 to draw together all the bits and
pieces of evidence. He concluded that the deception he had heard
vaguely about a decade earlier was now actually in effect.
Then Helms assembled a committee of Soviet and Chinese
experts to hear his case. They were, to put it mildly, unimpressed
with Golitsyn's evidence. When various experts pressed him about
his theories, he became "overly defensive," as Angleton explained
it, and he shouted back demanding to know what evidence they had
for disputing his theories. The meeting ended acrimoniously. More
important, in the years since Golitsyn had first mentioned the
Shelepin lecture, world events moved in a direction that confirmed
that the split was real, not fake. There was, for example, a border

war between Chinese and Soviet troops on the Ussari
River.
Nevertheless, Angleton continued to search for evidence
to
support Golitsyn. Finally, in 1969, Helms called him into
his office
and told him that it was now the policy of the Nixon
White House
not only to accept the Sino-Soviet split as a reality but to
exploit it
by seeking a detente with China. He was told "in polite
terms: drop
Golitsyn."
Angleton, who had survived in the CIA bureaucracy for
fifteen
years by now, understood that Helms, his last real ally,
was losing
patience. Golitsyn had not produced the promised results.
He had
to be put out to pasture with a part-time consulting
arrangement.
Angleton knew that his own days were numbered when
on
November 20, 1972, President Nixon asked for the
resignation of
Helms. Colby, who was now acting executive Director,
had been
the subject of one of Angleton's counterintelligence

investigations,
and he made no secret of his animosity. He had little experience in
secret intelligence, as opposed to covert actions. He made it clear
to Angleton that he rejected Angleton's complicated view of KGB
strategic deception. He saw the job of the CIA as a straightforward
one of gathering intelligence for the President. He felt that the
KGB should not be the focus of CIA operations, that deception was
a technical, not a strategical problem. And as far as epistemology
was concerned, he had faith that the CIA's polygraph tests could
detect false defectors and KGB-controlled double agents.
Colby went to the new Director, James Schlesinger, a professor,
who had been Nixon's budget director. He recommended that
he fire Angleton, and laid out the case against him.
Schlesinger then called Angleton into his office and went
through the criticism of him point by point. Schlesinger told
Angleton that Colby had accused him of being overly secretive and

having a conspiratorial approach. He blamed Angleton, moreover,
for confusing and demoralizing the Soviet Division. On balance,
Colby concluded that Angleton's relentless suspicions of Soviet
infiltration had proven "more of a liability than an asset."
Angleton, assuming he had been fired, made no effort to rebut
this attack. He also recognized that part of it was true. He was
secretive; his ideas were complicated and convoluted, with many
cunning passages, trapdoors, and contrived corridors—he would
say, paraphrasing Eliot's "Gerontion." If they were impenetrable to
outsiders, or even his own staff, that was how he dealt with
deception as a state of mind. And he had paralyzed the Soviet
Division—on purpose.
Just as he prepared to leave the room, Schlesinger called him
back. He asked him, almost as a matter of courtesy, what he
viewed as the difficulty at the CIA.
Angleton said deferentially that it would take quite some

time to
even describe the problem—much less the solution. The new
director then lit his pipe and beckoned him to sit down. Angleton
began talking about the nature of secret intelligence: its epistemology,
its vulnerability, and its ultimate value. Three hours went by.
When Angleton emerged from the Director's office, he had not
been fired as counterintelligence chief. He had now become the
adviser to Schlesinger—just as he had become the adviser to
Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, John McCone, and Richard Helms.
Angleton's reprieve was short lived. Schlesinger served only four
months in the CIA (although he remained close to Angleton
afterward and was one of the first to arrive at his memorial
service), before he was replaced as Director by Colby.
Colby would not be seduced by Angleton's ideas or his epistemology.
Nor had he forgotten Angleton's investigating of his
contacts in Vietnam. He realized that Angleton still had

vestiges of
power—especially in his 180-man counterintelligence staff, some
of whose officers had worked with Angleton since the poetry
magazine Furioso at Yale. He therefore moved expeditiously to
reduce the reach and size of Angleton's counterintelligence staff.
He first took away its job of determining bona fides, complaining
that in the past the CIA had spent an inordinate amount of time
worrying about false defectors and false agents. He then began
cutting down its liaison duties with other intelligence services—
particularly Israel. These liaisons, which Angleton had developed
over twenty years, provided him with what was tantamount to his
own intelligence service. He could informally suggest an
investigation to SDECE, MI6, or Mossad—and they passed the
results on to him. Colby also began a reorganization of units and
departments that not only undermined Angleton's position in the

CIA but made his counterintelligence staff largely superfluous.

During this period of declining power, Angleton had been shaken by the death of his father, Hugh. His ulcer got worse, forcing him into the hospital time and again. His work also lapsed—as Colby stripped him of his mystery.

Finally, in December 20, 1974, Colby found a way to dispose of Angleton that would leave him without any comeback. Seymour Hersh of The New York Times, who had been investigating the illicit activities of the CIA, had requested an interview with him.

He called him into his office and in response to his questions, confirmed his suspicions. He acknowledged that the CIA had arranged in the late 1950s to open letters mailed from the Soviet Union to American citizens, and named Angleton as the man who had been responsible for this mail-opening program.

Colby next summoned Angleton to his office. He told him that the Times was about to publish a damaging story about

the mail-
opening program, and when this information became public he
could no longer afford to have Angleton in the CIA. He asked for
Angleton's resignation on the spot. He wanted him out of the
Agency before Christmas.
The purge had finally happened. Rocca, Miler, and most of his
staff were forced to resign. Major revisions followed, with many of
the suspected defectors and double agents accepted as bona fide
sources. The "serials" Angleton had labored over were locked in a
safe and later, as Miler reported to Angleton, "systematically
shredded." (Even the word "disinformation" was subtly redefined;
instead of meaning the manipulation of a nation's intelligence
system through the injection of credible but misleading data, it
came to mean the manipulation of newspapers and television
through propaganda.)
When Angleton left the CIA on Christmas Eve, true to his

orders, he fashioned three white feathers as symbols of cowardice.
He planned to give them to the three top CIA executives under
Colby, who had actually authorized and run the mail-opening
program that he had been only nominally responsible for. They had
allowed Angleton to take the blame. He looked at the feathers and
decided instead to use them as fishing lures. The battle within the
CIA thus ended without a whimper.
Angleton wanted to hear no more about Washington—or the
CIA. He left for the Arizona Desert, abandoning his prize-winning
orchids and letting his greenhouse in Virginia fall into disrepair.
That next year he went on a long solitary trip to a fishing camp
high on the Matapedia River in New Brunswick, Canada. He took
with him his collection of over two hundred fishing lures, some of
them given to Angleton by Bedell Smith in the early days of the
CIA, but most of them painstakingly designed by him.

Like all
lures, they were meant to misrepresent reality in a way that would
trigger a response in the target. He caught more than a dozen
salmon. Then he went back to Washington. It was not long after he
returned that I first called him, and told him I was interviewing
Nosenko.
Over the next ten years, I would see Angleton whenever I went
to Washington in the course of my research. He did not take well to
retirement. He continued to testify before congressional
subcommittees on counterintelligence but soon lost contact with the
new CIA—or so he claimed. He had become involved in
publishing a newsletter for retired intelligence officers, but that
seemed much more a way of remaining in contact with his old
friends than a full-time enterprise. I began to realize how much
time he had on his hands when one of our lunches at the Madison
Hotel continued on so long that, when the waiters began setting up

the buffet for dinner, Angleton suggested we stay. It was the
longest meal I ever had. Angleton could be extraordinarily precise,
as he was that day (and night), but his stories rarely had a
conventional beginning—or end. They were more like peeling
away the layers of an onion. What I wanted to learn from Angleton
concerned the subject he had raised with Schlesinger: deception.
What he called "a state of mind; the mind of the state." Why was it
such an intractable problem for American intelligence?
At one lunch in a small French restaurant in a shopping center in
Virginia, he brought along a picture from a book of experiments in
Gestalt psychology that illustrated what he considered to be the
problem. It showed an image that could be seen one of two ways:
One either saw the profiles of two heads or one saw a wine cup. It
depended on "one's mind-set," he explained. If one expected the
heads, they popped into focus; if one expected the wine cup, it

appeared. But a person could not hold both pictures in his mind at
the same time; they were mutually exclusive concepts. The point
applied equally to seeing intelligence or deception in a world
picture.

He explained that ordinary standards of evidence cannot be
applied to much of the information the CIA receives from inside
the Soviet bloc. It is a "denied area," where often it is not possible
for American case officers to meet, much less test, the ultimate
sources in their chains of agents. What emerges in Washington
from the darkness is copies of Soviet state documents and reports
of what high-level Soviet officials have said in private. The crucial
issue is whether these documents and private conversations from
the Soviet inner sanctum represent legitimate intelligence
or disinformation.

If the material has been intercepted without the
knowledge of the KGB, it is considered intelligence; if it has been

passed through this chain with the knowledge of the
KGB, it is
considered disinformation. What separates intelligence
from disinformation
is nothing more than an assumption about the enemy's
state of awareness—an assumption always open to
question in the
secret world.

As a practical matter, Angleton found in the CIA that a
"single
mind-set" could not deal with this contingent reality. Like
the
picture of the two faces—or wine cup—the CIA tended to
see the
stream of data coming from Russia as either intelligence
or
deception; but not both. Whatever mode it chose would
determine
how it interpreted both past and future evidence. The real
danger
was that the CIA would become trapped in the wrong
"mind-set."
The remedy he had proposed in 1954 was for the CIA to
have
what would amount to two separate mind-sets. His
counterintelligence
staff would provide the alternative view of the picture.
Whereas the Soviet Division might see a Soviet diplomat

as a
possible CIA mole, the counterintelligence staff would view him as
a possible disinformation agent. What division case officers would
tend to look at as valid information, furnished by Soviet sources
who risked their lives to cooperate with them, counterintelligence
officers tended to question as disinformation, provided by KGB controlled
sources. This was, as Angleton put it, "a necessary duality."
I could see why this concept would appeal to every Director
from Bedell Smith to James Schlesinger. It was their insurance
policy, even though the premium they paid in terms of conflicts
and disputed intelligence might be high. It provided a way of
guarding the CIA against the nightmare that it would be made an
instrument of its enemy. But why had Colby rejected it?
"Colby said he couldn't see the problem," Angleton answered.
"Colby believed that the CIA had the technological ability to weed

out disinformation—with its satellites, computers, and
polygraphs."
It could be done by a single mind-set in the Soviet
Division, without competition from the
counterintelligence. "Colby
believed what he wanted to believe. I was fired,"
Angleton
concluded.
Angleton's interest in the "wilderness of mirrors" did not
end.
He continued to develop and refine his theory of
deception, even
after he learned in the spring of 1986 that he had
incurable lung
cancer—and probably less than a year to live.

CHAPTER SEVEN
The Theory of Perfect Deception

In his last years, Angleton saw very little possibility of a
nuclear
war between the superpowers. The destructive power of
these
weapons had all but precluded the use of force.
If so, why did the invisible war between the CIA and
KGB,
which had obsessed him for a quarter of century, matter?

What real
consequences did deception have for the nuclear world? When I
pressed him about these questions, he shrugged and suggested that
I read a thin book on Chinese strategy. It was Lionel Giles's
translation of Sun-tzu's treatise, The Art of War. Since the treatise
had been written over two thousand years ago, I took this
recommendation as simply another one of Angleton's evasions—
until I read the book.
Unlike modern military texts that set out tactics for winning
through combat, Sun-tzu argued that the highest form of the art of
war is winning without fighting a single armed battle. Victory was
achieved by exhausting an adversary's resources, dividing the
loyalty of its people, demoralizing its leadership, and ultimately
"breaking the enemy's resistance." To achieve this objective, Sun-tzu
outlined a system for so misleading a leader about his
opponent's capabilities and intentions that he would be completely

unprepared to deal with the reality of the situation. It was based on
pure deception. He advises: "When able to attack, seem unable;
when active, seem inactive; when near, make the
enemy believe you are far; when far away, make him believe you
are near; when organized, feign disorder; if weak, pretend to be
strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you; when strong, pretend
to be weak, so that the enemy may grow to be arrogant."
Sun-tzu recognized that for such deceptions to decisively reshape
an enemy's image, it was not enough to stage temporary
effects, such as phony campfires, or supply the enemy with disinformation,
which he called "false tidings." It was also necessary
to control the enemy's own intelligence system.
This "divine manipulation of the threads"—as Sun-tzu termed
reaching into and controlling the enemy's intelligence apparatus—
involved the close coordination of disinformation, which was sent
to the enemy through "doomed spies" who were misleadingly
briefed and then sent into enemy territory to be captured,

with the
penetration of enemy intelligence by "inward spies," or
moles. The
eventual result was that the enemy's false picture of
reality was
reinforced by its own intelligence service.
Angleton, like Sun-tzu, based his theory of deception on
the
vulnerability of the very agencies that were supposed to
be proof
against it, the intelligence services. He had learned this
lesson early
on in the Philby affair. "Deception begins and ends with
intelligence," he said quietly but with real conviction; he
had been
pondering the problem, when we spoke about it in 1985,
for over a
third of a century. Over these years, he had drawn Sun-
tzu's
"threads" into an elegant, if noose like concept which he
called
simply "the loop."
It consisted of two lines of communications that hooked
up rival
intelligence services—one perpetrating the deception; the
other the
victim of it. The deceiver uses one set of lines to pass
messages to

its opposition. In practice, this means that its intelligence service
must establish channels, whether human or electronic, that connect
it to its adversary's intelligence service. And these must be
channels that the victim relies on for its secret information. They
can be false defectors, double agents, diplomatic chatter at embassy
dinners, inspection trips by military attaches,
or even the swathes of territory photographed by enemy satellites.
The deceiver uses the second set of lines to get a fix on the
victim's reactions to the messages. At the end of these lines, there
have to be moles or microphones in the enemy camp with access to
the evaluators of its messages. This feedback, which Angleton had
gone into at length earlier, was essential to building up the
adversary's intelligence service's commitment to the sources in the
disinformation part of the loop. Without it, the deceiver is working
in the dark. He can never be sure whether he is tricking the
opposition or is being tricked himself. With it, he can

amplify and
reinforce the parts of the story the opposing intelligence service is
prone to believe, and eliminate or revise those that are doubted.
He suggested: imagine a wife, attempting to deceive her husband,
who has bribed his psychiatrist into telling her how her husband interpreted all the lies and misleading clues she furnished
him. Those he believed, she could elaborate on; those he disbelieved, she could cease providing or modify. Eventually,
through trial and error, the wife and psychiatrist would supply the
husband with a story that perfectly fit in with what he believed.
Through such strategies, as Angleton put it, "the deceived becomes
its own deceiver."
Angleton's description of how the deception loop worked against an adversarial intelligence service reminded me of a similar
arrangement I had recently seen in the film The Sting.
The deception planners in this story were not KGB or CIA
intelligence experts but a pair of confidence men played by Paul

Newman and Robert Redford. Their particular skill, as the name of
their trade implies, is building up the confidence of their "mark"
enough for him to turn his money over to them—even though they
are strangers. When one of their friends is killed by a gangster,
played by Robert Shaw, they use this skill to avenge the murder by
duping the gangster into giving them his money.
To accomplish this feat, Newman and Redford, assisted by a gang
of a dozen or so other con men, set about constructing a false
reality for the gangster. This takes the form of a sham horse-betting
parlor, supposedly run by Paul Newman, to which the gangster is
led. Next, Robert Redford pretends to defect from Newman's camp
and offers the gangster a tantalizing piece of information: the result
of the races can be delayed by crooked executives in the telegraph
company long enough for the gangster to bet on a sure thing.
As more and more disinformation is fed to the gangster by

the
group of con men, it reinforces his faith in Redford. And, as the
gangster's confidant, Redford is able to feed back to Newman the
gangster's reactions. Whenever the gangster has suspicions,
Newman can thus adjust the disinformation to allay them. This
makes the deception impossible for the gangster to resist and he is
fleeced of his money.
Angleton asserted that this deception loop was a relatively easy
piece of machinery to install. Although a deceiver needed to
establish credible disinformation channels, well-placed moles, and
secure compartments within its own intelligence service, he found
in his experience that both the KGB and the CIA had demonstrated
they had the capacity, and techniques, to solve these problems. But
he held that the loop itself, though it may control the enemy's
intelligence service, was not sufficient to guarantee the success of a

strategic deception. For perfect deception, he suggested, two
further conditions were necessary.
First, the victim's leadership has to be in a state of mind to want
to accept and act on the disinformation it receives from its own
intelligence. This might not happen unless the disinformation fits
in with the adversary's prevailing preconceptions or interests—
which is, at least in the case of the United States, not difficult to
determine. Angleton suggested that Lenin showed he understood
this principle when he instructed his intelligence
chief in 1921, in crafting disinformation, to "Tell them what they
want to hear."
Second, the victim has to be in a state of mind in which he is so
confident of his own intelligence that he is unwilling to entertain
evidence, or even theories, that he is or can be duped. This kind of
blanket denial amounts to a conceit, which Angleton claimed could
be cultivated in an adversary, that one's rival lacks the

wherewithal
and competence to hide its activities, organize disinformation, and
penetrate its ranks. If it proved wrong, it left a nation defenseless
against deception.
The issue, as Angleton saw it, was not whether the Soviet Union
might attempt to win strategic advantages through peacetime
deception—he assumed it would if it could—but whether the conditions existed, or could be developed, to allow it to succeed.
Do these conditions for deception exist today—in the era of
Glasnost? Is there still a "mind of the state" in the Soviet Union
capable of perpetrating a deception? Is there a "state of mind" here
that could allow the Soviet Union to win without fighting? These
are the questions I set out to explore in this book.

PART TWO
The Mind of the State

CHAPTER EIGHT
The Deception Conferences

What was the "mind of the state"—or, at least, the American
intelligence establishment? How did it deal with the problem of
deception and the issues posed by Angleton?
Between April 1979 and September 1985, I set out to explore
and, if possible, answer these questions by attending an unusual
series of academic conferences on deception.1 They were sponsored
by universities, foundations, and, in at least one case, the
CIA. I wanted to meet the executives of intelligence services in an
informal atmosphere in which they would both answer questions
and open doors for me. As it turned out, the large contingent from
the intelligence community that I had an opportunity to talk to at
these small gatherings would not have been accessible to me, or
presumably anyone else outside their secret world, under any other

circumstance.

From the CIA, there was William Casey, the future Director of
Central Intelligence, and William Colby, the past Director; George
Kalaris, who had replaced Angleton as chief of the counterintelligence
staff; Fred Hutchinson, the CIA's National Intelligence
Officer for Deception; Fritz Ermath, the CIA's National
Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union; Larry Gershwin, the
CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs;
Richard Lehman, the CIA's National Warning Officer; Klaus
Knorr, Bruce C. Clark, and Stuart Cohen from the CIA's
National Foreign Assessment Center; Merrill T. Kelly, who headed
the DIA's "human systems," which recruited spies; Ray Cline, the
former Deputy Director for Intelligence; Theodore G. Shackley,
the former associate Director for Operations; Hugh Tovar and
Donald J. Purcell, the former directors of Covert Action; Vernon
Walters, a former Deputy Director of the CIA and future
Ambassador to the UN; and William Johnson, Norman L.

Smith,
Donovan Pratt, Scotty Miler, William Hood, and Ray Rocca, all of
whom had served on Angleton's staff. From the FBI's
counterespionage division, there was William Branigan, James
Nolan, and Ray Wannall—all Soviet experts. From the Defense
Intelligence Agency came General Daniel O. Graham, its former
director, and John Dziak, Wynfred Joshua, and Arthur Zuehlke,
who were Soviet specialists; from the Office of Naval Intelligence,
the former director, Admiral Donald P. Harvey; and from Air
Force Intelligence, General George Keegan, its former head. From
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, there was its
former head, Admiral George Anderson.
There were also scientists from the Pentagon, defectors from
Soviet bloc intelligence, CIA station chiefs from a half-dozen
posts, intelligence liaisons from the British, French, Canadian,
Italian, and Israeli services, representatives from the

National
Security Council, Ph.D.s from exotic think tanks with names such
as Pan Heuristics, Mathmatica, Falcon Associates, and R&D, and
staff from both the House and Senate oversight committees on
intelligence. There was even an active spy, Jonathan Pollard (who
was subsequently arrested on espionage charges).
At the first of these remarkable meetings, which was held under
the auspices of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at the Hyatt
Regency Hotel in Cambridge, Massachusetts, I was amazed to find
that a small group of academics was already developing the subject
of deception into an intellectual discipline. It included R. V. Jones,
a Scottish scientist and practical joker, who had combined his
fields of interest to spoof and deceive German
electron intelligence in World War II; Barton Whaley, an MIT
trained political scientist and magic buff, who had compiled an
800-page analysis of all the known military deceptions of

the

twentieth century;[2] Michael Handel, an Israeli professor who had
worked out an elaborate theory of surprise that applied to politics
as well as war; and Andrew W. Marshall, a RAND intellectual who
had now become the director of the Pentagon's Office of Net
Assessment, which was funding a large share of the studies on
deception.

There was general agreement at the conference on a number of
central points about deception. First, no one doubted the power of
deception to affect human behavior. It was pointed out that ever
since primitive man learned how to dupe prey into coming within
his range by placing a lure on the water or mimicking the mating
call of birds, deception had been part of civilization. Individuals
commonly use deception to make themselves more attractive
through cosmetics or deter intruders by leaving lights and radios on

when they are not home (or even installing anti-burglar devices
that simulate the barking of dogs).
There was also consensus at the conference that governments
have a wealth of experience in applying the techniques of deception.
Even if these techniques were rarely part of the curriculum
of most political science courses, at least outside these conferences,
they played an important part in the process through which people
are governed. Examples were supplied of how governments,
through their manipulation of words, images, music, and other
signals that individuals follow and use as a guide to reality, achieve
social control. Both democracies and dictatorships, albeit in
different degrees, tinker with these closely watched signals, which
can be anything from statistics to newspaper headlines. One
professor at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy even argued that the
modern state uses deception as a "humane and cheap

alternative to
brute force in regulating the behavior of its populations."
Even in democracies like the United States, deception is a main
mechanism of law enforcement, especially in federal crimes. Governments
frequently rely on "stings" to catch narcotics dealers, tax
violators, influence peddlers, arms traffickers, and even common
criminals. These techniques are particularly effective since
criminals, lacking the resources to investigate in advance their
potential victims or collaborators, must rely on relatively crude
indicators, such as their dress, behavior, or credentials
—all of
which police can easily mimic or forge. In New York City, police
routinely disguise themselves as elderly pedestrians, drunks, single
women, and other likely victims, and loiter conspicuously
—
wolves in sheep's clothes—to capture muggers. In Washington,
D.C., to round up burglars on a mass scale, police organized their
own "fencing" business in a local warehouse and offered

higher
prices for stolen goods than anyone else. In San Francisco, the U.S.
Navy created its own fake defense contractors, which offered
payoffs for reordering supplies to entrap Naval employees on the
take. In Chicago, police set up a chain of credit card "laundries"
offering to surreptitiously convert charges for illicit services made
on American Express and other credit cards into ones putatively
paid to restaurants. By managing this credit card business, they
were able to identify the prostitutes, pimps, panderers, and
pornographers supplying the services. The FBI, in its Abscam,
dressed as Arab sheiks to test politicians with bribes. In Bermuda,
IRS agents created fictional tax lawyers, accountants, and real
estate men so that they could be taken into the confidence of other
lawyers and accountants arranging tax-avoidance schemes.[3] In Los
Angeles, undercover medical investigators randomly

visited
doctors' offices under the guise of distressed patients to entice
doctors into issuing prescriptions for illicit pharmaceuticals. And in
the national forests, Fish and Wildlife wardens opened up fake
taxidermy enterprises specializing in stuffing endangered species
to snare poachers.
The techniques of deception work for the state not only in
controlling conventional criminals but in controlling political dissidents.
The practice of using agents provocateurs to infiltrate
dissident movements was perfected in the late nineteenth century
by the czars of Russia. Under the direction of the Okhrana, the
czars' predecessor to the KGB, agents masquerading as dissidents
would carry out dramatic acts of terrorism, even assassinating their
own czarist officials and blowing up their own police installations,
to prove their bona fides to the legitimate underground leaders. The
Okhrana found that its agents provocateurs could not be weeded

out by dissident movements because they could easily pass the
only available test: undertaking dangerous missions against the
state. Since their successes in this terrorism— as well as their
safety—were effectively guaranteed by the hidden hand of the
Okhrana, they were in a position to rise to leadership in the
underground. This system of pseudo-terrorism was not without its
costs. As one participant in the conference pointed out, in 1901, an
undercover police agent called Azev supervised the assassination
of the Grand Duke Sergei, the Governor General of Moscow. But,
even with such embarrassments, the Okhrana gained almost total
control of all the leading dissident factions both in Russia and in
exile. By manipulating them, it managed to identify almost all the
anti-czarists up until the outbreak of World War I—and the czars
evidently willingly accepted the costs of this deception.
The agent provocateur system was by no means limited to

the
service of czars and dictators.4 The British security service, MI5,
employed agents to mimic nationalist terrorists in India, Palestine,
and Ireland. France proved equally adept at using these agents in
its colonies. The United States managed by the early 1950s to
completely infiltrate undercover agents into almost all the key
positions in the Communist Party USA. The infiltration was so
successful, according to one of the FBI counterespionage experts,
that J. Edgar Hoover opposed congressional efforts to outlaw the
Communist Party. Hoover maintained that since it was already an
FBI-controlled organization, it could help identify and manipulate
those who joined it. In this respect, it was not unlike the Trust.
The FBI had institutionalized these deception techniques in its
so-called counterintelligence program (Cointellpro) to incite
suspicions within many other dissident groups, as I

learned from
William Sullivan, who had supervised it. By combining inside
men—that is, informers—with outside provocateurs, the FBI was
able to use the deception loop to immense effect in undermining
the element of trust necessary to bond together dissident movements.5
Finally, everyone at the conference, including even skeptics,
accepted that in time of war governments use deception against
their enemies with great effect. Indeed, it seemed a large number of
the participants had themselves taken part in deceptions in World
War II. Professor Jones, for example, described how he had
deceived the Germans about the type of radio direction beacons the
RAF was using to bomb Germany by scripting entire conversations
that were then passed through double agents to German
intelligence. He made it sound easy, explaining in his Scottish
brogue, "To deceive, you have to first find what channels of

information your adversary has at his disposal, to make, sure you
provide as many clues as possible, and then either block or
discredit those channels in which you cannot supply positive
clues."
This method was refined to a fine art in the deception plan that
the British used to divide and divert the German enemy before and
after its invasion of Normandy in 1944. It could be analyzed in
great detail at the conference because, unlike other strategic
deceptions, which remain closely guarded secrets, the British
government authorized an official history of it.6
The Allied strategy was to put all its eggs in one basket and land
a million-man British-American-Canadian Expeditionary Force on
the beaches of Normandy on D-Day. Before these troops could
safely land, however, the Germans had to be given a false picture
not only of when and where they would land, but their strategic

objective. Otherwise, the Germans would bring all
their forces in Western Europe to focus on these
beachheads— and
possibly overwhelm them.
The deception plan aimed at making the Germans believe,
even
after the Normandy landings, that the initial landings were
part of a
two-pronged invasion, with another even greater Allied
army
poised to land on the beaches of Pas de Calais. If the
Germans
could be so convinced, they would have no choice but to
divide
their forces and, even after the invasion, to keep
reinforcements
farther north to ward off the second blow.
British deception planners had begun working three years
earlier
toward the goal of establishing this alternative
interpretation of
Allied activities in the mind of Hitler and the German
High
Command. The illusionary picture they furnished, bit by
bit, when
pieced together by German intelligence, was of a huge
American
army, called the "Fourth U.S. Army Group"—or FUSAG

—
commanded by General George Patton, stationed in the north of
England. Although FUSAG was totally fictitious, the deception
planners, called the London Coordinating Committee, strove to
focus the attention of German radio interception, aerial
reconnaissance, and intelligence analyses so tightly on fabricated
signals emanating from the location of the phantom armies that the
German High Command would either neglect the real invasion
force assembling in southern England, or assess it as merely part of
a multi-pronged invasion. As clues, the British deception planners
faked thousands of phony messages that appeared to come from
various fictional units of FUSAG but actually had been piped
across England from real army units. They provided German aerial
photography cameras with decoy tanks, landing crafts, and planes
at bases in northern England—all of which were fake. They stirred

up by wind machines dust clouds that would be misinterpreted.

They planted stories in the local press about marriages, engagements, and other vital statistics concerning the officers and

men in this nonexistent army. And they scripted false stories—then

passed

through German agents in England to German intelligence— that

were in fact controlled by British intelligence.

The British had developed this capacity to control German

intelligence over the preceding four years by capturing some two

dozen German case officers, parachuted or otherwise smuggled

into Britain, and then having them continue to send radio messages

back to Germany—but messages given to them by MI5 agents who

were supervising their activities. In this double-cross system, as it

was called, the German agents were provided with networks of

sources and credible bits of information so that they would be

believed by their controllers in German intelligence.

Eventually, or
at least in time for the deception plan, Germany relied on them as
its eyes in England. These double-cross agents, the equivalent of
Sun-tzu's converted agents, were thus able to provide reports that
falsely confirmed the existence of FUSAG.
The British deception planners also had at their disposal
"doomed spies," whom they could expose to information that they
wanted to fall into German hands. These were the French, Belgian,
and Dutch resistance fighters—whose organizations had been
infiltrated by German informers. The probability was that many of
them would be captured, interrogated, tortured, or otherwise
coerced or bribed to reveal what they knew. They were therefore
sent orders to conduct sabotage missions in areas that would be
consistent with a second front at Pas de Calais, on the assumption
that they would provide German counterintelligence with further
evidence of a two-pronged attack.

The feedback came in this case not from a human spy but from
the ability of the British to decipher the German military code.
Before the war even began, British intelligence agents had obtained
through espionage a model of the machine that the German High
Command used to encipher all its signals sent out over the airwaves to military units, submarines, and intelligence agents. It
was called Enigma.7 They also obtained through French and Polish
espionage agents the manual for this machine and its code settings.
By 1941, a team of mathematicians based at Bletchley Park had
developed a method of reading these coded messages.
The intelligence derived from these intercepted signals was codenamed
"Ultra." With it, British deception planners could figure out
how each of the clues they were planting in German channels were
being received by the Germans, and how to modify them to make
them more credible. It completed the deception loop (see Table 2).

The German intelligence services were extremely active and
technically competent during this entire deception. They photographed
English ports and airfields, intercepted messages sent
from one Allied unit to another, and successfully penetrated
French, Dutch, and Belgian undergrounds. But this merely created
more channels for the British to pass disinformation through. In the
end, such intelligence gathering, rather than acting as a remedy for
deception, became its unwitting ally.

It became clear as the conference proceeded that the British
were not the only successful deceivers in the war. Barton Whaley,
who had written his Ph.D. dissertation on Hitler's surprise attack on
Russia in 1941 code-named Barbarossa, demonstrated that the
German High Command had managed through brilliantly
orchestrated disinformation to convince Stalin that the massive
movement eastward of over one hundred German divisions— an

invasion force too large to be concealed—was merely a feint meant

to deceive the British.[8] The guidelines for this deception, which

were made part of the record of the Nuremberg War Trials,

presented a detailed program for gradually sprinkling the fragments

of "false intelligence" into channels that were being monitored by

Soviet intelligence. When pieced together, these clues were

designed to produce "a mosaic picture."

The German logic was that if Stalin became committed to the

"picture" that Germany's immediate target was the invasion of

England, he would dismiss contrary intelligence that suggested the

target was the Soviet Union as disinformation. The German

deception planners' problem was engendering that mind-set. They

determined that Stalin was predisposed to believing that Hitler

depended on his pact with the Soviet Union, and the Trans-

Siberian Railroad, to get the fuel, grain, and other supplies

he
desperately needed, and that therefore Hitler would not turn on
Russia until he had knocked England out of the war. To reinforce
Stalin's preconception, they sent hundreds of separate messages
through double agents, diplomats, compromised codes, and
military attaches over a fourteen-month period. They even
arranged the construction of expensive German defensive positions
in Poland, suggesting Germany was not planning an offense, solely
for the benefit of Soviet aerial photographers. The result was that
Stalin became so convinced Hitler intended to do nothing more
than present him with an ultimatum for more grain —which Stalin
planned to acquiesce to—that when Hitler invaded and overran
most of Russia, Stalin had a virtual nervous
breakdown and was unable to confront the reality of the situation.
But Stalin then went into the deception game himself with a
vengeance.9 Soviet intelligence determined that the

German High
Command depended on its analyses of the Soviet radio signals it
intercepted to track the movements of each and every regiment size
unit of the Red Army. For this purpose, it was not necessary
for the Germans to break the Soviet codes, or even know the actual
content of the radio communications. They merely had to do
"traffic analysis," which means counting and categorizing the
signals going back and forth between Soviet walkie-talkies, mobile
radios, field transmitters, and telegraph machines. Since each
Soviet unit had different types of radio equipment, and organized it
differently, its pattern of transmissions, or "signature," could be
recognized by German intelligence.
Once Soviet intelligence had worked out exactly the way that
this German traffic analysis was done, they used it with devastating
effect to deceive the Germans. In the 1942 Kursk offensive against

the Germans, for example, Stalin succeeded through
communications deceptions in creating even larger
phantom armies
than the British had in their more celebrated stratagem.
Japan also used deception to dupe the United States about
the
true state of its military competence.[10] The main channel
that the
Japanese used to foster this misperception was their air
shows.
When Western military attaches were invited to Japanese
air bases
in 1941, exhibitions of flying incompetence were
purposely staged
for them. And they were then informally told by Japanese
Air
Ministry officials that the air force was having difficulties
training
Japanese pilots to fly solo—which reinforced American
preconceptions about Japanese incompetence. While
concealing its
modern Zero fighter, Japan displayed its antiquated and
obsolescent planes. As one of Japan's leading strategists
later
explained, "Foreign observers saw only what we
allowed them to see." The picture that emerged, and was
duly
reported to Washington and London, was of a primitive

Japanese
Air Force, lacking the technology for refueling in midair, precision
bombing, and long-range missions. This left the United States and
Britain unprepared for a Japanese Air Force that had superior
planes, the ability to extend its range through midair refueling, and
pilots trained to torpedo ships in presumably safe harbors. By
December 1941, U.S. intelligence had concluded that Japan did not
have the capacity to launch torpedoes from airplanes in shallow
water, and therefore the Naval Command assumed that its fleet
would be safe from torpedoes in the shallow waters of Pearl
Harbor.
The real surprise was not the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, but the technological ability of the Japanese.
This was demonstrated the next day when the United States left its
only wing of bombers unprotected on Clark Air Force Base in the

Philippines—even after the attack on Pearl Harbor—and it was
destroyed by Japanese bombers that had been unexpectedly
refueled in midair. Such Japanese strategies succeeded only
because of a false picture of Japanese incompetence that persisted
for the first year of the war.

The United States, in turn, deceived the Japanese. It used highly
sophisticated electronic wizardry and Hollywood props to create
the illusion it would attack the northern Japanese islands in 1945.

Moreover, the technique of using the "double cross system" to
take over an opponent's espionage service, though publicly
revealed when Sir John Masterman, an Oxford historian and
former British counterintelligence officer, published a report he
wrote for MI5 that documented how British intelligence "actively
ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country,"
was not a British or even recent invention.11 Sun-tzu

noted, "The
enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out,
tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they
will be converted spies available for our service." And while
MI5 was occupied turning all the German agents in England into
disinformation agents, the German Abwehr was engaged in exactly
the same game in Holland, Belgium, Turkey, and France, duping
both the British and Americans.[12] The Abwehr was, in turn,
deceived by Soviet intelligence operating an extensive double-cross
system in the Balkans in which it sacrificed military units in
order to build credibility.[13] Without belaboring the point, it appears
everyone deceived everyone in World War II.
After reviewing the plethora of material on these wartime
deceptions, only one relevant question remained: Could the same
techniques be used in peacetime to win without fighting?

CHAPTER NINE
The Goldhamer Inventory

"The British and French will come in and squash us like
flies."
—Air Marshal Hermann Goering
"Not if we buzz loudly enough."
—Adolph Hitler

Andrew Marshall, with his large bald head, horn-rimmed
glasses,
precise but soft voice, and pipe that refused to stay lit,
was the
embodiment to me of the defense intellectual. When I first
met him
at the conference in Cambridge, he told me that his Office
of Net
Assessment was interested in non-military as well as
military uses
of deception, and he mentioned that in 1974 he had
commissioned
a study that dealt with projecting misleading images of
national
strengths and weaknesses to win strategic advantages in
peacetime.
I then went to see him at his office in the Pentagon, which
was

located adjacent to the suite of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. As I looked at the giant maps on the wall, he explained
that his job was to take as many factors into account as possible in
weighing the relative strengths of the United States
and the Soviet Union, and provide the Secretary with an ongoing
assessment of the gap between the two.
"Is the capability for deception put in this equation?" I asked.
He answered, relighting his pipe, that he had made that a
consideration but that "not everyone in the Pentagon" agreed with
him about the relevance of deception. He pointed out that it is far
more difficult to gauge than tanks, ships, submarines, or nuclear
warheads. And assessing the effectiveness of deception in
peacetime presented even greater difficulties since "what is
successfully hidden is not found."
When I reminded him of the study he had discussed in Cambridge,
he confirmed that it had indeed provided some very
illuminating examples of peacetime deceptions that had decisively

worked, especially in the 1930s. Unfortunately, Dr. Herbert
Goldhamer, the political scientist who had played the "leading role
in the program," and for whom Marshall had the highest regard,
had died in August 1977—leaving the study unfinished. He
reflected for a moment and then added that he had given
Goldhamer's widow, Joan, a grant to put her husband's relevant
notes in a three-volume, 1100-page inventory for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.[1]
His assistant, presumably with Marshall's approval, subsequently
sent me the Goldhamer Inventory. I found in the fragments,
as Marshall had suggested, data that when pieced together
showed how Hitler had used deception as a peacetime stratagem:
first, by projecting false strength to deter Britain and France from
intervening; second, by dividing his enemies; and finally, by
projecting false weakness to slow down their own military preparations.
In 1933, the situation was as follows. Hitler had no real

prospect
of conquering Europe by force. The German Army had neither the
manpower nor the ordnance to realize his vaunted ambitions. Less
than a decade earlier, it had been completely defeated and
disarmed. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended
World War I, still restricted Germany from possessing
any offensive
weapons or fortifying its borders. It was specifically
prohibited
from stationing any armed troops, even military police, in
its own Rhineland, which was to be an undefended buffer
between
it and France. Nor was Germany allowed to possess an air
force. Its
navy was limited to a few antiquated patrol ships. Its
skeleton army
was little more than a police force. It was barred from
having any
tanks, armored cars, heavy artillery or other mobile
weaponry, and
from drafting any soldiers.
Even though it had managed to evade some of the treaty
restrictions, Germany still had little offensive capability.[2]
In the
West, it faced France, which had the largest and best-
equipped land

army in the world, and Great Britain, whose all-powerful fleet
could blockade German ports at will. In the East, Germany was
hemmed in by Czechoslovakia and Poland, both backed, through a
series of alliances, by France, England, and the Soviet Union.
Hitler's immediate objective was to break out of this bind. Since he
had no chance of accomplishing this through military means, he
substituted fraud for force.

But how could Hitler win without fighting? Any massive rebuilding
of the German armed forces, which would openly violate
the terms of the Versailles Treaty, would invite an invasion or
blockade by the Allied powers, who were its guarantors. Given the
defenseless state of Germany's borders, this would put a premature
end to his "Thousand-year Reich." To deter the Allied powers from
intervening until Germany was fully rearmed, Hitler therefore had
to invent an illusionary threat of retaliation. For this purpose,

air power was a perfect bluff.3

Until then, military officers had had little experience with aerial

bombardment. Although the few bombs dropped during the final

days of World War I resulted in little actual damage, they caused

panics and riots—and a legacy of fear for the next two decades.4

They also caught the imagination of the postwar peace movement,

which raised the specter of the total destruction of Europe. The

concern was heightened by scientists who, taking

the worst case possible, greatly exaggerated their effect. In England,

for example, it was estimated that a mere 40 tons of gas

sprayed from bombers would end all life in London; while in Paris,

the head of the fire-fighting brigade announced that fifty

incendiary bombs would reduce the French capital to a mound of

ashes. Politicians also did little to allay popular fears by repeatedly

pointing out that while the military was relatively safe from

attack—the French Army behind the Maginot Line and the British

Navy protected by the English Channel—there was no apparent
protection against bombers for the civilian populations.
Hitler evidently realized that these widespread fears of annihilation
could be played upon to deter Great Britain and France
from intervening in Germany. Even though Germany had no
bombers in 1933 capable of reaching England—and it would not
have them for at least another eight years—Hitler had the means of
immediately establishing the reputation, if not the reality, of the
Luftwaffe's strength: strategic deception.
Here German staff officers already had considerable experience.
The word "disinformation" was in fact coined by the German High
Command (OKW) during World War I.5 Whereas deception had
always been part of German military tactics at the field level, the
development of the radio forced these tactical deceptions to be
centrally coordinated. The OKW thus set up a special unit, called
the Disinformation Service, to coordinate the forged radio

traffic
that was likely to be intercepted and misread by British, French,
and Russian intelligence. Its outstanding accomplishment had been
in dividing and disrupting the Russian war effort against Germany.
In April 1917, with 10 million Russian soldiers still arrayed on the
Eastern Front against Germany, the German deception staff
organized one of the most successful pieces of planned subversions
in modern history. General Walter Nicolai, of German military
intelligence, arranged a special train to take Lenin and thirty other
revolutionaries from Switzerland, where they had been in exile, to
the Russian border, where they
would be smuggled in. As he made clear to his superiors, the
purpose of this exercise was to undermine the Russian war effort
against Germany. His intelligence service, which had been in close
contact with these revolutionaries in Switzerland, had correctly

assessed that while they were only a tiny faction in Russian
politics, they would work conspiratorially to disrupt the new
provincial government. And indeed, within a year after it had been
insinuated into Russia by German intelligence, the Lenin faction
managed to seize power in a coup d'etat. It then moved to withdraw
Russia from the war with Germany. While Lenin and his
colleagues were unwitting instruments in the German design, they
received substantial clandestine support from the German
Embassy—both in terms of money and intelligence—which
greatly facilitated their coup.
Even though the Disinformation Service was officially disbanded
after the war, its officers and techniques, working as part of
the German High Command, played an important role in the
peacetime deception that successfully evaded the arms prohibitions
in the Versailles Treaty and, by so doing, concealed the training of
a cadre for a future German Army.

This gigantic subterfuge, code-named "Operation Kama," took
place mainly in the Soviet Union. As ironic as it seems in
retrospect, Lenin had secretly agreed in 1921 to help Germany
rearm in return for industrial equipment and patents. By 1926,
nearly a third of Germany's military budget was funneled into the
Soviet Union through a dummy export-import corporation called
GEFU, which was the acronym in German for Industrial Export
Corporation. Through a chain of equally fictitious subsidiaries,
GEFU organized plants in Leningrad and Moscow to manufacture
forbidden weapons, such as poison gas and bombs. It also leased
clandestine bases on the Ukrainian plains to test aircraft and train
German pilots. As the scale of this operation increased in the late
1920s, Germany developed many of the offensive tactics, such as
the Blitzkrieg and dive bombing, with which it would later surprise
its host. This curious collaboration

between ideological enemies, which continued for eleven years,
required elaborate deception. German pilots killed in crashes were
shipped back in crates labeled machine parts. Fighter planes were
disguised as advertising planes, towing behind them, as they flew
back to Germany, banners recommending beer. Officers who had
nominally resigned from the German military during their training
in Russia were nominally redeployed on their return as pilots for
Lufthansa, the commercial airline.6
Although the deception ended in 1933, this covert enterprise had
provided Germany not only the nucleus for an air force but also a
highly experienced apparatus for planning and implementing
sustained deceptions.
The first step in Hitler's strategic deception was turning weakness
into what appeared to be strength. The few German fighter
planes, which still were not even operational, had to be converted

through the techniques of disinformation into an apocalyptic threat.

This required, in turn, a channel through which the German deception planners could place bits of information—some true, some false, but all misleading—directly into the hands of Western intelligence. The conduit they selected was British Air Intelligence, a newly formed adjunct to the British Secret Service, which ironically had the job of ferreting out the secrets of Germany's airplanes.

The head of this new espionage service, Wing Commander Frederick W. Winterbotham, was a thirty-six-year-old former Royal Air Force pilot who had already attempted to maneuver a British agent named William de Ropp, who was working in Berlin as a salesman for Bristol Aircraft, into a position of access in the German Air Ministry. To further the intrigue, Winterbotham himself had feigned sympathy for Hitler (to whom he was

personally introduced), and had also offered to help the Luftwaffe
buy British aviation equipment from de Ropp.7 Taking advantage
of this double agent, German intelligence officers provided British
Air Intelligence with Luftwaffe secrets—but secrets especially
selected so as to exaggerate German aeronautical advances in such
crucial areas as speed, range, and bomb-carrying capacity.
To reinforce this sporadic stream of disinformation, the Germans
also allowed British air attaches to inspect airfields at appropriate
times. Within a few years, this arrangement evolved into
a system of quasi-formal inspections by two RAF vice marshals
and two British intelligence officers. The Luftwaffe fully
understood that whatever facts it chose to provide to these observers
would become an important part of Britain's and its Allies'
assessment of German capability. As one Luftwaffe executive later
noted: "Naturally we were aware that these officers were expected
to furnish their espionage chiefs with reports . . . which would

ultimately reach the top government circles of all the major

powers."[8] They also realized that the basic data the observers

would report on—the number, speed, and range of war-planes—

could be manipulated for the desired effect like peas in a shell

game.

German airports now became the modern equivalent of Prince

Potemkin's one-dimensional villages in eighteenth-century Russia.

Just as those legendary facades were moved each night on barges

and reassembled in the morning on another site to impress

Catherine the Great with the number of villages in her empire, the

small force of advanced Luftwaffe fighters was flown from base to

base for the benefit of visiting delegations of foreigners. In 1938,

for example, every fighter plane in the Luftwaffe was ordered to a

single airfield in advance of the arrival there of a French general.

The same fighter planes were thus counted over and over again in

British, French, and American intelligence estimates.
In addition, the German aircraft factory at Oranienburg was
converted into a veritable showcase to impress foreign visitors. The
stage-managing used to exaggerate the performance of the
Luftwaffe often involved carefully rehearsed dramas. For example,
when General Joseph Vuillemen, the French Air Chief of Staff,
visited Oranienburg in 1938, he was shown an airfield
"carefully packed with aircraft, assembled each day from other
fields to give him a vastly inflated figure of German air strength."9
Then, to create the illusion of speed, he was taken up in a courier
plane that had been specially prepared to fly extraordinarily slowly
without stalling. Although he did not realize it, the plane
deliberately slowed down to less than 35 miles an hour. At this
moment, a test pilot shot past in an experimental plane, disguised
with military markings as the vaunted Heinkel fighter. In a staged
conversation with other Luftwaffe officers, his pilot suggested this

plane was now being produced daily on three production lines.

Not realizing how slowly his own plane was flying, or that the plane that streaked by was not the Heinkel fighter in current production, General Vuillemen was, as he later conceded, "shattered." He assumed—incorrectly—that the Luftwaffe had achieved a technological breakthrough in speed that left the French Air Force totally helpless. "If war breaks out, there won't be a single French aircraft left after fourteen days," he told the French Ambassador in the car on the way back to Berlin. As one historian noted, Vuillemen was so "gulled and swindled by [the] series of Potemkin villages" that he returned "convinced that war would mean the ruin of Paris."10 Even though Charles A. Lindbergh, the celebrated American aviator, had more experience with such stunt flying tricks, he was just as thoroughly hoodwinked by the tours the German air staff organized for him of aircraft factories.

Lindbergh, assuming that the efficiency and precision he witnessed
in these selected showcases were typical of other German
production lines, concluded—and reported to Allied intelligence—
that Germany was mass-producing war-planes at a rate well
beyond that of France, Britain, or America. As his wife later
observed, "There is no doubt that [German Air Marshal Hermann]
Goering did 'use' Lindbergh to show off his air production,
anticipating that stories of its strength would spread abroad and
delay opposition to Hitler's aggressive program."[11]
Hitler also used international air competitions to reinforce this
illusion of invulnerability. For example, at the Zurich International
Air Meet in July 1937, the Luftwaffe entered a silver-colored,
pencil-shaped bomber with the same military markings as the
German planes that had recently bombed Guernica in the Spanish
Civil War.[12] It was called the Do-17, which suggested it was a

German bomber in mass production. As French and British
military observers clocked its speed, it zoomed ahead of all the
other fighters entered in the competition. This led Allied intelligence
to conclude that Germany had a long-range bomber that
could not be overtaken by their fighters. At this stage of military
aviation, in which neither radar-controlled guns nor antiaircraft
missiles had yet been developed, a bomber that could outspeed
fighters was virtually invulnerable.
The Do-17, however, was not then, and would never be, an
operational bomber. It was a prototype, designed to awe and
intimidate the observers from foreign intelligence services. Its
engines, handcrafted out of rare alloys for the competition, were
not available for any other Luftwaffe planes. As Herbert Malloy
Mason, Jr., describes in his authoritative Rise of the Luftwaffe:
"this particular flying pencil had been specially fitted with a pair of

the scarce DB 600A, 1000 horsepower engines, and handily won
the Alpine Circuit competition with a maximum speed of 280 miles
an hour—faster than any of the foreign fighters present . . . [but]
astonished French and British air observers had no way of knowing
that production versions of the bomber were coming off lines with
lesser engines and speeds."
Germany, in fact, had decided even before the competition to
suspend production of the Do-17 and all other strategic bombers
because of shortages of imported materials. The primary mission of
the handful of long-range bombers built in these prewar years was
not to bomb but to break records at air meets—and to intimidate
potential enemies. Hitler even had a so-called Amerika-Bomber
tested, with a range of some 9,000 miles, to threaten
New York in this image war, although only a single such plane was
ever constructed.13
The deception of trained observers worked in part because

seeing turned out to be believing. The trick of showcasing simply
involved substituting the atypical for the typical. What they saw at
airfields, factories, and competitions was real, but it did not
represent what it purported to represent—operational war-planes.
As Don Quixote points out, "Facts are the great enemy of truth."
To be sure, the gross overestimate of the Luftwaffe threat was
not entirely the result of a German manipulation. "In addition to
the systematic bluff organized at [the] top level," notes a former
Luftwaffe leader, "there was also willing self-deception . . ."[14] He
observed that when British and French air attaches were shown the
exterior of empty hangars, they were more than willing to jump to
the conclusion that they were crammed full of ultra-modern
fighters.
At higher levels in the chain of Allied intelligence, there was
also a predisposition toward accepting the reports of

Luftwaffe air
supremacy. Indeed, advocates of British air power used them to
make their own case for dramatically expanding the budget and
manpower of the Royal Air Force. If German bombers out-flew all
the RAF fighters, they could argue that there was an immediate
need to develop faster British interceptors—no matter what the
cost. And if Germany was mass-producing its bombers, they could
cogently argue that England needed a similar crash program.
German deception planners thus found receptive, if unwitting,
allies in their efforts to shape a convincing image of an omnipotent
Luftwaffe.
In the orchestration of the deception, the leitmotif of disinformation,
played directly into the ears of British intelligence,
echoed and confirmed by staged exhibitions, was reinforced in the
media by the constant drumbeat of propaganda. To inspire mass
hysteria over the possibility of the bombing of civilian

tar-
gets, the German propaganda mill supplied a constant flow of
horror stories to the Western press about the devastation wreaked
on cities during the Spanish Civil War. It especially exploited the
German raid on the small fishing village of Guernica, with gory
pictures and newsreels showing bomb damage.[15] This had the
desired effect of magnifying the Luftwaffe threat in a spate of scare
stories in the Western press. In London, The Times created a near
panic by reporting that the Luftwaffe had deployed a four-engine
bomber that could carry 5 tons of bombs across the Channel—in
fact, the Germans had no such bomber— while in Paris, politicians
warned of a worker's revolution, and establishment of a new
Commune, if Parisian factories were bombed.[16] (Indeed, when the
war finally began, it was common to exaggerate civilian casualties
in a single air raid by 3,000 percent or more.) Churchill

measured
the success of this German propaganda campaign by the
fact that
750,000 hospital beds were set aside for air-raid casualties
in 1939-
40, whereas only 6,000 were actually needed. He later
wrote, "The
picture of air destruction was so exaggerated that it
depressed the
statesmen responsible for the pre-war policy."
Hitler fully understood that deception depended more on
the
appearance of overwhelming numbers of planes than on
their
operational reality—at least so long as enemy intelligence
continued
to count, and miscount, the aircraft parked at the
"Potemkin
village" airfields. Under these circumstances, it mattered
little that
most of the planes were not adequately armed for combat.
As late
as 1939, when pressed by his Air Minister for emergency
funds to
equip the air force with ordnance, Hitler turned down the
request,
commenting tellingly: "Nobody inquires whether I have
any bombs

or ammunition, it is the number of aircraft. . . that counts."[17] As the
historian A. J. P. Taylor concluded, "pretending to prepare for a
great war and not in fact doing so was an essential part of Hitler's
strategy."[18]
The first real test of this strategy came when Hitler occupied
the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936 with a mere three thousand
soldiers armed with nothing more than rifles and light machine
guns. It was a clear violation of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler
realized at the time that he had no chance of success if France, the
guarantor of the treaty, chose to intervene with its vastly superior
army—or air force. As he put it, "We would have had to withdraw
with our tail between our legs, for the military resources at our
disposal were inadequate for even a modest resistance."[19]
What he was counting on to deter the French and British was
not, however, military resources but their carefully cultivated fear

of reprisal bombings by the Luftwaffe. To prepare the climate for
this coup, Hitler did everything he could to give an air of reality to
the phantom threat. Mason recounts that "the Luftwaffe temporarily requisitioned every available civilian aviator —
including even student pilots—and then filled the skies over the
Rhine with as many aircraft as it could muster. The same planes,
with hastily repainted insignia, repeatedly flew around in circles
over the Rhine to multiply the illusion of numbers. In reality, the
dreaded German air force amounted to no more than a squadron of
fighters, not one of which was capable of combat."[20] The few
planes that had both ammunition and guns lacked the synchronization gear necessary for firing through the prop.
Nevertheless, in a performance for the benefit of its enemies, the
High Command telegraphed ominous orders to its phantom air
units and overseas missions over lines that it knew were being

tapped by the Allies. These messages suggested that Hitler was
preparing an Armageddon-type raid on Paris in the event of French
intervention in the Rhineland. The bluff succeeded: Without a shot
being fired, Hitler was able to remilitarize—and fortify—Germany's Western Front.
Behind his dazzling shield of phantom bombers, which had now
proved its power to intimidate, if not totally blind, Britain, France,
and the other guarantors of the Versailles Accord, Hitler proceeded
to unilaterally scrap the treaty, demobilize the German Army, and,
in March 1938, incorporate the 6 million people of
Austria in his "Thousand-year Reich." He then demanded, in an
ultimatum in the spring of 1938, the entire Sudetenland portion of
Czechoslovakia—which, with its hundreds of miles of
underground fortifications, was the only defensible part of that
country. Britain and France were thus faced with the choice of
either ceding to Hitler their ally in Central Europe or fighting

Germany, with its presumed air superiority.
Hitler was prepared at this time to wage a war of nerves but, as
his generals warned him in the summer of 1938, not one involving
tanks and planes. In both these crucial categories, German forces
were blatantly inferior to those of France and England. Yet he had
so successfully manipulated his adversaries' intelligence reports
that they had erroneously conceded the German Army superiority
on land and the Luftwaffe near invincibility in the skies. In Paris,
French liaison officers passed the word to their British counterparts, as one full colonel put it, that "there will be no war,
since we are not going to fight."[21] According to their assessment,
the French Air Force was "powerless" to contain the German air
threat, and the French military had decided that they could not risk
the threat of reprisal bombings. Since Britain could not go to war
with Germany without France— or dispute this assessment—the

fate of Czechoslovakia was sealed.

In Munich, on September 30, 1938, Britain and France accepted
Hitler's terms.22 Czechoslovakia was dismembered and its
Sudetenland made part of Germany. Less than six months later, the
Czech President was summoned to Berlin and told that Luftwaffe
bombers were waiting on runways for the order to turn Prague into
rubble. He hastily signed the document turning the remainder of
his country into a German protectorate.23 So Czech air bases, an
hour away from the heartland of Germany, rather than being
available to refuel Allied bombers in the event of war, now became
advance bases for the Luftwaffe in Eastern Europe. The thirty-five
well-equipped Czech divisions, which only months before the
Allies had counted on to pin down German divisions, now became
part of the German order of battle. And the giant
Skoda arms industry, the most modern in Europe, was now available
to supply the German Army. This sudden advance into the

Balkans also left Hungary and Rumania—with its vital oil
fields—
no alternative but to join Hitler's axis. Through the
Bomber bluff,
Hitler had significantly altered the balance of power in
Europe.
Hitler himself made no secret about the role that
deception and
propaganda played in this victory.24 He explained to an
audience of
German editors in late 1938:
I myself became aware of the enormity of this success
when I
stood for the first time in the middle of the Czech
fortifications [in
the Sudetenland]. Then and there I realized what it means
to take
possession of fortifications representing a front of almost
2000
kilometers long without firing a single shot of live
ammunition. . . .
This time, by means of propaganda in service of an idea,
we have
obtained 10 million human beings with 100,000 square
kilometers
of land.
The systematic twisting of facts indeed had ruled the day.
The

problem was not that England and France lacked intelligence
agents in Germany, but that they were misled. They were fed—
and shown in sham demonstrations—data that led to disastrously
wrong conclusions.
In choosing appeasement instead of confrontation, the Allies
had, as they learned in retrospect, been intimidated by a phantom
threat. They, not Hitler, had the superior forces. Whereas they had
assumed that the Luftwaffe was invincible in the air—it had,
according to one authoritative estimate, as many as twelve thousand
planes ready for war—it was not even capable of defending
Germany. In all, it had a mere four hundred fighters, and as Mason
points out, "what only the Luftwaffe High Command knew was
that nearly half this number was earmarked for use in the east,
leaving the rest of the Reich perimeter spread too thin to counter
any serious air offensive by the R.A.F. or the French."25

The bomber threat was also mainly illusionary. The dreaded
four-engine strategic bombers had not yet even gone into production.
Almost all of the three hundred bombers available in the
West were tactical dive bombers, without the range or bomb carrying
capacity to threaten London or Paris. And on the ground,
the five German combat divisions were no match for fifty mobilized
French divisions. Against such odds, Hitler could—and
did—win only by not fighting. Napoleon's dictum that "The reputation
of one's arms ... is everything and equivalent to real forces"
applied, as Hitler demonstrated, in peace as well as war.
After his costless victory in Czechoslovakia, Hitler turned his
full attention toward Poland—a country half the size of France that
now remained the only obstacle to Germany's total domination of
Eastern Europe. Its integrity was guaranteed by the Soviet Union—
to whose own defenses it was vital—as well as by France and
Britain. And while phantom bomber terror might again be used to

deter the French and English from coming to the aid of the Poles, it
was not likely to restrain the Red Army. Not only was Moscow
well out of range of the Luftwaffe, but the bombing of civilians
held little terror for Josef Stalin, who had himself ordered the mass
executions of millions of his own citizens. As early as 1937, Hitler
realized that he needed a different kind of deception that would
disrupt and, at least temporarily, weather the Red Army.

THE STRATAGEM OF SUBVERSION

Just as, twenty years earlier, the German High Command had
disrupted the Soviet Union through the provocative stratagem of
returning Lenin, Hitler found a similar opportunity in 1937 to use
deception to undermine the Soviet military.
It began when a German agent, pretending to cooperate with
Soviet intelligence, reported to his superiors in German military

intelligence, the Abwehr, that he had received an unusual —and

curious—request from his controller in Moscow. They wanted

him to attempt to search German intelligence files, to which he had

access, to determine if there existed any trace of a plot by Soviet

and German generals to overthrow Stalin. Although no such plot

existed, the Germans pressed their double agent to find out more

about this Soviet concern. As it then turned out, the request came

from Stalin, who seemed obsessed with the idea of a conspiracy

against him, and on the verge of launching a purge of the Red

Army. By piecing together other clues from their informants, the

Abwehr determined that the most probable target was none other

than M. N. Tukhachevsky, one of the Soviet Union's greatest

heroes, and one of the four ranking marshals of the Red Army.

Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of Hitler's security service, immediately

saw the potential damage that could be done to the Soviet military if these suspicions were fanned. As he put it to his deputy, by encouraging such a purge, "a blow could be struck at the leadership of the Red Army from which it would not recover for many years."[26] All that was needed was credible disinformation that would persuade Stalin that there was indeed a conspiracy to overthrow him.

Heydrich's staff, after months of research, finally found an archive of old intelligence records that seemed perfect for this deception. They had been compiled ten years earlier, during the era of covert German-Soviet cooperation by "Group R," which had supervised the training of German officers in Russia during Operation Kama. The dossiers on Soviet officers in this archive included the routine assessments done by German intelligence officers of their political views, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In completely innocent encounters in training facilities, bars,

and
restaurants, the Germans had duly reported many of the comments,
complaints, and jokes made by Soviet officers. It was standard, and
essentially trivial, intelligence intended at the time to provide a
picture of the weaknesses and strengths of the Red Army. Yet now,
a decade later in a different context, these dossiers became part of
the plan to wreck the Soviet military. Hitler
personally approved the plan, but insisted that it be kept secret
from even the German Army.
Heydrich, with two squads of trusted intelligence officers, discreetly
removed the decade-old Operation Kama dossiers from the
archive and, with the help of specialists, began to reorganize the
material. Exculpating documents were removed, pages were
renumbered, dates were changed, and new entries were added to
the chronological record of contacts between Germans and Soviet
officers. Special attention was given to those Soviet

officers, such
as Tukhachevsky, who had risen in the intervening years to
positions of command. The resulting dossiers were not for the most
part out-and-out forgeries but ingenious rearrangements that gave
innocent chatter among soldiers the appearance of secret liaisons
between conspirators. The entire process of sorting through,
abridging, and editing the material took four days.
The next step in the deception was to allow—and induce—a
Soviet espionage agent to "steal" the doctored dossiers. To alert the
Soviet secret police to the existence of this poisoned file, German
intelligence began leaking clues about it to numerous double
agents in Central Europe. For this purpose, it was not necessary to
determine whether their primary loyalty was to Germany or the
Soviet Union. The assumption was that at least some of these
agents would report the existence of the treasure trove to Soviet

intelligence.

The bait apparently worked: in early 1938, Soviet intelligence
began pressing their recruiters to find a source in German intelligence
with access to this file. Then, in Czechoslovakia, a German
official, pretending to be a traitor, approached the intelligence
chief at the Soviet Embassy and offered to deliver the sought-after
file for three million rubles—a staggering sum that German
intelligence hoped would add to the credibility of the documents.

After a flurry of coded cables, Stalin authorized the payment of
the three million rubles (though, as the Germans learned later, the
banknotes had been counterfeited). Less than a day later,
the dossiers were delivered and flown to Moscow in a special
courier plane.

Stalin, presuming that this documentary evidence resulted from
his agents' penetrating the secret archives of German intelligence,
used it to build a case against those he suspected in the

Red Army.
Thousands of the officers named in the dossiers were called in and
brutally interrogated about what they had said to the Germans
some ten years earlier. If they omitted mentioning any of the
meetings cited in the dossiers, or denied their involvement, they
were confronted with their dossier and then arrested. If, on the
other hand, they admitted the meetings but claimed they were
innocent, they were also arrested. The investigators ignored the
context—that Soviets were assisting, on Lenin's orders, German
rearmament—and forced officers to implicate their superiors. It
took little more than a year to expand the investigation to the top
command of the Red Army.
Finally, in May 1938, Marshal Tukhachevsky was confronted
with his dossier, summarily imprisoned, tried—and executed one
week later. The purge of the army that followed resulted in the

execution or imprisonment of no fewer than twenty thousand
officers, more than a third of those then on active duty.[27] The
victims included three out of five of the Soviet marshals, thirteen
out of fifteen of the commanding generals, over half the commanders
of Soviet divisions, and seventy-five out of eighty members
of the Supreme Military Council. By 1939, when the purge
ended, these losses had crippled the Red Army.
Whether Hitler had caused this catastrophic purge or merely
added fuel to the fire through the diabolic gift of the Kama file, he
took full advantage of it. He offered Stalin a deal he was not in
position to refuse: a non-aggression pact. On August 23, after
hectic negotiations in Moscow, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty,
named after the foreign ministers who signed it, was announced to
a stunned world. The secret codicils to the treaty sealed the fate of
Poland: In return for the Soviet Union's not opposing

Hitler's
planned invasion of western Poland, Hitler agreed not
to enter eastern Poland, which Stalin would then be free
to seize.
This agreement also meant that Germany could ship
across Russia
on the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Japan and Pacific
ports the
strategic materials it needed, and thereby greatly mitigate
the threat
of a British blockade of German ports. Nothing now stood
in
Hitler's way.
On September 3, 1939, after staging a fake Polish attack
on a
German outpost, complete with corpses dressed in
German
uniforms, Hitler's Panzer divisions raced across Poland.28
Within a
week, they surrounded the Polish capital of Warsaw.
England and
France, not accepting Hitler's transparent pretext of
defending
against a Polish attack on him, declared war on Germany
as was
required by their treaty obligation. Both, however, still
deterred by
the Luftwaffe threat, did nothing more to help the Poles

than drop
propaganda leaflets on three German cities.
On September 17, while German troops were mopping up
isolated pockets of resistance, Soviet troops moved in and
occupied
their allocated zone in eastern Poland. Hitler's first war
was over,
without the promised Allied intervention, two weeks after
it began.
Although France and Britain officially were now in a state
of
hostility with Germany, the situation remained, as it was
aptly
called, a "phony war." Both sides peacefully withdrew to
their own
lines, and virtually all shooting and bombing stopped.
This hiatus provided Hitler with the opportunity he
desperately
needed to complete his rearmament. Even after the
conquest of
Poland he was still unprepared for a real war. The navy
was still
awaiting the delivery of submarines. The army had
exhausted
much of its stockpile of ammunition and fuel in the Polish
campaign. The air force still lacked everything from
bombers to
navigation equipment. The highly-touted western

defenses, the so-called
Siegfried Line, also still had not been completed—leaving
Germany exposed to a French counterattack. According to even the
most optimistic assessment of his High Command,
Germany needed months to consolidate its victories in Poland and
Czechoslovakia, and redeploy its forces in the West. It was thus
decidedly to Germany's advantage to prolong the phony war.
To accomplish this without unduly provoking France and Britain
to accelerate their own rearmament programs, Hitler's deception
planners created a false dissident group in Germany. Its
purpose was to convince the British government that a conspiracy
of anti-Nazi generals was on the verge of overthrowing Hitler.
And, to succeed, they needed several more months without war to
complete their preparations. If, on the other hand, Britain attacked
Germany, their anti-Nazi colleagues would be forced to defend
their homeland and consequently there would be no coup

d'etat.
The implications were that war in Europe could be averted, and
England and France could win their objectives without fighting, if
only they delayed their attack. It was a message that presumably
the British would want to hear—and believe.

THE STRATAGEM OF WEAKNESS

German intelligence had already prepared a suitable channel for
passing this disinformation to the British: the British Secret Service.
Through dogged surveillance, Germany had managed to identify all the principal British intelligence officers in Holland.
Moreover, it found out that some of the top British officers there
had been illegally making money for themselves by selling visas to
Jews wanting to emigrate to Palestine, and therefore were vulnerable to blackmail. By skillfully exploiting this corruption, it
further succeeded in recruiting one of The Hague station's key
men—Jack Hooper.

By 1939, with the unseen help of German intelligence, The
Hague station had developed into the principal link between anti-
Nazi groups in Germany and the British Foreign Office. It was
headed by Major Richard Stevens, a young officer with no previous
experience in the dangerous game of foreign intelligence.
He was joined by Captain Sigismund Best, an English businessman
in Holland, who had developed his own independent network of
German spies. As it turned out, most of Best's agents, code-named
"Chair," "Table," and other pieces of furniture, did not actually
exist. He had invented his secret sources, like the character in
Graham Greene's Our Man in Havana, to get extra money from the
British Secret Service. Fully apprised by Hooper of the
inexperience and petty corruption of British intelligence in
Holland, the German deception planners had little difficulty in
manipulating its activities.
They knew, for example, that Stevens and Best were

under
orders to attempt to recruit a German Air Force officer as
a spy.
And they accommodated them by sending them a
candidate: a
German counterintelligence expert masquerading as a
disaffected
Luftwaffe officer.
Major Sohm, as he called himself, made contact with Best
that
October. He claimed to be one of a group of disaffected
German
officers. To demonstrate his access to the highest level of
the
Luftwaffe, he provided Best with several secret
documents. As the
deception progressed and the documents were accepted
by the
British as genuine, Sohm identified a dozen anti-Nazi
German
generals as the principals in his conspiracy. He then
passed on the
message to Best that they wanted to set up secret talks
with the
British government to end the crisis on a status quo ante
basis. If
the British agreed to these negotiations, the generals
further

proposed to arrest Hitler as a sign of their good faith. The British

Secret Service, falling for the offer, then arranged, through Stevens

and Best, for one of the generals in the plot to fly to London.

Throughout this deception, the Germans had a source in London

in a position to feed back to them the British assessment of their

messages. He was Charles Howard Ellis, a senior officer in the

British Secret Service, known to his friends as "Dickie."29 The

Germans had recruited him through a double agent in the late

1920s when he was stationed in Paris, and he had continued to

sell them secrets when he was returned to England. Assigned in

headquarters to the sensitive job of translating purloined top secret

German documents in 1938, he was privy to the evaluation of the

material received from the dissident generals. His reports were then

relayed back to German intelligence through the double agent in

Paris who recruited him. Through Ellis, and possibly other sources,
the German deception planners were able to establish that the
British placed considerable value on their fake dissidents, and play
out their hand accordingly.
Later that spring, Sohm informed Best that any renewed Allied
military actions on the Western Front would delay, or even end,
their plot to arrest Hitler. He pointed out that many of the generals
involved in the conspiracy would, in the event of an attack, put
their duty to defend the German fatherland above their distaste for
the Nazis. The remaining dissidents would then risk betrayal—and
arrest. If, on the other hand, the British refrained from seriously
engaging the Germans for one or two months, he suggested that the
dissidents would overthrow the Nazis.
This intelligence was immediately relayed to London. To politicians
who feared German bombings of cities and generals not
eager to become involved in a land war in Europe, the

prospect of
winning without fighting was beguiling. In any case, the British
military wanted more time to prepare for war. The dissident offer,
if nothing else, furnished a persuasive rationale for the British to do
what they wanted to do: defer military counter-moves to the Polish
invasion until after the summer.
Meanwhile, Hitler gained the time he needed to consolidate his
gains in the East, and prepare his invasion of Holland and Belgium.
In November 1939, with the fiction of the dissidents becoming
increasingly more difficult to maintain, German intelligence
decided to liquidate the deception with a demoralizing blow. On
the pretext of arranging still another meeting with his generals,
Sohm lured Best and Stevens to the village of Venlo
in Holland, where they were kidnapped at gunpoint by German
agents and driven across the border to Germany. Even after the
Venlo Incident,30 as it was called, which revealed Sohm as

a German
agent, the British still hung to the hope for several months that
the dissident generals in Germany he claimed to represent might be
real—and planning a coup d'etat.31 This illusion was dashed that
spring when Hitler launched surprise attacks in rapid succession
against Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and France —and, in
little more than a month, completely dominated Europe.32
The concepts of deception that Hitler used to win the peace in
Europe, though dramatic in consequences, were hardly original.
Their tactical design came from the standard operational practices
of German military intelligence in World War I, and their strategic
design was contained in Sun-tzu's precept: If weak, feign strength;
if strong, feign weakness. When Germany was too weak to defend
itself, it pretended to have a secret weapon— the Luftwaffe
bombers—which deterred its enemies from attacking it.
Subsequently, in 1939, when it became strong enough to

mount a
surprise attack, it pretended that there was a split between
the Nazi
government and the generals which lulled its enemies into
complacency. And when confronted with the threat of the
Soviet
Army in the East, it pretended that it was collaborating
with
Russian officers, which deeply divided the enemy. In each
case, it
shaped the deceptive message to tell its foe what it wanted
—and
expected—to hear. In shamming a strategic bombing
force, Hitler
provided the French and British air forces with the
budgetary
rationale they themselves needed in order to expand. In
faking a
dissident movement within his own ranks, Hitler played
on the
disinclination among the Allies to engage in an
unrestricted war. In
faking conspiratorial files for key army officers, Hitler
provided
Stalin with the evidence he wanted for his purge. The
deceptions
thus found willing, if unwitting, allies in the victims.
Moreover, these deceptions relied on their adversary's

intel-
ligence services to unwittingly provide them with a direct channel
for their disinformation. Whatever channels the messages originally
used—whether fake dissident movements, military attaches,
or double agents—the messages quickly passed into the hands of
the adversary's intelligence officers, as they were intended to do,
and then, through them, to the government leaders. Paradoxically,
if Britain, the Soviet Union, and France had not run espionage
networks, they would have been more difficult to dupe.
Finally, the Germans had the requisite sources of feedback deep
inside British intelligence to assure that the deception was not
precipitously detected. Whenever British suspicions were aroused,
a German "inner spy," or mole, was in a position to warn the
deception planners. They could then either change the channel used
for the disinformation to one that had not been discredited or, as in

the case of the Generals' plot, they could abruptly disconnect it by
arresting the principal contacts on an entirely different pretext. In
any case, with all these elements in place, deception cost very little
to implement (Stalin even paid for the privilege of being deceived)
and was by any measure a far less risky enterprise than war—as
Hitler learned in the next four years.
It was the war, not the peace, that Hitler lost. Up until then, he
demonstrated a frightening capacity to change the balance of
power through peacetime stratagems.

CHAPTER TEN
The New Maginot Line

Peacetime deception had been effectively used in the 1930s to dupe
the Western Allies. Could it be equally effectively used against the
United States today?
The answer given by the American intelligence establishment is

no. According to their public statements, modern technology
combined with satellites in space constitutes an all but infallible
defense against strategic deception. Bobby Ray Inman, who served
first as Director of the National Security Agency, which plays the
lead role in collecting electronic intelligence, and then, until 1982,
as Deputy Director of the CIA, for example, has stated that
American intelligence operates under the assumption that the
Soviet data intercepted by these American satellites "came in
relatively pure," that is, untainted by deception.[1] He explained:
"The vastness of the [American] intelligence 'take' from the Soviet
Union, and the pattern of continuity going back years, even
decades . . . [make Soviet deception] impossible." He reasoned
further that if the Soviets exposed false information to any one
sensor (for example, the telescope on a satellite), the attempted

deception would be picked up by other sensors (the data intercepting
antennae on a satellite), so the only way the Soviets could deceive the United States would be to create electronic as
well as visual "Potemkin villages." But he ruled these out as "impractical" because even if they were technically practical,
they would exhaust all the economic resources of the Soviet
Union.
This confidence was also shared by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
who headed the CIA up until 1981. He suggested in his biography
that the telescopes, antennae, and other sensors in space are
capable of "seeing," "hearing," or otherwise "detecting" virtually
everything of consequence that happens in the Soviet bloc. He
predicted: "we are approaching a time when we will be able to
survey almost any point on the earth's surface with some sensor,
and probably more than one ... we should soon be able to keep
track of most activities on the surface of the earth, day or

night,
good weather or bad."2 To Turner, this new technology makes the
United States not only virtually omniscient but free from dependence on conventional spying.
The extent to which these satellites and other exotic intelligence-
gathering machines had been adopted by the American government as its Maginot Line against deception was driven
home to me at a conference I attended at the Air Force Academy,
Boulder, Colorado, in June 1984. At almost the last moment,
through some misunderstanding or error, I was asked to be the
moderator of a panel on "Intelligence and the Allocations of
Resources."3 When I accepted, I had no idea what topic was
actually covered by this innocuous title.
I found the conference room at the Air Force Academy packed
with generals and admirals, and, as the first paper was read, it
quickly became apparent that the subject that had drawn these staff
officers was not a mundane one. It concerned the

effectiveness of
new and super-secret technology for intelligence gathering. The
issue on the agenda was how the money for it, which was hidden in
the Pentagon budget, should be divided among the CIA, the NSA,
the National Reconnaissance Office, which was responsible for
running "overhead" photography satellites, the Special Navy
Control Program, which was responsible for tapping into undersea
Soviet cables with submarines, and other
units of the military which sounded to me like random letters from
the alphabet. It was all part of an entity called the National
Intelligence Program, a term I had not heard before, which was
important, as I also learned at the meeting, because it constituted
over 90 percent of America's multi-billion-dollar intelligence
budget. This program was administered, at least in terms of its
budget allocations, by a small group called the Intelligence Community

Staff, working jointly under the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense. Three of the other
members of the panel who, unlike me, had top security clearances,
worked on or with this staff, which explained the turnout. William
Lackland was the deputy director of this staff; a second, Peter C.
Oleson, represented the Secretary of Defense on the staff; and the
third, George "Chip" Pickett, Jr., had been the liaison between the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the staff. Among
them, they had a great deal to say as to which programs were
funded. The fourth member of the panel, William Johnson, came
from the CIA and had served on Angleton's counterintelligence
staff. He, however, fell silent after Lackland described his
specialty, espionage, as "nickel and dime stuff. . . not really worth
talking about."
The three technocrats talked about intelligence in almost janitorial
terms, as if it were simply another maintenance service

provided by government. Over and over again, Lackland talked
about "vacuum cleaning," which meant, as he somewhat impatiently
explained when I asked, "sucking in data from wherever you can find it." In other words, signals were indiscriminately
recorded with the idea that they might later be analyzed. At one
point he suggested that "the entire electromagnetic spectrum could
be vacuum-cleaned." For the better part of an hour, they elaborated
on the "reach" of this high-tech equipment, which they wanted to
extend not merely to the Soviet Union but the entire world.
"But couldn't the Soviet Union anticipate and take measures
against this kind of surveillance?" I interrupted. As moderator,
I attempted to steer the discussion toward the issue that interested
me: I suggested that Angleton had argued that intelligence cannot
be easily separated from its twin, deception, if the sources and
methods of collecting it from an adversary are anticipated

by him.

Lackland answered, without missing a beat, "Even if the Soviet
Union knows about it, there is nothing they can do." He acknowledged
that conventional intelligence was predicated on a
chance "snapshot," and it was conceivable that someone might try
to deceive the camera by posing if he could anticipate where and
when the photograph would be taken. But he insisted that with
state-of-the-art space surveillance so many snapshots were taken,
through so many different mediums, that the subject could not alter
his image. So what if he knew his actions were being watched and
listened to; he was "impotent" to deceive this omniscient surveillance.

It became clear as the discussion progressed that this trio was
not merely describing a technology but a new philosophic doctrine
or even, in Angleton's term, a new "epistemology of intelligence."
It blurred the distinction between unanticipated and anticipated

intelligence on the grounds that the quantity of data "vacuum cleaned"
made the target's state of knowledge irrelevant.
Under these premises, systematic deception was treated as if it
were little more than a sick joke. When I pressed the issue about
how one could know "the state of mind" of the enemy, for
example, Lackland and Pickett responded with another technological
solution: the staff had approved funding for research on
ESP "mind-reading" projects which, if successful on Soviet
leaders, would provide another field for vacuum cleaning.
The assertion that these technical systems, even without ESP,
gave the United States an invulnerable shield against deception, if
true, justified the projected expenditure of over $50 billion on them
in the next decade. It also fit in well with the values of the
reorganized American intelligence community. If these sat-
elites systems could yield the answers to all relevant questions
about the Soviet Union's strategy and plans, the CIA and NSA
could do their job by processing a steady flow of

predictable
information from legal sensors in space, which required no risks or
embarrassments. They could also project budgets on stable
expectations of what hardware was needed through the millennium,
predicated on the life span of satellites; provide routine
coverage of Soviet sites specified by arms control treaties; and, in
accomplishing these tasks, measure success by the quantity of
intercepted photographs and signals.
But whereas this new technological doctrine may have satisfied
many of the bureaucratic requisites of the intelligence establishment,
it seemed to arouse considerable hostility from the generals
and admirals in the room. One Air Force general asked pointedly,
"If these systems are so all-seeing, why the hell didn't we receive
warning about the Soviets going into Afghanistan?"
Others cited
warning failures in Europe and the Persian Gulf. An admiral
recalled a U.S. Navy experiment in which a task force of

ships

knowing the precise orbit of U.S. satellites were able to so
successfully zigzag out of their range that they crossed the
Atlantic
"invisible" to satellite coverage.4
Lackland, Oleson, and Pickett dismissed these examples
as mere
"glitches" in the system, but many in the audience seemed
unconvinced. Afterwards, in less formal circumstances, I
discussed
these problems with some of the generals. I subsequently
brought
the matter up with Senator Malcolm Wallop, who had
served on
the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Angelo Codevilla,
his
staffer who had dealt with space intelligence (and who
had also
been at the Air Force Academy conference).
They had great admiration for the technological ingenuity
of
these intelligence-gathering machines which could
identify virtually
any target under the right conditions. But they pointed out
that when all the bureaucratic jargon and mystery is
stripped away,
satellites are nothing more than platforms for observing
or listening to an object that is at least one hundred miles

away.

They had their limitations.

Moreover, as Senator Wallop noted, there are only a handful of
American observation satellites in the sky at any one time. The two
main types are two Key Hole satellites, called the KH-11, a photo
reconnaissance satellite, which takes detailed pictures over Soviet
territory; and four signal satellites, code-named Aquacades, which
are permanently stationed over Soviet territory to intercept radio
and other electromagnetic signals. In addition, there are a few
special-purpose satellites for tracking specific targets, such as the
heat generated by Soviet missile launchings. And in December
1988, the United States added a satellite code-named Lacrosse that
employed radar to "image" targets. This limited array of satellites,
backed by tens of thousands of analysts at the National
Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and CIA,
constitute the "eyes" and "ears" of American space-based

intelligence.

The two KH-11 spacecraft are each 64 feet long and weigh 15
tons apiece. They fly across some Soviet territory every ninety
minutes at altitudes of from 150 to 330 miles. At this relatively low
altitude, their telescopes take pictures of preselected targets. Unlike
earlier satellites, which took pictures on film (which then had to be
ejected and recovered), the KH-11 transmits these pictures
electronically, relaying them through other communications
satellites to the Special Missile and Aeronautics Center at Fort
Meade, Maryland. Here, within seconds, they are enhanced by
super-computers into photographs with sufficiently high resolution
to identify not only individual pieces of military equipment but,
through insignias and numbers, the unit to which they belong.

But the KH-11 satellite still can only "see" with any meaningful
clarity in the daytime and in good weather. It cannot take

photographs
at night, which is half the time, or through clouds, which
cover over 70 percent of the Soviet Union at any one
time.
Moreover, as Codevilla pointed out to me, these satellites
not only
do not "cover all that they can theoretically see, but they
cannot
even cover the square kilometer directly on their ground
track."
This is because their telescopes can focus with any clarity
along a
thin swath of territory. So, by any standard, the two KH-
11
satellites can see only a small fraction of what is
happening in the
Soviet Union at any one time—and because of weather
and other
technical factors, not what they necessarily want to see.
The
difficulty in identifying a new site under the best of
circumstances
is illustrated by how long it took U.S. intelligence to
photograph
the giant Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk in 1983. Even after
the
United States had learned of the radar station's
construction and

approximate location through other means (and it was the height of
a thirty-story building), it took U.S. satellites more than two
months to pinpoint the site and find appropriate weather conditions
to photograph it.

To compensate for this fragmented vision, the CIA, through the
National Reconnaissance Office, builds what it calls "mosaics,"
which are composed of hundreds of separate pictures taken at
different times of the same site. The assumption—which is
problematic—is that the gaps between the individual pictures, both
in time and space, are irrelevant.

There is, however, a far more important limit on the KH-11, or
any other satellite: it cannot see what is going on inside buildings
or under roofs. And it is indoors where secret developments tend to
take place. The KH-11 has never managed to photograph a single
SS-18 or any other Soviet fourth-generation missile.

All that the KH-11 can be relied on to see is the outside of

permanent structures, such as missile silos, radars, and
factories, or
weapons, such as aircraft carriers, that are too large to
hide or
move out of range. It peeks in on only a very few Soviet
activities—and the Soviets can pull the shade down on
these
"windows" at any time.
The Soviets can control exactly what is seen because of
the
totally predictable orbit of the KH-11. Unlike World War
II
reconnaissance planes or the U-2, which could arrive at
unexpected
times and change directions, satellites are tracked by
computers
from the moment they are launched. The KH-11 does
have rocket
engines, which allow it to modify its orbit (to the extent
that the
minuscule amount of fuel it carries lasts), but Soviet radar
can
detect these changes.
The Soviets also know precisely what the lenses can see,
not
only by knowing the laws of optics but through
espionage. In 1978,
the KGB acquired the KH-11 manual from an ex-CIA

officer
named William Kampiles. It explains all the operating procedures,
transmission features, and capacities. Since then, the KH-11 has in
no way been secret.5
Nor is its path. The verification procedures in the SALT arms
control agreement have had the paradoxical effect of making the
routes of the KH-11 highly predictable. Because the Soviets know
which missile sites under construction must be continuously
monitored by the United States, they can determine the angle at
which the satellite's telescope is pointed, and the range of its
camera on each pass. Soviet intelligence has even used its liaison
with the SALT compliance commission to test the full capacity of
the KH-11—by simply staging minor violations of SALT under
different conditions to find out exactly when they can be detected
by the satellite.6
Moreover, since 1966, the Soviets have employed a

sophisticated
warning system to alert all secret sites, such as missile testing
ranges or weapons-testing laboratories, exactly when they
will be exposed to the lenses of American spy satellites. Not
surprisingly, they are then able to bring indoors or otherwise cover
objects they wish to hide. Missiles, for instance, are not loaded
during the brief interval when the KH-11 passes.
With this Satellite Warning System, the Soviet deception planners
deal with U.S. surveillance, when the alarm sounds—just as a
politician uses a photo opportunity—to put in the path of the
satellite lenses what they want to be photographed. To accomplish
this deception, they need not forge comprehensive Po-
temkin villages; they need only add or alter the data which
American analysts rely on to gauge relevant activities. According
to the KGB defector Aleksei Myagov, Soviet military counterintelligence,
in conjunction with the KGB, has since 1968 been
given the mandate "to prepare and carry out. . . special

measures

for disinformation of the enemy," which include deceiving space

surveillance.[7] Another more recent defector, Viktor Suvorov, has

provided detailed accounts of how the Soviet Army displays fake

military equipment for the benefit of the satellite. The coordination

of these "special measures" to deceive and confuse U.S. satellite

cameras was even put under a special staff, known as GUSM,

originally organized by General N. V. Ogarkov.[8] When an American satellite is due to pass over a secret site, GUSM has

three options: It can permit it to be photographed in its true state; it

can try to hide or disguise this site; or it can use the opportunity to

expose some other feature or equipment on the site, real or

fabricated, which will mislead the United States.

No greater skills are needed today to camouflage objects subject

to satellite photography than were needed to deceive aerial

photography in World War II.[9] Though it is a vastly

superior
technology, the space-based telescope takes a picture
from 100 to
330 miles away, whereas the aerial camera used in World
War II
took a picture from a distance of a mile or less. The
additional
power of the telescope simply compensates for the
additional
distance. As can be calculated, taking pictures from an
altitude of
100 miles away with a telescope that has a focal length of
64 feet
(the maximum that will fit in the KH-11) permits
observation of
objects down to six inches in size, in perfect air
conditions, which
is approximately the same resolution as the aerial cameras
used by
German planes in the 1940s. Yet Soviet deception
planners
demonstrated their ability to dupe German aerial
photography in
World War II even to the extent of creating phantom
armies and
fortifications.
The concept was known as Maskirovka, or mashing,
which involved

hiding real objects through camouflage while at the same
time displaying spurious indicators of nonexistent objects
to confuse
and distract foreign intelligence sensors. The Soviet
Military
Historical Journal cites more than twenty major military
successes
between 1941 to 1944 that proceeded from such
techniques. As the
camouflage problem is now no different and they have no
doubt
improved these techniques, the duping of satellites cannot
be
considered a technical impossibility.
If an adversary knows where, when, and how he is being
served,
there is no way to prevent him from putting misleading
messages
in the path of the surveillance. Since the KH-11 operates
under
such conditions, if only because of the predictability of its
orbit, it
can serve as a channel of communications for GUSM as
well as an
observation platform for the CIA. This severely limits its
ability to
serve as any sort of shield against Soviet deception.
Of course, satellite photography is only one component

—the
"eyes"—of America's surveillance of the Soviet bloc. The other
mainstay is the "ears"—signals intelligence satellites stationed
some 22,500 miles high, in geosynchronous orbit, over Soviet
territory.[10] Although this is too far away for photographs, their
antennae continuously "vacuum-clean" emissions coming from Soviet
VHF, UHF, or microwave broadcasts, the telemetry from
missile tests, communications between aircraft, telephone relays,
and most other electronic transmissions. Unlike the KH-11, these
satellites travel at approximately the same speed as the earth,
remain positioned over important targets for long periods of time,
and can intercept signals broadcast from them in any weather, day
or night. They then relay these intercepted signals, through the
"down link" in Pine Gap, Australia, to NSA headquarters at Ford
Meade, Maryland, for processing. But their activities are neither

secret nor unexpected. Soviet intelligence learned their
capabilities—and vulnerabilities—in 1975, when a
TRW employee, Christopher Boyce, delivered to the
KGB
hundreds of technical documents describing the way these
satellites
(then code-named "Rhyolite") operated.[11]
Signals intelligence satellites are, moreover, easily
identifiable
by Soviet radar—if only because of their football field-
size antennae.
The Soviets can be expected to know, at any given time,
their position and the direction in which their antennae are
pointing.
They can then figure out their potential targets simply by
checking which of their own radio emissions would
intersect with
the antennae. Then, as Codevilla pointed out in his
analysis of
space intelligence, those responsible for Soviet
communications
security can "either shift the [compromised]
communication to a
safe channel or transmit knowing someone is listening."[12]
If they
choose the latter course, they can encrypt the data, which
will
make it meaningless to the listener, or else use the

opportunity for
deception, which means adding material that will mislead the
listener.
Even though the United States deploys other highly specialized
reconnaissance satellites that pick up radiation, heat, magnetic
impulses, and other "signatures" from Soviet radar, nuclear blasts,
and missile launchings—and even though the amount of data
processed is no doubt "vast"—the focus is extremely narrow,
limited to tiny slits in Soviet security such as unencrypted broadcasts
or equipment left outdoors.
For example, the new radar satellite, code-named Lacrosse, can
detect objects through cloud cover, and at night, by bombarding
them with high-frequency signals and then deducing from the way
the "blips" bounce off it, the shape of the object. But the amount of
Soviet territory that can be analyzed this way by a single satellite is
minuscule—even compared with the KH-11 satellite.

Moreover, it
has little value as clandestine or unexpected intelligence since
radar "reads" an object, like a blind person reading braille, by
touching it with blips, allowing the Soviets to know exactly what
was being spied upon by the satellite.
And because it can be anticipated, radar can easily be deceived by
distorting angles and surfaces.
Codevilla and Wallop estimated that "thousands of satellites
would be needed to do what Stansfield Turner claimed we do
routinely: keep track of everything important on the face of the
earth!"13 And even most of these exposures can be controlled by
the Soviets if they believe it is worth the expense and effort to shut
the slits or bias the information leaking out of them. In wartime,
when it is more difficult to control exposure, especially if there are
major military movements or missile launchings, space-based
intelligence is truly invaluable. It may also be extremely

helpful,
and convenient for both sides, to verify arms control treaties. But
in peacetime, because the peepholes can be more tightly controlled,
the handful of American satellites cannot be assumed capable of
exposing many kinds of activities— and especially those which the
Soviets valued enough to keep secret.
This led to a further concern. The intelligence executives I spoke
to seemed to be unconcerned with obtaining unanticipated
intelligence about the Soviet Union. Indeed, they did not believe
this arcane form of spying was necessary. If so, and if, consequently,
Soviet intelligence could expect where, when, and how
American satellites would be looking and listening to its activities,
could it also use these highly valued American intelligence machines
as channels for deception?

CHAPTER ELEVEN
The Telemetry Double Cross

Could high-tech satellites be double-crossed in the same way that
human spies were in the celebrated double-cross systems of World
War II?

I pursued this line of inquiry in Los Angeles with Amrom H.
Katz, whom I had been introduced to at the first deception conference
as America's foremost authority on space reconnaissance.[1]
He had begun his career in 1940 at the Air Force's Aerial
Reconnaissance Laboratory, and then he played a major role at
RAND in the development of America's space-based reconnaissance.
Later, in 1973, he headed the Bureau of Verification and
Analysis, which had the responsibility for verifying the SALT
treaties. Like others involved in arms control negotiations, he used
the euphemism "National Technical Means," or NTMs, to describe
spy satellites.[2]
Katz, a short, assertive man, spoke with a precision about his
science that at times was its own kind of poetry. He began by
cutting right to the heart of my question about space

surveillance.

He asked suggestively: "Why not apply Heisenberg's principle to

NTMs and assume that the observer inevitably affects the actions

of the observed?"

"And the Soviets know that they are being observed?" I asked.

"It would be foolish to assume otherwise," he answered, reasoning

that "the laws of physics apply equally in both hemi-

spheres," and what the Soviets cannot deduce from theoretical

physics they can ascertain by experimenting with their own satellites,

which operate at similar altitudes and conditions as their American counterparts. He pointed out further that aside from what

they had learned through their espionage successes the Soviets also

had the ability to test the limits of American satellites merely by

staging an infraction of the SALT accords and then seeing whether

or not it was detected. "I doubt there is much mystery that remains

about what we are observing." He suggested that rather than

catching either side by surprise, the satellites provided a mutual

channel for communications. They permit each side to disclose

data the other side needs to know, he argued, adding, "Disclosure

is part of deterrence." He reminded me that in the satirical film Dr.

Strangelove, the Soviet deterrent, a "Doomsday" bomb designed to

end life on earth if the Soviet Union is attacked, failed because the

Soviets had not informed the United States about it.

Satellites allowed each side to disclose not only whatever

"Doomsday" deterrent it might possess but whatever other information

it wanted foreign observers to be aware of, such as its

compliance with the SALT Treaty. "What it needs to keep secret is

another problem." NTMs, at least in this mode, acted as a sort of

collaborative "show and tell game." Indeed, Katz pointed out that

when the United States considered shuttling missiles around

between silos in the mid-1970s, it included in the plan a provision

for sliding open the roofs of both the empty and full silos

when
Soviet satellites passed overhead so that they could accurately
count the missiles.
But if that was the case, why couldn't the Soviets use this
"game" to show information which, even if it was not factually
inaccurate, would mislead American intelligence? I asked, "Does
anyone worry about satellites being double-crossed?"
Katz quoted what he called Crow's Law, which had been developed
by a British bureaucrat called Crow, and held: "Do not
think what you want to think until you know what you ought to
know." He said, "I have a colleague at RAND who can possibly
tell you what you ought to know. He has been working on this
problem for years." He was William R. Harris, an international
lawyer at RAND and a consultant to the Senate Intelligence
Committee, who was, as Katz put it, "fascinated with turning
things inside out."
I met Harris for breakfast at his home at Pacific Palisades the

next morning. He was young, energetic, articulate, and extremely
guarded in what he said, preferring to speak in the hypothetical
realm. He explained that he held very high "code word" security
clearances for his work at RAND and had to be very careful in
what he said. He was also an almost obsessive intelligence buff,
who compiled a three-volume annotated bibliography on spies and
deception while he was at Harvard University in 1968.3 In 1976, he
had worked on a project at RAND to reassess data that had been
intercepted from the Soviet Union. And he knew, even before I had
broached the subject, of the double cross in which I was interested.
Before we had finished our first cup of coffee in what was to be
a long, caffeine-drenched day, he came to the point. "In the 1960s a
mistake was made by us in assessing Soviet capabilities," he
began. "It was a mistake of such stunning magnitude that we are

still reckoning with the consequences today." He explained that
this error, which persisted for the better part of a decade, involved
drastically underestimating the ability of the Soviet Union to
produce intercontinental missiles that had the pinpoint accuracy
necessary to threaten America's land-based missile force. This
occurred when U.S. intelligence, employing its "most advanced
sources and methods," concluded that the Soviet Union was
precluded from achieving such accuracy in the foreseeable future
because it had not mastered the key component in the guidance
system, and, given this deficiency, the Soviets were basing their
future strategy, which could continue into the next millennium, on
targeting their missiles on cities, which required far less accuracy,
instead of missile silos. If so, the Soviets
had a defensive deterrent, since they could retaliate against
American cities, but not a strategy for striking first and

destroying
American missiles on the ground which were (and
remain)
clustered in a half-dozen sites. On the basis of this
intelligence,
"We made unwarranted assumptions about both the
invulnerability
of our missiles and Soviet weakness," he concluded.
It seemed incredible to me that America's entire strategy
could
be based on some deficient part in some rocket. I asked
him,
moving from the grand to the prosaic picture, "What was
this key
component?"
He answered, "The accelerometers," holding his thumb
and
forefinger about three inches apart, indicating the tiny size
of this
part. He explained that accelerometers act as a sort of high
precision
gyroscope that, by measuring the pull of gravity, indicates
exactly how fast an object is accelerating at any moment.
From this information a computer can then calculate the
object's
precise position and speed. This is crucially important on
missiles
because it allows a computer to determine when to release

the
warheads, which then, with no further guidance, proceed by gravity
toward their targets thousands of miles away.
"But what about our satellites and other NTMs?" I asked, borrowing the lingo from Katz. "Couldn't we ascertain something
as evident as how accurate Soviet missiles were . . . ?"
He jumped in with his answer before I had finished my question."
We did rely on NTMs. That's the point. The data that led to
the error came from NTMs."
He explained that the United States had been intercepting the
measurement data broadcast back to earth, or telemetry, from
Soviet rockets when they were tested. For this purpose, even before
it orbited its signals satellites, the United States used antennae in
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Among this telemetry, which was
broadcast back unencrypted in the 1960s, was the data from each
of nine accelerometers sent back on separate channels. Analyses
showed striking variations between different

accelerometers
supposedly measuring the same value. The CIA task
force studying these interceptions was perplexed not only by this
inconsistency but by the fact that the Soviets were using redundant
accelerometers. The Soviets were using nine accelerometers
whereas three would be enough—one to measure each of the three
axes. The assumption the CIA made to explain this discrepancy
was that the Soviet accelerometers were so inaccurate and
unreliable that the Soviets did not trust their measurements.
Instead, the Soviets had to resort to a primitive system of averaging
the data from multiple accelerometers on each axis and using that
result. (The United States had considered a similar method before
it developed more accurate accelerometers.) The CIA thus found
that the Soviets showed no intention of designing accurate missiles,
a conclusion which fit in with what America wanted to believe
about the Soviet Union.4

This conclusion proved to be wrong in 1968 when the Soviet
stunned American strategists by testing MIRV and other highly
sophisticated missiles which demonstrated that they had mastered
the accelerometer problem, despite the telemetry data. How could
such a contradiction be explained?
When the data was reanalyzed, it was then determined, as Harris
put it, that "only the systematic biasing of telemetry by the Soviets
would produce the apparent large errors in guidance." The Soviets
had, in other words, allowed some of the accelerometers to
broadcast inaccurate data, which evidently was not used for
purposes of guidance, and this bad data, when averaged in with the
relevant data, produced the "systematic bias" that so disastrously
misled the U.S. strategic design.
There still remained the question of whether or not the deception
was deliberate. "Did Soviet intelligence know the United States

was intercepting its telemetry?" I asked.

"There is no doubt about that, it was hardly a secret," Harris
answered. The Soviets had captured a large cache of their own
telemetry data on a downed U.S. transport plane which had strayed
over Soviet territory in 1957, and in 1960, Bernon Mitchell and
William H. Martin defected from the National Security Agency to Moscow. Both had been working on telemetry analyses
and no doubt told the KGB exactly how the United States intercepted
Soviet telemetry.5
Soviet intelligence had great experience in double-crossing
communications interceptions. It had used it as a technique of
disinformation ever since the Bolshevik Revolution. For example,
in 1921 when British intelligence agents obtained the Soviet
diplomatic code from a spy in its Estonian mission and used it to
decode its messages, Soviet intelligence, rather than changing this
betrayed code, used it to misinform British intelligence

about
Soviet arms shipments to rebels in British India. It sent messages in
this code to its Teheran Embassy suggesting that it was ending its
clandestine arms traffic, knowing they would be read by the
British. By doing so, it provided evidence that the British Foreign
Office needed to sign a trade treaty with the Soviet Union.6
Stalin also used this double-cross technique in 1940 when he
discovered that Germany, though then supposedly an ally, had
tapped into the cable link between Japan and the Soviet Union, and
deciphered the code through which messages were sent to its
embassy in Tokyo. Although he could have easily changed from
using the compromised diplomatic code to virtually unbreakable
"one-time" pads, in which the code is switched every message
(which were being used at European embassies), he decided
instead to allow the Germans access to this link. He then

arranged
for Soviet intelligence to insert disinformation messages in the
cable traffic.
"The same concept applies to double-crossing telemetry signals,"
Harris suggested. In this case, the Soviets simply had to add
to each missile being tested extra gauges that were biased in one
direction or another so that they would broadcast back data that
would appear to be inaccurate to American eavesdroppers. Since
Soviet scientists knew which gauges were dummies, they could
simply ignore the biased data. But the United States, not knowing
what this data reflected, had no way of excluding the bogus data
from its calculations.
Why would the Soviets go to such trouble to deceive the United
States? Harris explained that Soviet planners had a very good
reason for deceiving the United States about the accuracy of a new
generation of missiles, the so-called SS-7s, that their

Yangel
Design Bureau was developing in 1958-59. If U.S. intelligence had
realized that the guidance systems on these missiles were good
enough to pinpoint and destroy in a surprise attack all eighty
command centers necessary to launch U.S. land-based missiles, the
United States would have compensated for this by either placing
their missile force on moving trains—a plan then under
consideration—or further hardening the silos to make them less
vulnerable. In either case, it would have defeated the peremptory
threat of the Soviet SS-7. But by distorting the telemetry, and
making the SS-7s appear to be inaccurate, the Soviets furthered
their potential for winning a Pearl Harbor type preemptive war.
Harris pointed out that by the early 1960s the "KGB not only
established a field office at the Tyura-Tam Missile Test Center
[where the SS7s were tested], but actually controlled access to

missile guidance and calibration facilities at that test range." The
KGB was thus able to manage the "indicators" through which the
CIA decided the degree of lethality of these weapons. Moreover,
he noted that there was no downside for the Soviets to this
deception. "The recorded mis-calibrations, before flight testing, of
one or more of each set of redundant instruments, could result in a
test series in which the Soviet strategic rocket forces could estimate
the actual guidance errors" while deceiving the United States at the
same time.
After I returned to New York, I dug out an old file of notes. Harris
was not the first person to have brought up accelerometers. I
recalled that William Sullivan had mentioned them in regard to
another matter shortly before he died in his hunting accident in
1976. It did not seem relevant at the time, but when I reread the file
I realized it fit in with what Harris told me.
Sullivan had described how Vadim Isakov, a Soviet

diplomat
working for UNESCO in New York, led the FBI "on a merry chase
of arms dealers" around the country in the early 1960s—even
though he knew he was under surveillance. He was trying to buy,
among other things, accelerometers. Eventually, in 1965, he led his
FBI shadows to an arms dealer in New Jersey, who agreed to sell
him accelerometers, and he was promptly arrested. Sullivan's point
was that it was a "set-up" designed to focus American attention on
these devices (which he did not describe further).
When this Soviet interest in accelerometers was passed on to the
CIA science and technology task force, it requested the FBI to see
what the two FBI double agents at the UN, Fedora and Top Hat,
knew about Isakov's mission. Both men reported that they had
received a questionnaire from Moscow that urgently requested
information about American guidance controls, which meant

accelerometers.

Fedora then returned to Moscow on home leave. When he came
back to New York, he had some further data for the FBI. He said
that he had learned that Soviet scientists were having great
difficulty gauging the exact moment to separate warheads from
missiles. They needed to know, according to Fedora, how
American scientists had solved this problem.

Sullivan had no doubt that Fedora was a Soviet-controlled agent
(which was later confirmed when he returned to Moscow). He was
therefore suggesting that Moscow was feeding Washington
disinformation about the inaccuracy of its guidance system through
double agents.

When I told Harris about Fedora's role, he hardly sounded
surprised. He added, "It wasn't only double-agent channels that
were used" to reinforce the biased telemetry. There was a third
channel, but he insisted that he "absolutely could not discuss it."

By this time, I could make a fairly educated guess,

especially in
light of my prior conservation with Katz, that this third channel
was satellite photography. After all, as Katz had explained to
me, ever since World War II, photo reconnaissance experts had
studied bomb and artillery craters to determine the accuracy of
weapons. It would be an obvious use for satellites.
I raised this issue with a staffer on the Senate Intelligence
Committee who also had an interest in deception. He answered
matter-of-factly, perhaps assuming that I knew more than I did,
that the National Reconnaissance Office used crater analysis to
confirm the relative inaccuracy of Soviet missiles. It tasked satellites,
when weather conditions permitted, to photograph the
Soviet missile-testing range in Siberia the day after test firings. He
pointed out that the Soviets certainly knew the craters were being
photographed and even left telephone poles they used as aiming
points in place. So it was a relatively easy matter to deduce how far

the warheads went astray.

This "crater impact analysis," I further learned, provided results

of wildly off-the-mark missiles that dovetailed with both the data

from the intercepted Soviet telemetry and Fedora's reports. These

three Soviet channels, all confirming each other, further convinced

American strategists that they were right in downplaying the

likelihood of highly accurate missiles.

He then went on to explain that in the early 1970s unexpected

intelligence revealed dramatically different results. For a brief

period, the Soviets did not realize that what they assumed was a

signals satellite was actually photographing its missile range. The

photographs this satellite took, obviously anticipated by Soviet

intelligence, revealed Soviet bulldozer crews working at night

filling in some craters and excavating others, and also moving

around the aiming points. Presumably, these alterations were being

made for the benefit of the expected American satellites that were
scheduled to pass over the sites the next day. The comparison of
the real craters with the doctored ones revealed the purpose of the
satellite deception: as in the case of the doctored accelerometers, it
was to under represent the accuracy of Soviet missiles. If nothing
else, this suggested that "vacuum-cleaning" different channels
would not expose a deception so
long as the Soviets orchestrate what is seen and heard in other
channels. In this case, the clues dished up by three channels—
telemetry, double agents, and satellite photography—only served
to make the deception more credible. And through this
orchestration the United States was misled about the accuracy of
Soviet missiles over a five-year period.[7]
Once the Soviets realized that the United States had caught on to
the faking of the craters, they not only ended this activity but the
reports from Fedora and his associates suggesting Soviet

missile
inaccuracy dried up. And, soon afterwards, the Soviets began
encrypting the telemetry from their accelerometers so that it was no
longer available to the CIA. It now seemed persuasive that, before
and after the fact, the Soviets were coordinating what the United
States saw—and didn't see—in these channels. Could it be
anything else than a well-planned double cross of U.S.
intelligence? It certainly had disastrously misled American
strategists.
The Soviets had the capacity to orchestrate such a deception.
The Soviet missile command had been reorganized in 1959, and a
special staff, GUSM, had been given the responsibility for the
security of its secret testing. But there still remained one element
missing in the deception loop—feedback.
In order for GUSM to have organized such a massive deception
in 1961, and sustain it for six years in the mind of American

intelligence, it would have to have a "window," as Harris put it, to
see how its tricks were being interpreted. It had to be certain, for
example, that the CIA had accepted the "averaging method" of
calculating telemetry (a method that had been conveniently
disclosed by a Soviet scientist at a conference monitored by the
CIA). It had to be sure that the CIA had swallowed the bait about
the accelerometers and that the National Reconnaissance Office
had taken the telephone poles among the craters to be aiming
points. And it had to be sure that the United States did not have an
unanticipated source of intelligence (as it subsequently developed)
that would expose the deception. This window would
require a mole who had access to some of America's most secret
and exotic intelligence.
I took this problem to Colonel Thomas D. Fox, whom I had met
in 1975 when I was doing research on narcotics control and he was

working for an elite anti-drug task force.[8] He had headed the
counterintelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the late
1960s and he had a labyrinthine memory for all the convoluted
trails left by moles in the defense establishment. I now wanted to
know from him if any had been in the position to provide feedback
for a telemetry double cross.

"One candidate, who had both the position and access, would be
Whalen," he began, as he recounted his history from memory like a
computer file. Lieutenant Colonel William Henry Whalen had been
the highest-ranking American military officer to be convicted as a
Soviet agent. He had joined the Army, at the age of twenty-five, in
1940. After sustaining injuries in a car accident in 1941, he became
a special service officer, assigned to the Office of Chief of Staff,
Intelligence Division, in Washington, D.C. This division is the
private intelligence service of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

which has
access to virtually all military secrets. In the late 1940s, he was
assigned responsibility for finding, and resettling, German rocket
scientists in the United States—which involved maintaining
"liaisons with industrial research, scientific, and scholastic
organizations." For this work, he received a top secret and
cryptographic clearance. Then, in the mid-1950s, he served in
Japan, helping to organize communications intelligence systems.
From 1955 to 1957, he returned to Washington and worked with
the Foreign Liaison Office in the Pentagon. His job there involved
delivering "cleared" information (including disinformation) to
Soviet military liaisons. Fox speculated that this was where he
came to the attention of Soviet recruiters.
In any case, as Army intelligence later pieced together, Colonel
Sergei Edemski, the Soviet Army attache, began cultivating
Whalen with dinners and small cash gifts in the guise of presents

for his child. When he found Whalen receptive to taking money,
he gradually increased the amounts. Since he had apparently
learned through another undetermined Soviet source in the Pentagon
that Whalen was not reporting these unorthodox social contacts, he intensified the pressure on him. He asked, for example,
Whalen's help in getting some unclassified manuals— which
would greatly help him impress his Soviet superiors. When Whalen
complied, further compromising himself, Edemski then began
requesting more useful data. At this point, Whalen realized that the
Soviets could not only destroy his career but put him in prison. He
had little alternative but to continue his relationship with Edemski.
In July 1957, Whalen was promoted to deputy chairman of the
Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency which, among other tasks,
assessed secret intelligence received from scientists. And, in 1959,
he was chosen as the intelligence adviser to the Army

Chief of

Staff—one of the highest intelligence positions in the country.

From these two vantage points, he could claim a "need to know"

virtually whatever intelligence was relevant to the Joint Chief of

Staff's planning and allocation of military forces. This included

satellite, communications, and electronic intelligence gathering.

Whalen continued passing such information on to his Soviet case

officers until 1962. This would have been the critical period for

feedback for the telemetry deception. "He certainly told the Soviets

about the conclusions we were drawing from the telemetry

intercepts," Fox concluded.

Fox added that Whalen had been caught by the FBI through

surveillance. He confessed, was arrested, tried, and convicted of

conspiring with a Soviet agent in 1966.[9]

So Whalen could have provided the window the Soviet deception

planners needed initially. But who provided it after 1962?

"The Soviets might have gotten what else they needed from
Jack Dunlap," Fox suggested. Unlike Whalen, Jack E. Dunlap was
merely a sergeant in the National Security Agency. But he had
access to the "kings of the kingdom" as the chauffeur for
Major General Garrison B. Coverdale, the chief of staff of the
National Security Agency. Fox explained that at NSA headquarters
at Fort Meade, Maryland, where the total product of U.S. electronic
interceptions—the data vacuum-cleaned from antennae in space
satellites, naval spy ships, and planted listening devices in hostile
countries—is processed and analyzed, security is based on
preventing anyone from taking any data from the base. Everyone is
searched at the gates—with one exception. As the driver of the
chief of staff's car, Dunlap was permitted to drive on and off the
base without being searched. It was, according to Fox, the only
vehicle that could leave the base without being inspected.
Dunlap also opened up a small business which vastly

increased
his access. Since his car had unique "no inspection"
status, he
volunteered to help senior officers at the NSA pilfer from
the base
various items, such as typewriters and furniture, which
they wanted
at home. At least six of the officers accepted the offer and,
with
Dunlap's help, continued smuggling articles out for at
least two
years. A later investigation even found that one NSA
colonel had
tutored Dunlap in methods of circumventing other NSA
procedures.
All this time Dunlap was a Soviet agent, having been
compromised
and recruited in Turkey in 1957. While pretending to be
merely assisting his superiors get their effects off the
base, Dunlap
and his KGB controllers got virtually the complete run of
America's most secret intelligence base. The pilfering ring
not only
provided Dunlap with the keys to offices and
combinations to
safes; it also gave him a plausible rationale for his after-
hour visits.
Dunlap was thus able to deliver to his Soviet contacts

microfilmed
copies of virtually all the instruction books, repair
manuals,
mathematical models, and design plans for the machinery
used to
encrypt American codes.
Then, in 1961, he was given responsibility by the chief of
staff
for shuttling secret data back and forth between Fort
Meade and
the CIA counterintelligence officers on Angleton's staff
who
were cleared on a "need to know" basis to see these
interceptions.
This afforded Dunlap the opportunity to ascertain—and
feed back
to his Soviet case officers—the questions that CIA
counterintelligence
was asking about data intercepted from the Soviet
Union. He could have, up until 1963, delivered what Fox
called the
"methodology" for this intelligence.
But that could not be determined by military intelligence.
On
October 10, 1963, before the evidence came to light
showing he
was a Soviet mole, Dunlap died in his car in his garage
from

asphyxiation, an apparent suicide.

Fox told me that there had been a full-scale NSA postmortem

investigation by General Joseph P. Carroll that I could obtain under

the Freedom of Information Act, which I did.10 I then went to see

Angleton since, according to Fox, Dunlap had been acting as a

liaison with Angleton's counterintelligence staff shortly before his

death.

After reading through the Carroll Report, which he had obviously

seen before, Angleton said glumly, "The real tragedy was that Dunlap was never debriefed." I recalled that a number of other

Soviet agents had apparently killed themselves before they could

be interrogated. There were three such cases in Germany alone in

1968. "Making murder look like suicide is no trick," he said with

an enigmatic shrug.

Angleton did not want to talk about Dunlap's contacts with his

staff, saying, "That was not the problem." He explained that in

1962, when Dunlap was carting NSA data by the truckload to his
Soviet case officers, the NSA was involved in the installation and
security arrangements for the CIA's new central computer. This
system not only connected up the CIA's own archives but provided
electronic channels to safely transmit data to outside agencies in
the intelligence community. Since this computer was a prime target
of Soviet intelligence, Angleton feared that Dunlap might have
given away the computer's safeguard design. If so, the Soviets
could "breach the computer from the outside" and monitor, step by
step, the way the CIA "conceived of an
intelligence problem." He then suggested that in the late 1960s his
counterintelligence staff and the Office of Security developed
incontrovertible evidence that such a "breach" of the computer
system had indeed occurred. The Soviets thus had their feedback

CHAPTER TWELVE
The War of the Moles

Having inward spies means making use of officials of the enemy...
to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain the
plans that are being formed against you, and disturb the harmony
and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers.
—Sun-tzu, The Art of War

After learning about Dunlap, I wanted to know why U.S. intelligence
was vulnerable to penetrations. Not only must such a mole
be in the right place at the right moment, he must be willing to
betray his country, very possibly at the risk of his life. What were
the conditions that allowed the KGB to find these "inward spies"?

Earlier in my research, an officer in the CIA's Soviet Bloc
Division outlined to me what he claimed was a novel that he
wanted to write. It was called "The Letter."

It begins when a young CIA officer working out of the

American
Embassy in Berne, Switzerland, receives an anonymous letter
warning him that one of his superiors in the CIA is a Soviet mole.
The writer adds that he will personally contact the officer within
the week and provide him with secret documents that will establish
his bona fides. The letter writer makes one final request: he asks
the CIA officer to keep even the fact that he has received
the letter a secret from his superiors, lest it leak back to the mole
and the KGB.
The case officer ignores this injunction. Instead, following CIA
procedures, he informs his superior about the letter. Several
months later he receives another letter from the mystery writer
explaining that his initial letter has leaked to the KGB, precipitating
a Soviet security investigation. To prove that there was
indeed a penetration into the CIA station, he also encloses the
name of an Eastern European diplomat the CIA was planning to

recruit that month. The writer notes that if this letter is passed up
through channels, he will undoubtedly be discovered and arrested;
if not, he will contact the CIA officer.
The CIA officer, convinced by this information that indeed there
is a mole in his own chain of command, decides this time to follow
the instructions in the letter. This time he ignores the rules.
Weeks go by. Then, at a large reception, a Soviet diplomat
identifies himself to the CIA officer as the letter writer. He explains
that he is a KGB counterintelligence officer who wants to
defect to the United States. He points out that, having revealed
himself, his life now depends on the discretion of the CIA officer.
And he offers a bargain that is difficult to resist. He will supply an
entire cache of documents about Soviet intelligence operations that
will pinpoint the Soviet moles in the CIA. In return, all the CIA
officer has to do is help conceal his identity until the mole complex

is exposed.

The CIA officer replies that he has no real choice in the matter:
whatever documents he receives from him will have to be passed
up through channels.

The KGB officer then suggests a way out of this bind. The
documents could be turned over to his superiors, but, to throw the
inevitable KGB investigation off his tracks, the CIA officer would
misreport the time of the meetings by a day or so. He argues that
this misreporting, which would be leaked back to the KGB, will
allow him to establish an alibi.

The CIA officer accepts the deal. He figures in return for trivial
lies to his superior that will not be noticed, he will protect his
source's life. The documents he gets will then expose the moles,
which will make him a hero.

The documents begin flowing in, and the case officer suddenly
finds himself an important man in the Soviet Division. He is even

taken to a briefing of the President.

But his source, who is becoming progressively more valuable,
then begins to complain that the KGB security investigation is
closing in on his section. Even with the time discrepancy, he says
he will come under suspicion if he continues to supply material. He
now needs the CIA officer's help in diverting attention away from
him. He asks him to make a trip to Vienna and report that his
source was there (even though the Soviet officer will remain in
Switzerland).

The CIA officer, anxious for the next batch of documents, agrees to this harmless deception. He gets the documents in
Switzerland, holds them secretly in a girlfriend's apartment, then
travels to Vienna, where he hopes he will be picked up by Soviet
surveillance. On his return from Vienna, he gets the documents and
hands them in to his superior—as well as a fake report about his
contact.

As more and more secret material comes in, his "mole" assumes
progressively greater importance to the CIA. Accordingly, the case
officer has to go to greater lengths to maintain the fictional identity
of his source, which by now involves falsifying expense vouchers,
as well as the times and places of meetings.
Finally, when the CIA case officer is sufficiently entangled in
this web, his "mole" suddenly turns the tables on him. He shows
him a complete dossier that has been ingeniously compiled on him
by the KGB during this entire episode. It includes everything from
photographs of him in places that he was not supposed to be, with a
Soviet diplomat whom he has never mentioned in his reports, to
bank books showing that money has been deposited in his name in
bank accounts.
The CIA officer, realizing how incriminating this dossier would
look to his superiors, listens in stunned amazement as the Soviet

intelligence officer now makes him a proposition: becoming a

Soviet mole. If he accepts, the Soviet recruiter says, the KGB could

make him Director of the CIA. If he refuses, his dossier will be

leaked to CIA counterintelligence.

The CIA case officer decides to break off his contacts with his

Soviet accomplice, and admits to falsifying the records of the case.

But his superiors do not believe him—and a new nightmare begins

as he tries to prove he is not a mole. This was as far as the author

had gotten in his outline.

Angleton said, when I had finished recounting this plot to him,

"That is not a novel; it is what had happened in 1962."

The only difference was the ending. The CIA officer who had

gotten himself entrapped through a combination of zeal, ambition,

and compassion was forced to resign, since even with lie detectors

the counterintelligence staff could not be certain about his story.

Angleton understood he had become a successful banker.[1]

The ease with which a trained, loyal, and experienced CIA case
officer could be entrapped interested me. The recruitment of a
mole appeared to have been refined to a science by intelligence
services. As Angleton explained it, the making of a mole is far less
difficult in practice than it appears to the public. It is based on the
premise that whereas few individuals would elect to commit
treason if they knew what they were doing, few can resist breaking
minor rules and regulations when presented with the right set of
temptations. What it involves then is not a single conscious
decision to betray state secrets, but an incremental entrapment in a
subtle web of compromises. Intelligence services, with the aid of
psychologists and social behaviorists, have refined the procedure to
a precise science. It requires three conditions: access, vulnerability
to compromise, and the inability to resist blackmail.
Access, or the opportunity to approach a target without

arousing
suspicion, is rarely a problem in the intelligence game.
Enemy
intelligence officers, especially those charged with
espionage operations,
are continually in contact with one another. It is, as
Angleton put it, "part of their mission." The main job of a
CIA
officer is, after all, to recruit an Eastern bloc intelligence
officer.
Conversely, the main job of a KGB officer is to recruit a
CIA
intelligence officer. The CIA's Soviet Division, which is
in charge
of this espionage activity, stations most of its officers in
American
embassies around the world and in the UN, under the
guise of
American diplomats. The KGB's American Section of its
Foreign
Service (or First Chief Directorate), which performs a
similar
mission for the Soviet Union, posts its officers under
diplomatic
cover at most of its embassies abroad—and its UN
Mission. Since
the diplomatic cover tends to be transparent, they both
know who

the other is (and, if there is any question, both sides maintain
archives of snapshots to identify their rivals).
At diplomatic receptions where Western and Eastern bloc intelligence
officers often home in on one another like long-lost
friends, both sides attempt to assess each other's vulnerabilities. In
these exchanges, it is not uncommon for a CIA and KGB officer to
pick each other as targets for recruitment. As this game continues,
the rival intelligence officers may invite one another to dinner,
family outings, sporting events, or other social occasions. They can
even dangle bits of information to each other— so long as these are
"cleared" by their own intelligence service as "bait." The only
restriction on this activity, according to Angleton, is that each
officer file a full written report of his contact with the enemy.
In addition to such diplomatic contacts, opposition intelligence
officers frequently call each other "cold" to establish contact. To

heighten their counterpart's interest in them, they often feign

dissatisfaction with their work, financial difficulties, or a sexual

vulnerability. These ritualistic flirtations involve a sizable part of

both the American and Soviet espionage services. Angleton estimated

that, any given time, there are several hundred intelligence

officers "in the deer park," as he called this pool of case officers

and targets.

The second condition, vulnerability, is more difficult to find.

Not all the targets can be compromised, but intelligence services

have techniques for selecting those in the pool with weaknesses

that can be exploited. The "target" somehow must be tempted into

doing something that is an infraction of his country's rules and

regulations—no matter how trivial. The lure can be whatever

appears to interest him, including money, sex, drugs, friendship,

career advancement, or any combination of the above. In

1966, a
study prepared for the Assistant Army Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, entitled "Motivations to Treason," concluded that
bribes were by far the most often used inducements. (Ironically, the
Intelligence Chief's own deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Whalen, was
later convicted for passing classified American secrets to Soviet
intelligence officers in return for money.)3 Bribes need not be
direct. They can take the form of loans to relatives, consulting fees,
gambling tips, inside information on a stock, or participation in a
profitable business venture. Nor does the person dispensing the
benefit have to reveal for whom he is really working. Or the bait
can be sexual—custom-designed to fit almost any human weakness
or perversion.
While it may be more convenient for a nation to find a recruit
predisposed to its cause—as Philby, Burgess, Maclean, and Blunt
were sympathetic to the Communist cause—it is not

necessary.

Acting under a "false flag," a KGB recruiter can assume, Protean like,
any affiliation to which his target is predisposed, no
matter how antithetical it is to communism. Angleton recalled
cases in which KGB officers pretended to be Israeli officials,
NATO military attaches, and even neo-Nazis. Once these officers
violated the reporting requirements of their service, they were
compromised and blackmailed into service for the real princi-
pal—the KGB. Since any "false flag" can be adopted, any intelligence
officer who believes strongly enough in any cause or movement is vulnerable.[2]

Because of the peculiar symbiotic relations of intelligence service,
recruiters can also use the desire for career advancement to
compromise rival intelligence officers. "Careers are made on
sources," Angleton said. They can offer to make or break their
career in their own service—because rival intelligence services

often depend on each other for their successes. For both the CIA

and the KGB, the ultimate prize is a source in the enemy's camp.

And almost invariably these "sources" are enemy intelligence

officers. An intelligence officer who finds—and controls— such a

source in the rival camp greatly increases his own prospects for

advancement. To the extent that such a source is considered

valuable, so is the case officer who often has exclusive access to

him.

Whereas money, sex, ideology, and ambition provide the means

for compromising targets, the lever used to convert a man into a

mole tends to be blackmail. The point of the exercise, as Angleton

explained it to me, "is to get the recruit in the palm of your hand,

and, once he has nowhere else to go, gradually squeeze him." The

aim is to compromise the prospect enough so that cooperating

appears to be a lesser danger than not cooperating. To

execute it,
the case officer may require months of surveillance and
preparation, and employ teams of specialists. Whatever
lure is
used, the point of the sting is to make it impossible for the
recruit
to explain his activities to his superiors. He is
compromised, not so
much by his original indiscretion, but for failing to report
it.
A CIA document I found in the Teheran Archive explains
this
recruitment practice: "From the view point of Soviet
Intelligence,
any American who agrees to an unofficial and personal
relationship with a Soviet, and conceals the fact from his
(or her)
superiors has already taken a first compromising step."
Every
move by the KGB is intended to deepen the guilt. "By
accepting
the small aspects of clandestineness which are gradually
introduced,
such as not calling the Soviet at his official number or
agreeing to meetings at unorthodox times and places, the
American
compounds his original compromise. . . ." It continues,
"The effect

of this process is to draw the American into a 'confidential'
relationship, from which the American gradually comes to realize
he cannot withdraw except at the cost of acute embarrassment— or
perhaps severe personal consequences—by disclosing the compromise to his superiors."4 When he is in so deep that he
cannot plausibly explain his actions, he will be confronted with the
loss of whatever he values most: his career, his reputation, or even
his family. The alternative is to supply information to the enemy.
Initially, he may be asked only for completely innocuous documents, such as an embassy's Christmas card list, but supplying
it gradually increases the blackmail threat.
Still, for the purposes of getting feedback, it is not enough merely to recruit moles. They must be in precisely the right place
at the right time. This is no easy matter, since intelligence agencies
usually are divided up into tight compartments, with strict rules
and "bigot lists," specifying which members of the intelligence

service are allowed to see the secret material within it. A mole
cannot therefore glean the information his principals need by
casually wandering around an intelligence agency and chatting
with his fellow officers in corridors; he has to have a "need to
know" clearance for it. To get such privileged access, a mole must
be maneuvered and advanced through the bureaucratic labyrinth
until he is in the right compartment. The real problem, according to
Angleton, was managing the careers of moles by remote control so
that they wound up burrowing into the right compartments. Such
compartments are, for example, the CIA's Reports Sections, where
agents' reports are collated and analyzed; the counterintelligence
units, where reports are vetted and challenged; and the liaison
committees representing different agencies, where U.S.
intelligence operations are coordinated. And since the KGB is
unlikely to find a single mole that meets

all its requirements, it needs moles it can maneuver from position
to position.

Here again the peculiar symbiotic relationship of the KGB and
CIA provides each side with a means for advancing their mole into
the necessary compartment. Both sides can give the other a Trojan
gift in the form of a highly placed source. The KGB, for example,
can allow the CIA to recruit another one of their agents, who
becomes the "outside man." Then the "outside man" gives the mole
information that in order to investigate takes him to new areas. The
classic example of this outside-inside gambit was Heinz Felfe.5
Felfe was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1951, when he was
a minor investigator in the West German intelligence service. At
the behest of his Soviet case officer, he applied to his own
counterintelligence section, and his transfer was approved the
following year. He had responsibility there for investigating the

credentials of refugees pouring in from East Germany. To build his
career, Soviet intelligence allowed him to detect six East German
agents among these refugees. Each of these agents then agreed to
be "turned" and provided Felfe with the intelligence questions they
had been sent into West Germany to answer. They, moreover, all
agreed to work for him as double agents.
While these coups made Felfe a hero in the eyes of his superiors
and led to his rapid promotion—he became Deputy Director of the
West German counterintelligence service in 1959— they had also
expanded his access to see information from other West German
departments and agencies and pass it on to the KGB. For instance,
the KGB sent him a refugee agent into West Germany and, like a
chess sacrifice of a pawn, allowed him to be caught by the West
German police. This sacrificed agent had in his possession a list of
prominent NATO names. When it was turned over to

Felfe, the list
thus gave Felfe a "need to know" rationale for
investigating the
names on it, which required working with the CIA and
other
Western intelligence services. As this case expanded, he
further
extended his reach. By the late 1950s,
his KGB controllers had maneuvered him, through his
supplied
"sources," into a position where he was able to feed back
to them
the assessments of allied intelligence services of the
disinformation
being furnished through refugee sources. He even visited
CIA
headquarters in Washington. (He was not exposed until
1963.)
How prevalent are penetrations in the CIA? Although the
number of legal actions brought against present or former
officers
for working for hostile intelligence services is relatively
small—
twelve since 1948—the question of KGB penetration is
not a
question that can be answered by resorting to the legal
record. As
Angleton explained, the counterintelligence technique

employed
by the CIA when it discovers a potential "turned"
employee is not
to arrest him and hold a public trial, since the KGB will
learn their
agent is compromised, as well as other valuable clues
from the
legal proceedings. The KGB will then have the
opportunity to
replace a known agent with an unknown one. The
alternative that is
followed, according to Angleton, is to quietly transfer
suspects
from highly sensitive compartments.
Intelligence services do not need a 100 percent success
rate in
advancing moles. If one candidate fails to get the right
job, another
can be substituted. With even a one-in-ten success rate,
intelligence
services can, according to Angleton, establish the
feedback they
need for deception. Moreover, studies of the penetrations
of NATO
services, sparked by Golitsyn's defection, were not
reassuring. The
facilities with which the Soviets recruited and
maneuvered moles

in the British, French, Canadian, and West German services, which
were only secondary targets in the intelligence war, made it
difficult for Angleton to believe that the KGB would not have
applied equal resources to penetrating the services of its "main
enemy"—U.S. intelligence. "There was no reason to presume CIA
officers were invulnerable to recruitment," he pointed out.
The CIA was an ad hoc group, pulled together from many
different organizations in the late 1940s. Its personnel was anything
but homogeneous: some had Ivy League backgrounds, others
had Russian or Eastern European backgrounds and had been
chosen because of their language skills. Many of its officers had
served in Russia during the war, or were liaisons with underground
fighters in Eastern Europe who were allied with the Communists.
If the Soviets had followed the same procedures they did against
the British, a significant proportion of these officers would have

been targets of recruitment operations. Once a higher-level
candidate had been compromised, the data that the KGB acquired
from low-level penetrations, such as Marine guards, secretaries,
embassy bugs, and purloined documents, could be used to support
the recruitment.

Yet, when Angleton and his counterintelligence staff reexamined
their files in the early 1960s, they found that the reporting
of these contacts was so "sporadic and chaotic" as to raise
questions whether there was any "quality control at all," as Angleton
explained the problem. Even if it were assumed that none of
these officers made a conscious decision then to commit treason, it
did not necessarily follow that no one would not have committed
indiscretions or accepted some favors from their ally. And so,
Soviet intelligence would have some leverage to pressure them,
even years later, into other irregular acts.

In the cases of both Whalen and Dunlap, the KGB showed that

even an obscure agent could still tap into crucial intelligence

assessments at the highest level. It simply took advantage of their

liaison role within the ganglia of different agencies in the "intelligence

community." Since the liaison level is where intelligence jigsaw puzzles are pieced together by the different agencies, it

became, ever since Philby, a prime target for infiltration. Angleton

cited the case of David Barnett, who had served as a CIA officer

for twenty years in Asia as a secret operations officer. The KGB

recruited him after he left the CIA, and attempted to place him on

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. At the CIA, Barnett,

as a field officer in Indonesia, had

only limited value: he could betray CIA sources and methods

where he was stationed, but this would not lead to any penetration

of the centralized assessments being made of data intercepted from

the Soviet Union. At the Senate Select Committee, which had

oversight responsibility for all the intelligence agencies, reviewing
methods as well as results, he could provide the feedback necessary for Soviet deceptions. (Before he could actually do any
damage, Barnett was arrested, tried, and convicted for collaborating with Soviet intelligence officers.)
Angleton's point was that the core business of intelligence services was establishing and running moles in the enemy camp.
Like other modern businesses, such as advertising, they had developed
the techniques to accomplish this task (though it was antithetical to their work to spell them out). If nations like the
Soviet Union, United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and
Israel did not believe, after studying the secret data, that the job of
recruiting, compromising, and managing moles was at least doable,
they could not justify the continuation of their espionage services—the KGB, CIA, MI6, SDECE, BND, and Mossad. The
KGB, moreover, had already demonstrated with Philby, Whalen,
and Dunlap that it could find and breach the nerve-center compartments

in American intelligence. So it would be only prudent to assume that the Soviet Union had, or could obtain, the feedback
necessary for strategic deception.
The picture pieced together by Angleton, as bleak as it was for
the CIA, suggested that the KGB also could be infiltrated by the
CIA. Wasn't penetration a two-edged sword? Had not the United
States also recruited its share of Soviet intelligence officers in the
war of moles?
Angleton acknowledged that the CIA had its share of successes.
CIA documents in the Teheran Archive, moreover, made it clear
that the CIA's Soviet Bloc Division was fully confident that it had
"the capability to mount and support. . . operations" in the Soviet
bloc that included managing the careers of its moles in government
positions and even evacuating them to safety if
they got in trouble. And, as it was pointed out at the deception
conferences, there had been over one hundred defectors from the

Soviet bloc since the end of World War II, most of whom had been
recruits, if not actual moles, of the CIA and its allied services.6 But,
as it turned out, with the notable exception of Lieutenant Colonel
Peter Popov, a Soviet military attache whom the CIA maintained
as a mole for nearly eight years, the life span of the moles recruited
by the CIA has been relatively short. Even Oleg Penkovsky lasted
only seven months before he came under KGB surveillance.7 And
almost all were from the pool of Soviet officials permitted to travel
abroad—such as diplomats, military attaches, and intelligence
officers, which Golitsyn had identified as the "outer" KGB. In none
of these hundred-odd cases cited had the CIA succeeded in
advancing a mole to a critical position in Soviet communications
intelligence, intergovernmental liaison, or central assessment
before he had defected. Soviet intelligence, on the other hand,

succeeded in recruiting and running agents in virtually every strata
of American activity of interest to it. The moles who have been
uncovered in the United States have been, aside from intelligence
officers and diplomats, nuclear scientists, rocket-technology
experts, defense systems engineers, cryptographers, telemetry
analysts, congressional staff members, economists, mathematicians, archivists, translators, antisubmarine warfare
experts, medical researchers, journalists, computer operators, and
business executives.
These differences appeared to proceed not from any lack of
sophistication or skill in the CIA but from fundamental distinctions
between open and closed societies. It was what one think tank
analyst at the deception conference referred to as "the asymmetries."
To begin with, the Soviet Union does not need to rely on either
its espionage service or its satellites for basic intelligence about the

state of mind of the American political leaders, debates over U.S.
national security policies, or the technological developments they
depend on. It can openly garner such material
from newspapers that keep close contact with the elites, such as
The New York Times and The Washington Post; television
programs, such as the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour and ABC's
Nightline, on which policy makers debate each other; trade
publications like Aviation Week, in which defense contractors vie
with one another to release information about their projects; and
congressional reports and debates, which spell out priorities in
policy. To supplement and test these data, Soviet bloc diplomats,
journalists, and other researchers in the United States can use
public libraries, archives, and university services such as
University Microfilms to obtain on microfilm reference books,
Ph.D. theses, telephone directories, scientific treatises, and

government data released on prior Freedom of
Information Act
requests. Soviet intelligence can also, for the price of a
computer
search, consult data bases, such as Lexis, Nexis, and Facts
On File.
It can take advantage of UN research facilities, which
interconnect
with most economic data bases, or even make its own
Freedom of
Information Act requests. (Not surprisingly, Eastern bloc
countries
make a vast number of such requests.) In addition, it can
send
observers to almost all government hearings, which are by
law
open to the public. And whereas its own officials are
restricted, it
can often acquire the insights from zealous investigations
of
American journalists, congressional staff members, and
special
prosecutors—not to mention defectors from the
bureaucracy who
"go public" in books, magazines, and Senate hearings
because of
their objections to policies.
Aside from the plethora of information available in the

public
domain, Soviet intelligence systematically intercepts telephone
conversations of Americans it is interested in, through means that
are both legal and internationally acceptable. It can use, for
example, antennae on its embassy in Washington, D.C. (which,
after all, is not subject to U.S. laws), or its antennae in Cuba
(which pick up all trans-Atlantic satellite calls), or its satellites in
space, which are sanctified as "national technical means" by the
SALT Treaty. These interceptions are effective for two reasons:
First, unlike the Soviet Union, the telephone is universally used in
the United States, and virtually all targets of Soviet intelligence
make and receive calls. Second, dialing is now mainly computerized,
which makes it relatively easy to distinguish phone calls
made to selected numbers such as the office or home number of
policy makers, congressional staffs, Defense Department employees,

defense contractors, scientists, or lobbyists. And, unlike
the Soviet Union, telephone books are readily available.
Soviet
diplomats can even buy mailing and telephone lists of
government
employees from American market research services. This
ubiquitous telephone vulnerability means that even
Americans who
avoid leaking to the press or testifying before Congress
can be
listened to by Soviet intelligence.
The extraordinary mobility of employment in the United
States,
even for those holding classified secrets, makes it
exceedingly
difficult to control this leakage of information. The rapid
movement of technicians, lawyers, and academics back
and forth
between the private and public sectors renders it virtually
impossible
to segregate telephone users. And when government
officials move into the private sphere, they cannot be
compelled to
speak over "scrambler" telephones. Nor, since there is no
Official
Secrets Act, can ex-officials be prevented from revealing
secrets to
journalists preparing books or, with the exception of CIA

employees, from writing their own memoirs. Even when an
employee leaves a job in which he has access to secrets and moves
to another position, he still may hear "echoes" about the project
from friends and acquaintances, which he may pass on to others.
The huge consultant industry in Washington, which has had its
share of corruption, is based on ex-employees having informal
access to important information about American defense policy.
Just as corporations buy such insights by retaining consultants, so
can Soviet intelligence through "false flag" companies.
American deception planners, to be sure, could use these public
channels for disinformation by planting, and orchestrating, fake
stories in news media, congressional testimony, biographic
disclosures, and even phone conversations. But this possibility is
severely mitigated by the sanctions and opprobrium that arise from
government attempts to manipulate the American media.

The
concern that limits government actions is not the
disinformation,
which may be an acceptable objective, but the "blow
back" when it
is reported by American news organizations. When, for
example,
the Reagan White House planned to use disinformation to
undermine Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi, career civil
servants
and military officers immediately assessed the risk in
terms of their
own careers. Lieutenant General John H. Moellering,
representing
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, protested that the use of this
disinformation could be exposed. He asked, "What if the
[memorandum] ever got out?"[8]
As it turned out, the plan was leaked to Bob Woodward of
The
Washington Post, presumably by the "Middle East
experts" at the
CIA and Pentagon who were "aghast," as Woodward
reports, at the
prospect that the disinformation would "blow back" to the
American media. When he published the story on the
front page,
the media were predictably outraged, and the careers of
those

involved were permanently stained. The lesson was that disinformation

is a very dangerous enterprise; no one could be sure that enemies or rivals in the present or future administration would not

leak a plan. For many in the American bureaucracy, the risk of

exposure outweighs any advantage. While Soviet intelligence

cannot totally discount the possibility of disinformation being

inserted into public channels, it can reckon that this is done only in

rare circumstances given the penalties imposed on it by the

American media.

Whereas the United States must use its intelligence resources to

piece together a mosaic about Soviet intentions, the Soviet Union,

which has licit access to the vast public realm of data about

America and its allies, can concentrate all its espionage energies on

penetrating the few compartments that still remained sealed. And

here too, because of the differences in society, it has a distinct

comparative advantage. Whereas the CIA
has to operate in the tightly controlled police states of the Soviet
bloc, the KGB operates mainly in the open societies of the West.
From the point of view of running espionage agents, the freedom
of nationals in a target country to travel beyond national
borders is itself a significant advantage. Such freedom does not
exist in the Soviet Union. Soviet nationals cannot travel abroad
without special permission and, if they possess secrets, security
clearance. And, in many cases, they cannot even travel internally to
other cities in the Soviet Union. So if the CIA recruits an agent in
Russia, it then must attempt to equip and service him inside the
country—in cities where American or allied diplomats are
stationed—under the full surveillance of the Soviet state police. In
Moscow, for example, the CIA has to operate out of a base in the
U.S. Embassy which, as of 1988, had so many embedded
microphones in its structure that, according to one CIA officer,

working there was "the electronic equivalent of working in a fish
bowl." Even the sealed rooms and encrypting machines on which
they depended for the security of their communications were
compromised repeatedly by the KGB, which, by recruiting entire
teams of Marine guards, was able to gain entry to the embassy.
Moreover, when American diplomats left the embassy compound,
they found themselves under relentless surveillance. They were
irradiated with microwaves, sprayed with chemical tracers, and
followed by dogs. They also had to contend with the fact that the
KGB had learned through a CIA defector, Edward Lee Howard,
some of their most important trade craft for communicating with
potential Soviet traitors and turning them into agents in Moscow.
The chances of maintaining contact undetected under such difficult
circumstances are not high.
The KGB, on the other hand, has no such disadvantage.

Since
American citizens, even with security clearances, are free to travel
almost any place in the world at their own discretion (even without
passports in Mexico and Canada), KGB case officers can arrange
their rendezvous in locations where the chances of surveillance are
minimal. In many cases, they are instructed to fly
to Austria, where through connections the KGB maintains with the
local security service, neither they nor their spies were at much
risk. Americans can even go as tourists to Eastern Europe without
arousing suspicion.
A second difference that benefits Soviet espionage is the almost
unrestricted mobility of employment in the United States. In the
Soviet Union, individuals cannot simply leave one job and apply
for another. They need permission from their superior, as well as
from Communist Party officials and police officials. For the CIA,
this means that once a Soviet national is recruited in

Russia, he
cannot be easily maneuvered into a job where he will have access
to needed secrets. For example, if a dissident academic or disaffected municipal employee is recruited, there is not a great
probability that he can get a job in a sensitive military position—
and even a request for such a transfer might place him under
suspicion. In the United States, however, where job turnover is
relatively high, the KGB would have little problem advancing its
moles to positions in which they would be helpful. Individuals
need not explain why they are leaving a job, other than in terms of
self-betterment or a change of interest. No one needs justify his or
her shift from job to job or from private to government
employment. Aside from largely perfunctory FBI security checks,
there is virtually no bar to getting jobs with access to sensitive
information.
Finally, constitutional safeguards in an open society, meant to

protect its citizens from government power, have the side effect of
making it safer for hostile espionage services. In Russia, there are
virtually no restrictions on what security police can do if they even
suspect an individual is in contact with a foreigner. They can
surreptitiously open his mail, bug his telephones, break into his
residences, get his medical records, intimidate his friends, or detain
him without obtaining any prior court approval. This carte blanche
authority, which in many ways defines a police state, greatly
increases the tensions and risks of an espionage agent.
In the United States, the police have no such unrestricted
authority. They need court warrants or, in some cases, the Attorney
General's approval, to place a bug on a telephone or search a
residence. Investigations are impeded by a suspect's right to invoke
the Fifth Amendment, and the rights of his spouse, lawyer,
accountant, psychiatrist, and doctors not to reveal privileged

information about him. Moreover, the espionage laws themselves
place the burden of proof on the government. It must prove to a
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that a defendant provided
secrets to the KGB but that he did so with the intention of
damaging the United States. In the case of Richard Craig Smith in
1985, the defendant was acquitted of espionage, although he
admitted selling Army secrets to a KGB officer, because the
government could not prove he believed he was helping the KGB.9
Confronted with these asymmetries, it is understandable why the
CIA has proved far more successful at encouraging Soviet agents
to defect than in persuading them to continue working as double
agents. And although defections may be trumpeted in the press as
CIA accomplishments, they do not add to the capabilities of the
CIA to breach the Soviet compartments that would yield feedback
on a continuing basis. This meager product has, in turn,

led to
cutbacks in the money allocated to espionage. Admiral Turner, for
example, eliminated over a thousand positions in the clandestine
services in the late 1970s which resulted in shrinking espionage
activities by 40 percent, according to one former member of
Angleton's staff. For the espionage branch, it was a vicious cycle:
the fewer the officers, the easier it was for the KGB to reduce their
effectiveness; and these poorer results, in turn, justified further
personnel cuts.
It was becoming increasingly clear to me why the participants at
the Air Force Conference laughed at American espionage "as
nickel and dime stuff." Yet, without moles, how could the United
States counter Soviet penetrations?

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
The Denial of Deception

"When an intelligence service believes it is invulnerable to enemy
deception, it is most vulnerable."
—James Jesus Angleton

The final deception conference I attended turned out to be the most
revealing. It was held on September 26 to 28, 1985, at the U.S.
Navy Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. The subject
was supposed to be Soviet Strategic Deception. But the CIA, which
was helping to fund the conference, as I later learned, had its own
agenda: the presentation of a thesis that effectively denied the
possibility that the CIA could be duped by the KGB.
This antideception argument was outlined in the opening session
by Richards Heuer, a CIA consultant and former case officer. It
asserted that the CIA had debriefed more than one hundred Soviet
bloc intelligence service double agents and defectors in the postwar
years, and that through this constant contact with Soviet
intelligence services it had come to "understand the KGB better

than any agency of the U.S. government." This premise was

accepted by others in the large CIA contingent sitting around the

table, which included Fred Hutchinson, its National Intelligence

Officer for Deception, and Arnold Horlick, its National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union.

Heuer next explained that from this "knowledge base," the CIA

had deduced "the operational rules of the KGB" that prescribe what

the KGB can and cannot do in the intelligence games it plays with

the CIA. These "iron laws," imposed by the Soviet hierarchy, could

not be broken or bent. In a sense, they were like the convenient

"Indians don't fight at night" axiom in cowboy films.

One such "operational rule," according to the CIA, is that Soviet

intelligence officers are not permitted to disclose Soviet secrets in

documentary form to the CIA. This meant, Heuer asserted, coming

to the point, that the KGB could not use Soviet secrets "as chicken

feed" in order to advance or make credible a

disinformation agent.

This stricture proceeded from, as Heuer put it, the "Soviet passion
for secrecy." "If there is one thing more important to the Soviets
than deceiving the enemy," he concluded, "it is protecting their
own security."[1]

At this point Heuer was interrupted by questions from surprised
participants who had prepared papers on Soviet deception. Did he
mean secret information was never used to support a deception
scheme? What if events, such as satellite reconnaissance, would
disclose the secrets anyway in the near future?

"Secret documents cannot be passed by the KGB under any
circumstances," Heuer insisted categorically. This imputed KGB
rule thus gave the CIA an ironclad means of testing the bona fides
of any Soviet source. If the documents he handed over contained
authentic secrets, they could not have been deliberately disclosed
by the KGB; and hence he was genuine.

The rule supposedly applied not only to the present but to the
past, so the CIA was able to reassess all the cases of defectors and
double agents where deception was suspected by Angleton and his
counterintelligence staff—such as Nosenko, Fedora, and Top Hat.
All these suspected Soviet sources had given secret information, so
they could not have been under KGB control at the time. Through
such retrospective analysis in the late 1970s, the CIA was able
categorically to conclude that it had never been
deceived by a Soviet double agent on any issue of strategic importance—
nor had any Soviet disinformation been passed through
it for at least the past ten years.[2] The head of the clandestine part of
the CIA, David Blee, had already advanced the denial thesis to a
point where, as he explained to members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, the CIA "no longer attempted to prove the bona fides
of individual sources"; instead, it relied on its ability to verify the

data they provided.3 If the data was accurate, the CIA assumed that
its source was valid. And Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA up
until 1981, blamed the "paranoia of the CIA's counterintelligence
staff" for the intelligence failures of the CIA in the 1960s and
1970s, all of which had been since remedied by the CIA.4
But how could the CIA be so certain it had correctly inferred the
KGB's "operational rules"? The defectors and double agents, as it
turned out, were not unimpeachable. As Heuer acknowledged,
many of them were not from the Soviet intelligence services at all
but from Eastern European and Cuban intelligence services, where
they could not be expected to know the operational rules of the
KGB. These allies might indeed have been instructed never to give
away Soviet secrets to build an agent's credibility—but this would
not mean the KGB itself did not make exceptions. Of the Soviet
defectors, most were either military or foreign service

officers of
such low rank that they could not be reasonably expected to know
KGB policy in such sensitive areas. Others had actually defected
before the KGB was created in 1953. And, of the KGB double
agents who might be in a position to know operational rules, some
prominent ones, such as Fedora and Igor, not only had returned to
Moscow and the KGB fold— and had been accordingly assumed to
be disinformation agents— but they had been determined through
other U.S. intelligence surveillance techniques, which Soviet
intelligence apparently had not known about at the time, to be
under KGB control when they conveyed their messages to the CIA.
Finally, and most important, the information provided by those
with access to the
KGB was far from unanimous. Not only had Golitsyn said that the
KGB had license to provide the CIA with secrets; if they were

cleared by a KGB committee, he also furnished massive details
about a reorganization in the KGB, as we have seen, that separated
the deception staff from intelligence officers who were to be
stationed abroad. This would account for the lack of knowledge
other defectors had about Soviet deception policy. So how could
Heuer and others at the conference be so confident of the KGB's
"operational rules"?
The answer emerged toward the end of the conference. One top
CIA executive explained that the CIA had recently acquired a KGB
defector who overrode all these objections. He had served in the
KGB up until August 1985, making him current with its practices;
then, holding the rank of General-designate, he was in the "top
compartment" of Soviet intelligence, one of the six highest-ranking
officers in the KGB headquarters at Dzierzhinski Square. He was,
as became public several weeks later, Vitaliy Sergeyevich

Yurchenko. The CIA was so confident that Yurchenko ended the
issue about deception that it sent me his biography in the KGB.
From this, and interviews with intelligence officers involved with
him, I pieced together his story.
Yurchenko, a forty-nine-year-old Russian sporting a Stalin like
mustache, appeared to be a remarkable catch. According to the
biography the CIA compiled on him, Yurchenko had been a staff
officer in a Soviet submarine brigade in the Pacific before he
joined KGB counterintelligence in 1960. From 1961 to 1968, he
worked for the KGB on submarine security. Then, from 1969 to
1972, he was transferred to Egypt, where he was in charge of
preventing the recruitment of Soviet officers by Western intelligence
services. After becoming deputy chief of the intelligence
department of the KGB's Military Intelligence Directorate in May
1972, he specialized in running "dangles," an operation that

continued until 1975, in order to test Western intelligence services,
learn their procedures, and confuse and demoralize their operations. Because of his successes, he was transferred to Washington,
D.C., where he served as the security officer at the Soviet Embassy from August 1975 to August 1980. Aside from being
responsible for neutralizing the efforts of the CIA, FBI, and NSC
to penetrate the Soviet Embassy—which again involved sending
dangles to the FBI—he handled "foreign visitors . . . volunteering
their services to Soviet establishments."
The CIA came in contact with Yurchenko in Washington in
1980, and, as a matter of course, made him a cold-turkey offer to
become a double agent for the CIA. There was no reason to expect
him to accept the gambit, but it was done on the remote chance that
sometime in his career he might run into difficulties that would
cause him to reconsider. In August 1980, as scheduled, he returned
to the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, he had (according to his CIA debriefing) a meteoric
rise within the KGB. In September 1980, he had joined the First
Chief Directorate and was made the chief of the counterintelligence
department, which investigated suspected espionage
by KGB staff personnel. Here he was responsible for, among other
things, investigating the credentials of foreign agents recruited by
the KGB—which involved using "special drugs" on occasion. He
also said he had the task of investigating suspected cases of treason
among KGB personnel and of supervising "the indoctrination of
[KGB] counterintelligence [officers] going abroad."
Then, in April 1985, he was promoted to deputy chief of the
department specifically responsible for organizing espionage operations
against the United States, which included not only supervising
Soviet agents but coordinating their efforts with those
from other Eastern bloc countries.
Less than three months after reaching this pinnacle of success,

Yurchenko, using an address supplied to him by the CIA five years
earlier, contacted the CIA and offered to supply it with
information. If his incredible offer—and self-reported career— was
authentic, it was the coup that CIA had been waiting for.
Not only was he the highest-ranking KGB officer ever to volunteer
his services to the West, but he was a man uniquely qualified to
definitively answer the questions that had plagued American
intelligence about Soviet deception.
Although his motive was still unclear, General-designate Yurchenko
indicated that he was prepared to divulge the KGB's most
closely guarded secrets: its sources and methods. He offered to
rendezvous with CIA case officers in Rome the last week in July
1985.
This offer could not have come at a more propitious time for the
CIA. Western intelligence services had recently had a string of
disastrous losses that required an explanation only a source within
the KGB could provide. Earlier that summer, the KGB

had arrested
a CIA agent named A. G. Tolkachev, who had been considered one
of their most valuable sources in the Soviet Union. As an
electronics expert employed by an elite Soviet think tank that
researched problems of military aviation and space detection
systems, Tolkachev was in a position to pass on to the CIA
technical data on the state of the art of Soviet ground-and-space based
radar, which revealed the extent to which American
submarines and planes were vulnerable to detection. During the
same period, other CIA agents, suspecting they had been compromised
and were on the verge of being arrested by the KGB,
came in out of the cold. First, in India, Igor Gheja, the third
secretary of the Soviet Embassy, whom the CIA was secretly
developing as a potential mole, defected from his post; next, in
Greece, Sergei Bokhan, a Soviet military intelligence officer who
had provided the CIA with valuable insights into Soviet efforts to

infiltrate the Greek military, sought protection at the American

Embassy; then, one month later, in England, Oleg Antonovich

Gordievsky, the political counselor at the Soviet Embassy and a

KGB officer, who had been selling Soviet secrets to British intelligence

over the years, hastily organized his escape (abandoning his wife and two children).5

In less than three months, the careers of four well-placed spies

for the West were abruptly ended. While the defections could be

treated in the press as victories for the CIA, they were not. They all

represented KGB successes in closing down sources of information. As the secret 1973 CIA memorandum entitled

"Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins" explains:

While [intelligence] defectors can and do provide critical information,

there are very few cases in which the same individual would not have been of greater value if he returned to his post and

remained in place.. . . Our ultimate objective is to have the walk-in

return to his home country and continue his agent

relationship
[with the CIA] while working inside.6
Yurchenko could provide answers to how these agents were
compromised. He could also describe the KGB apparatus in North
America for recruiting its agents and identify moles who had been
infiltrated into American intelligence. The CIA therefore wasted no
time in dispatching to Rome one of its most experienced officers in
the Soviet Division, Colin Thompson, as well as a team of debriefers.
The initial interrogation took place in a safe house on the outskirts of the city during the last week of July. Yurchenko then
surprised Thompson: Instead of returning to Moscow, as expected,
he said that he wanted to defect to the United States. The CIA,
needing his information, had no choice but to accede to this
demand.
On August 1, Yurchenko formally applied for political asylum
at the U.S. Embassy in Rome. The next day he was bundled aboard

a military courier plane and flown to the United States. Officially,
he entered the United States on CIA parole.
Yurchenko was installed in an isolated two-story house, surrounded
by woods and a lake, some twenty-two miles outside of Washington. As the questioning proceeded, he told his CIA interrogators
that the KGB had uncovered the Western agents, not through any inside information, but through new and in-novative surveillance techniques. He described how the KGB
sprayed an invisible dust on Western diplomats in Moscow, which
they would then unwittingly get on whatever paper they touched.
When they posted clandestine letters to agents, the KGB could
detect the dust with machines in the central post office and trace
them to their recipient. The CIA—and State Department—had
already detected this dust, but Yurchenko now gave a plausible
explanation for its use.
The Tolkachev affair could not be fully explained by this KGB
dust spraying of diplomats. The CIA had used a newsman

rather
than a diplomat to make contact with his contact, who was known
as "Father Roman."7 But Yurchenko added that a former CIA
officer, known to him as "Robert," told the KGB about the CIA's
procedures for contacting its agents in Moscow.
He explained that the ex-CIA officer had visited the Soviet
Embassy in Washington in 1983, and subsequently traveled to St.
Anton, Austria, for a meeting with the KGB. These details
immediately focused suspicion on a thirty-three-year-old ex-CIA
employee who had been spotted by FBI surveillance at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington in 1983. He was Edward Lee Howard.
Howard had joined the CIA in 1981, and was trained for an
embassy job in Moscow—where he would meet and service
agents. But before undertaking the assignment, during his lie detector
examination, he made a damaging admission about drug
taking and, in June 1983, his brief career at the CIA ended. Several

months later he was spotted at the Soviet Embassy, and when he
was informally asked about the visit, he admitted that he had gone
there with the idea of giving them secrets.
Now, with the additional details about "Robert," the FBI again
questioned Howard. He acknowledged that he had met with several
Soviet officials in St. Anton. Although the date of the meeting
indisputably identified Howard as "Robert," it was not altogether
clear that he was in a position to have betrayed Tolkachev—who
had not yet been recruited when Howard left the
CIA in 1983. Before this contradiction could be resolved through
further interrogation, Howard disappeared from his house in Sante
Fe and defected to Moscow.
Yurchenko also volunteered one further tantalizing bit of information
about another ex-KGB source. This was a former
employee of the NSA who had come to the Soviet Embassy in
January 1980 and sold the KGB vital information about the NSA's

facilities for listening to the activities of Soviet submarines in the
Sea of Okhotsk. The NSA had known for years that Soviet
intelligence had learned of these listening devices, but now it had a
plausible explanation for how they were compromised. The ex-
NSA employee was quickly identified as Ronald Pelton, who was
subsequently tried and convicted for espionage.
Yurchenko's revelations were exactly the evidence the CIA had
been looking for to end the long and debilitating debate about
moles in the CIA. He claimed that its agents were not
compromised by traitors within, but by Soviet chemical surveillance
that was easily defended against. The only recruits the KGB
had made were two ex-officers—Howard and Pelton—neither of
whom was of any further use to the Soviets. Moreover, all the
KGB's attempted recruitments of CIA personnel, which came
under Yurchenko's purview, had failed. Even more reassuring to

the CIA, Yurchenko claimed that the KGB had not managed to
dupe the CIA with any "dangles" and it had not sent any false
defectors. The KGB therefore had neither channels nor feedback
from Western intelligence services. And when pressed, Yurchenko
confirmed the CIA hypothesis that the KGB followed predictable
operating rules.
By mid-October, Yurchenko was taken to meet Director William
Casey, who agreed to give interviews on this defector to news
media and authorized a book by him, along the lines of the CIA's
earlier covert best seller, The Penkovsky Papers, to publicly
demonstrate the CIA's successes over the KGB. As part of this
drive, John McMahon, then the Deputy Director of the CIA, took
this as evidence that the KGB lacked the wherewithal to
deceive influential senators and congressmen. On October 31, he
briefed the Agency's perhaps most influential critic, Senator

Malcolm Wallop, the Republican senator from Wyoming.
Wallop considered it ironic that McMahon brought him this
news on the seventh anniversary of the CIA's "Halloween massacre"—
in which hundreds of top career officers had been fired or
reassigned. He considered that reorganization part of the
"progressive degrading" of the CIA's capacity to detect Soviet
deception.8
McMahon now told Wallop that his concerns were ill-founded.
Yurchenko was a "fact" demonstrating that the KGB, because of its
self-imposed restrictions, had failed at any long-range penetrations
of American intelligence. Without such feedback, it could have
little hope of successfully deceiving the CIA.
Wallop was not entirely satisfied with this "one-man proof," as
he put it. He asked whether the CIA had considered the "alternative
hypothesis" that Yurchenko had been sent by the KGB to
misinform the CIA. After all, he pointed out, Yurchenko was
telling the CIA what it wanted to hear.
McMahon replied that was "impossible." Other collateral

information Yurchenko provided about Soviet recruits, which he
said could not be discussed outside the secure rooms in the CIA,
would prove "beyond a shadow of a doubt, Yurchenko was a
genuine defector." McMahon stated, therefore, "no other hypothesis
is necessary." He then dramatically concluded by saying:
"I would stake my career on Yurchenko's bona fides." It was a
statement that he would have cause to regret in forty-eight hours.

But while Deputy Director McMahon and other CIA executives
were making the case public, Colin Thompson and his team of
interrogators were finding the "take" from Yurchenko progressively
less impressive. As scientists closely analyzed what he
had said about KGB "spy dust," they found that the radioactive
properties of the material deteriorated too rapidly to make it
feasible for the KGB to use to ferret out letters in the central post
office—perhaps days after the diplomat mailing them had
been sprayed with the dust. Moreover, using all its exotic

technology,
U.S. intelligence could find no evidence that the Soviets
screened mail in this manner or even had the equipment in
place.
Nor, as the cases in India, Greece, and London were
reanalyzed,
did it appear the agents there could have been traced
through spy
dust. As the evidence came in, much of it through
techniques the
KGB could not have anticipated, it seemed increasingly
plausible
that the spy dust story was a red herring.
Moreover, the two former American intelligence officers
Yurchenko
gave away turned out to be agents whom the KGB had
reason to believe had blown covers anyway. Howard had
failed his
lie-detector test, had been spotted by the FBI outside the
Soviet
Embassy, and had admitted to CIA security in 1983 that
he had
made telephone contact with a Soviet official. The KGB,
presumably learning this from Howard during his
debriefings,
would (correctly) have assumed he was too compromised
for any
future intelligence use other than to give away other

agents.

Similarly, the KGB could have assumed that Pelton had been
compromised five years before by the two phone calls he made to
the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The KGB certainly was aware
that its telephone lines were constantly monitored and tapped by
the FBI, which thus had advance warning that an American ex-intelligence
officer would be coming to the Soviet Embassy to
divulge secrets. It could further assume that the FBI, from its
photography and visual surveillance of visitors to the embassy,
would determine his general physical characteristics—Caucasian,
mustached, middle-aged, and male—and, with these clues, it would
only be a matter of checking through the few hundred photographs
of recently discharged men who fit this description before the FBI
would come across Pelton (who had left the NSA five months
earlier). Moreover, he could be (as he in fact subsequently was)

positively identified from his voice on the FBI's tapes. Further,
even if the KGB had not concluded that these contacts compromised Pelton in 1980, the fact that he had failed to show up
at a scheduled meeting in Vienna with the
KGB in April 1985 would probably have indicated that, if not
caught, he had little further value to the KGB—aside from diverting
attention away from still active KGB agents in American intelligence. So Yurchenko had merely told the CIA during his
debriefings what the KGB could presume the CIA already knew
from other sources.
Even more suspicious, after delivering his initial messages in
July and August, Yurchenko clammed up about the Soviet's illegal
network in Canada and the United States. He claimed, for example,
total ignorance about the existence of dozens of elaborate hiding
places for messages that Soviet illegals had prepared for spies. This
was all part of the "wiring diagram" that Yurchenko, as the KGB's

section deputy chief for North America, should have known like
the back of his hand. The more he was pressed, the more recalcitrant he became. Even the offer of a million-dollar contract,
in which he would collect generous bounties for each Soviet mole
he identified, failed to move him to reveal KGB operations.
Instead, he repeated, as if by rote, that the KGB had not made any
other recruits during the five years that he was in charge of the
KGB's counterintelligence unit.
Despite his tenacity, the CIA interrogators had other evidence
demonstrating his claim was untrue. Both the CIA and Canadian
counterintelligence had dispatched "dangles," who allowed
themselves to be recruited during Yurchenko's tenure. Since all
these double agents would have been known to Yurchenko if he
held the position he claimed, his failure to name them —even when
led in their direction by the CIA—raised very serious questions

about his authenticity.

As they pondered these problems, Thompson and others from
the Soviet Division were no doubt aware of the parallels between
Yurchenko and Nosenko twenty-one years earlier. Like Yurchenko,
Nosenko had claimed to work in KGB headquarters in
Moscow—a position, in both cases, which the CIA had no
independent way of verifying. And like Yurchenko, Nosenko came
with a message that implied that there was no mole, or
other serious leak, in the CIA. He too had cited chemical "spy
dusts" painted on the soles of shoes as the explanation of how the
KGB had uncovered an important CIA agent in Russia. He also
gave away, like Yurchenko, burned-out ex-agents who no longer
had access to secrets. But once Nosenko had been imprisoned, the
CIA could find no way of proving or disproving the theory he was
a dispatched agent.

As Yurchenko grew more recalcitrant and the interrogation
sessions ground to a halt, his CIA handlers were

determined not to
make the same mistake. Instead of attempting to confine his
movements, they decided to test his intentions.
When Yurchenko asked to see a Soviet acquaintance in Canada—
the wife of a high-ranking Soviet diplomat in Montreal, with
whom he maintained he was having a romantic liaison—the CIA
decided to accommodate this extraordinary request, even though
KGB defectors on parole are usually prohibited from contacting
Soviet citizens, both for their own safety and to prevent them from
giving any signals to former comrades. Yurchenko was permitted
to make contact—although the exchange of words did not lead to a
meeting.
The game between Yurchenko and his handlers finally drew to
an end November 2—exactly three months to the day after his
arrival in America—on a cold, rainy Saturday afternoon. If they
did not actually return him to the Soviet Embassy, they

gave him
every opportunity to go. First, they took him to a clothing store in
the nearby town of Manassas and bought him a coat, hat, and
umbrella. They also left him at a phone, where he made two long-distance
calls to the Soviet Embassy and advised the Soviet officer
on duty he was returning. Then he was handed over to a lone CIA
officer who drove him to a restaurant a few blocks from the Soviet
Embassy compound. At this point, his handler indicated to
Yurchenko that he was free to go, and watched as he put on his
new coat and hat and walked out the door. After he was gone, his
CIA companion called neither the FBI nor the Washington police,
who could have intercepted him at the gates
of the embassy compound. It was the ultimate test: If Yurchenko
had betrayed the KGB, he would not be expected to make a beeline
for the KGB; if, on the other hand, he had acted under its control,
he would.9

Yurchenko later telephoned a CIA phone number he had been
given, and advised his handlers that he had safely arrived at his
destination—the Soviet Embassy. Whatever else it was, it could
hardly be called an escape.
The affair might have ended then and there if Yurchenko had
quietly returned to Moscow on his diplomatic passport. Even if
anyone asked about him, the CIA was under no obligation to
respond to queries about double agents. And this may have been
what his CIA handlers expected.
But the KGB had yet another surprise in store for the CIA, and
its Deputy Director, who had already bet his reputation on
Yurchenko. On Monday, November 4, reporters received an
invitation to a televised news conference that afternoon. The
speaker was Yurchenko (who, as far as was publicly known, was
still the CIA's prize defector).
Mocking the Agency at every opportunity, Yurchenko egregiously

claimed that he had been kidnapped from Rome, drugged, and held a prisoner for three months by the CIA. He insisted that,
rather than divulging intelligence to the CIA, he had been using the
debriefing sessions to learn from it its major areas of interest and
its interrogation techniques. He even described his meeting with
Casey.
The KGB teased the CIA with lightly disguised clues as to their
control over Yurchenko. For example, earlier that week, the State
Department had lodged a protest with the Soviet Foreign Ministry
charging that eight years earlier an American intelligence agent,
Nicholas Shadrin, had been paralyzed with drugs by the KGB in
Vienna and transported across international borders to Hungary.
The source for this assertion the State Department gave was
Yurchenko. Now, the Soviet Embassy filed an almost identical
protest with the State Department, charging
that Yurchenko had been paralyzed with drugs by the CIA

and
taken across international borders. The source for this story was
also Yurchenko. A single KGB officer thus had the distinction, in a
five-day period, of being the source for both American and Soviet
protests, both of which were also denied.
The next day Yurchenko went to the State Department to
demonstrate that he was acting without Soviet coercion. He met
there with a half-dozen CIA and State Department officials as well
as a psychologist—who agreed, after nearly a half-hour session,
that Yurchenko was returning voluntarily to the Soviet Union. As
he left, he jauntily clasped his hands over his head as a victory
sign. By Wednesday, the Soviet dangle was on an Aeroflot plane
heading home, his mission completed.
As this amazing case unraveled before his eyes, Senator Patrick
J. Leahy, the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, concluded
that Yurchenko was a double agent whom the KGB
"foisted" on the CIA.10 "This whole thing was very good

theater,"
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told The New York
Times. "And, to me, theater is something that is staged."[11]
McFarlane had no doubt read the CIA report that Yurchenko had
not furnished any important information not previously available to
U.S. intelligence. The assessment that he was "staged" proceeded
from two separate considerations. The first was that Yurchenko
had evidently trusted the KGB sufficiently to return to its fold.
The Soviet Union has no history of granting amnesty to, or
otherwise forgiving, intelligence officers who betray state secrets.
Pointedly, the acronym for its counterespionage arm, SMERSH,
stood for its slogan, "Death to All Spies." As a twenty-five-year
veteran of KGB counterespionage, Yurchenko certainly knew the
fate that would have awaited a traitor—or any KGB officer who
had, without proper authority, divulged secret data to the CIA.

While there are many cases of ordinary Soviet citizens—and even
ballet dancers, intellectuals, journalists, and soldiers—who did not have access to state secrets returning to the Soviet
Union without facing punishment, KGB officers who commit
treason fall into a different category. For that reason, any Soviet
intelligence officer who returned to Russia without being punished
for his treason was assumed by the CIA to have been acting under
KGB orders in feigning disloyalty. (Over the past quarter century,
there is only one known case of a Soviet intelligence officer
redefecting—Anatoli Tchebotarev in 1971—and he was judged by
CIA counterintelligence to be "a definite plant," who had been sent
over for three months to test CIA debriefing procedures.)
Yurchenko's voluntary return could be explained in two ways.
Either he had been a KGB officer sent on a mission, or he had been
a traitor. In the first case, he could safely return; in the second, he

was acting completely irrationally in putting himself in the hands
of the KGB, because it meant risking death or imprisonment.
The second consideration was that the KGB evidently trusted
Yurchenko enough to permit him to return two days later to the
State Department. This voluntary Soviet action was telling because
it meant that the KGB did not consider him to be irrational. If
Yurchenko had been crazed, unstable, or even emotionally
overwrought, it could not have taken a chance on allowing him to
go for an interview to the State Department building where he
would be examined by CIA representatives, psychologists, and
State Department officials. At any point during this interview, he
could again offer—or be persuaded—to defect. This possibility
could not be excluded by the Soviet Union if he had been a traitor a
day before. If he had been upset at the handling of this case by the

CIA, or disturbed by the threat of unanticipated Soviet reprisals
against himself or his family, the CIA could conceivably find some
way of reassuring him. If he had indeed been a traitor who had
changed his mind he could, at least from the Soviet perspective,
change it again under American persuasion.
The Soviet Embassy was under no obligation to place Yurchenko
back into American hands and give him another opportunity
to save his life by defecting again. If Yurchenko had actually
been a traitor, Soviet intelligence would need to exhaustively
determine from him in precise detail every iota of information he
had revealed to the CIA. This kind of damage assessment would
require intense interrogation of Yurchenko by experts themselves
familiar with the cases in which he had been involved for a quarter
of a century. This meant that the KGB would now have to keep
tight control over him—until he was squeezed of every

drop of
information.
Under these circumstances, Yurchenko would not have been
returned to American officials (especially if he was unstable, deranged,
or untrustworthy). The KGB could hardly be expected to trust a traitor who changed sides irrationally. It could only be fully
confident that he would return from the State Department if it
knew Yurchenko was a well-disciplined KGB officer who had
already proven himself loyal by carrying out his provocative
assignment. This would also explain his being allowed to give a
press conference.
When both these developments—Yurchenko trusting the KGB
and the KGB trusting Yurchenko—were taken together, they
afforded little doubt that the KGB was controlling his actions. But
admitting this sting had shattering implications for the CIA. If
Yurchenko had been merely one of the scores of Soviet
intelligence officers who approach their U.S. counterparts

overseas
every year, hold out a few misleading morsels, and then
return to
the fold, it would have been accepted as part and parcel of
the
dangle game. But Yurchenko had been taken public by
the CIA
and presented to critical senators as evidence that the CIA
was both
penetration-proof and deception-proof. It even took his
word as
final proof of the convenient "operating rules" it had
hypothesized.
Now he had returned to the fold—an active KGB officer
in
Moscow, which suggested that the messages he
had passed to the CIA during his ninety days in the
United States
were part of his mission. If so, the CIA could not be
certain how
the other agents rounded up by the KGB had been
compromised.
Rather than yellow spy dust, it might have been through
one or
more penetrations in Western intelligence. Nor could the
CIA
accept as credible Yurchenko's claim that the KGB had
made no

recruits in North America in the past five years, or that there were

no moles in the CIA. The Yurchenko mission had, moreover,

violated the doctrine of not handing over KGB secrets that the CIA

had imputed to the KGB. He himself had told the CIA about

Edward Howard and Pelton—both KGB secrets (even if they

would have been found out eventually), which meant that dangles

could use cleared secrets for deception purposes.

This put the CIA in a bind. If it acknowledged that Yurchenko

had been a KGB double agent all along, it would have to abandon

its thesis about the "operating rules" of the KGB, which would in

turn cut the heart out of the CIA's claim that it had an unambiguous

means of evaluating its Soviet sources. Thus the CIA had no basis

for denying the deception hypothesis, and all the data from hostile

territory—including the multi-billion-dollar product of satellite

"National Technical Means"—would have to be

reevaluated.

But the CIA leadership, some of whom had staked their careers
on Yurchenko prior to his return to the KGB, decided instead to
maintain steadfastly that Yurchenko had neither lied nor misled the
CIA during his short stay in the United States. It began issuing this
version after he returned to Moscow, even though the President's
national security adviser already had declared him a fake based on
the findings of the CIA's own Soviet Division, which handled the
case and allowed him to return to his KGB base; and President
Reagan himself, based on this briefing, publicly stated:"The
information [Yurchenko] provided was not anything new or
sensational."12

CIA Director Casey asserted to senators and journalists that
the CIA was convinced Yurchenko had told it the truth—though he
was now lying in his press conferences and State Department

interview. In other words, he had been a total truth teller from

August 1 to November 3, when his story served the CIA's interest,

and a total liar afterwards. The CIA thus declared Yurchenko, after

he was back at KGB headquarters, a bona fide defector —which

meant that he had proven himself loyal to the United States. Yet,

Yurchenko had demonstrably betrayed U.S. intelligence, first by

returning to the KGB; second, at the State Department, by pledging

his allegiance to the Soviet Union; and third, by divulging secret

details of his CIA debriefing to the KGB. Never before had a

defector earned his "bona fides" in such a perverse manner. To

come to this conclusion, Casey and other CIA executives had to

override, in a single coup, virtually all the criteria that the CIA had

developed for establishing the bona fides of double agents.

This denial also involved circulating stories among the media

suggesting Yurchenko's instability, irrationality, and romantic
liaisons (although both Casey and McMahon had endorsed his
soundness less than a week before his redefection). One such story
even cited the suicide of a Soviet woman in Toronto whom, in
reality, Yurchenko had not known or had any connection with
whatsoever. The campaign was capped in February 1986, when
intelligence sources fed Time, Life, National Public Radio, and
other media the false story that Yurchenko had been executed and
added, for spice, that Yurchenko's family had been charged with
the cost of the ammunition. No sooner did this "intelligence
community" story appear on national television than Yurchenko
appeared on European television announcing that he was preparing
a book about the CIA.
The Yurchenko case demonstrates, if nothing else, that once an
intelligence service adopts a policy of denying deception,

it can be

perpetuated indefinitely. Evidence of deception—even as gross as

a redefection—can be discounted, held in abeyance, or ignored—

even where it has become public.

The final element in the state of mind that facilitates deception is

denial of even the possibility of organized deception. Denial is, to

be sure, sometimes a useful limit on the imagination. In the natural

sciences, where the deception hypothesis would be ludicrous,

denial amounts to placing an outer boundary on what explanations

will be tolerated. Intelligence services could similarly benefit, at

least organizationally, by excluding considerations of deception

which could lead, as they did in the days of Angleton in the CIA, to

dissension, demoralization, and even paralysis. After all, by

applying the deception hypothesis, values can be continually

reversed, with intelligence successes—such as the acquisition of a

mole—transformed into failures; and whatever secrets spy masters,
electronic wizards, and satellite technicians extract from Soviet
bloc territories with great ingenuity and at great expense can be
instantly impeached as disinformation by armchair counterintelligence experts.
The difference between intelligence services and the natural
sciences is the subject being observed. Enemy nations, unlike
microbes, do conspire at times to dupe those studying them. This is
particularly true of the Soviet Union, which has even subtly but
systematically falsified its maps since the 1930s to mislead foreign
observers.13 And, as we have seen from the telemetry double cross,
Soviet intelligence has the means to affect the data being intercepted by even high-tech satellites.
The adoption of full-scale denial, as appears to have occurred in
the Yurchenko case, is the element in the state of mind that allows
the deceived to be a partner in its own deception.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN
The Confidence Game

What keeps a deception going, after the initial messages are
accepted as genuine, is the gradual development of a tacit relationship
between the deceiver and the deceived, based on a
powerful coincidence of interest both parties have. As the KGB
demonstrated in foisting Yurchenko on the CIA, the deceiver needs
to retain his mark's confidence. He also has a direct interest in
helping the mark enhance his own stature in the eyes of his
superiors—and his allied intelligence services—since that will
improve the chances of the deception's succeeding. The deceived,
in turn, benefits from his access to the apparently valuable
information that his source is providing him—if it does not become
suspect. He has therefore a direct interest in protecting the
reputation of his deceiver, as the CIA had with Yurchenko. The
more money he pays his deceiver, and the more

information he
vouches for to his superiors as genuine, the commensurately
greater stake the mark has in protecting the bona fides of his
deceiver.
Moreover, the deceived and deceiver often must work closely
together to protect the secrecy of this relationship. They must
arrange secret meeting places, code words, recognition signals, and
other conspiratorial exchanges. As in an illicit love affair, the very
act of collaborating to arrange these liaisons tends to further
heighten their mutual involvement. The more the mark becomes enmeshed in the conspiracy, the greater is his need to
trust his deceiver.
This collaboration may even reach the point where the mark is
forced to become the defender of his own deceiver—lest he open
himself up to the charge of being a dupe. In many instances, the
deceived tells the deceiver which elements of his story are suspect,

and what further evidence he must supply to convince others of his
legitimacy. This sort of tacit partnership developed in the Anglo-
German Treaty of 1935, which limited the size of battleships. The
Germans, who were systematically violating the treaty by building
larger ships, were the deceivers; the British, who were adhering to
it, the deceived.
As the Germans constructed two super dreadnoughts, the Bismarck
and Tirpitz, British field intelligence determined through
aerial reconnaissance that both ships would, when completed,
exceed the treaty limits. The Plans Division of the Royal Navy,
which had negotiated the treaty and verified German compliance,
had a strong interest in maintaining that it had not been duped. As a
subsequent British investigation found, there was a notable
"tendency of Naval officers and others who have taken part in
negotiations to become advocates of the integrity of the persons of

whom they secured the agreement."[1] They consistently decided to
ignore this early evidence of deception on the grounds it was
ambiguous. The British thus gradually became active allies of their
German deceivers. Even when the evidence became manifestly
clear, they found ad hoc reasons for ignoring almost every
violation. The result was that despite the evidence of aerial
photography, the deception worked.

The Iranian manipulation of the President's staff, made public by
the President's Special Review Board in February 1987, provides a
more recent example of how this collaboration between deceiver
and deceived works. The Iranian government needed the
cooperation of the White House to get American-made spare parts
for its anti-aircraft missiles, other military equipment, and
American satellite intelligence that could prove crucial in its war
against Iraq. Since the Reagan Administration publicly had taken
an implacably hostile stance against it, and had gone to great

lengths to organize an allied embargo against arms and technology
shipments, this cooperation could only be achieved through
Byzantine means.

In the summer of 1984, a number of agents of the Iranian
government approached international arms dealers with connections
to the CIA, and offered to supply them with intelligence
about Iran in return for American weapons on the prohibited list.
Like the double agents of Lenin's Trust, they explained that the
Khomeini regime was about to collapse, and they wanted to be on
the pro-Western side. The arms dealers immediately passed these
offers over to the CIA, which noted, "We have . . . probably 30 to
40 requests per year from Iranians and Iranian exiles to provide us
with very fancy intelligence, very important political insights, if we
in return can arrange for the sale of a dozen Bell helicopter gun
ships or 1,000 TOW missiles or something else."[2]
The CIA—assuming correctly, as it turned out, that these offers

were all part of a deception—rejected them out of hand. With such
negative responses, the Iranian officers responsible for getting
these arms had to go back and at least refine the "come on"
message to appeal to the preconceptions of the Reagan administration.
In November 1984, Manucher Ghorbanifar, an ex-Iranian intelligence officer who had represented the Khomeini regime in
purchasing arms, approached Theodore Shackley, who had just
retired from the CIA as one of its top executives, with a more
appealing line.3 Ghorbanifar said he "feared" Iran would become a
"Soviet satellite," possibly by 1987, unless the more "moderate"
elements in the Iranian government could "get a meaningful
dialogue with Washington." Since the CIA had proved skeptical,
Ghorbanifar tried to direct the new message to the White House;
"We know the CIA . . . they want to tear us like Kleenex—use us
for their purposes and then throw us out

the window."4 The message, as Ghorbanifar put it, was: "It is
President Reagan who has the destiny of the Iranian people in his
hands."
As specific proof of his bona fides, Ghorbanifar offered to arrange to ransom William Buckley—the CIA officer in Beirut
who had been captured by terrorists and whose release, as the
Iranians knew, had become a top objective of the CIA and its
Director William Casey. Ghorbanifar also offered to trade secret
Soviet equipment captured by Iran in Iraq for TOW missiles—
which would appeal to the Pentagon.
This revised approach fit in more closely with the White House's
picture of a struggle for succession in Iran. It consequently
received serious consideration by the National Security Council.
The State Department and Pentagon objected, however, saying that
it would undermine the American-sponsored boycott, and the
overture was rejected.

But in another respect Ghorbanifar and his principals in Teheran
succeeded. The NSC accepted the idea that Khomeini was on his
deathbed and that the United States should covertly intervene to
block any Soviet move, which justified finding and making contact
with the "moderate" faction. When the Iranians learned from
feedback through third parties—notably Israeli arms dealers—that
the United States was looking for representatives of the "moderate"
faction, they merely had to modify Ghorbanifar's story so it fit the
job description. For the deceiver, the tailoring of the "bait" is much
like breaking an access code to a telephone answering machine:
one keeps trying different digits until they produce the play-back
tone.
The Iranians finally succeeded in July 1985 after Ghorbanifar,
approaching the NSC staff through Israeli arms dealers, claimed to
represent "high individuals inside the Iranian

government."5

Ghorbanifar claimed that this faction had both the will and the
means to install an anti-Soviet government in Iran after Khomeini
died. Since Khomeini was suffering from terminal cancer, according to Ghorbanifar, this event was imminent. Ghorbanifar
explained that this faction, which included the Prime Minister, Mir
Hosein Musavi-Khamenei, the Minister of Oil, Gholam Reza
Aqazadeh, and most of the Iranian General Staff, feared that the
Soviets were poised to take over Iran, through the Tudeh Party,
which is the Communist Party in Iran. And that they had
approached the President, Ali Khameini, and leaders in Parliament,
with their plan to block the Communist coup. But they needed
credibility and support—especially with the military. If they could
demonstrate they had American backing, their chances of succeeding would improve immeasurably.
Ghorbanifar thus provided the White House with the exact
geopolitical rationale it was looking for—to do what it

wanted to
do. The NSC could now open up secret negotiations with the
Iranians.
Ghorbanifar suggested that the first step in the "dialogue" was
for each side to show its good faith. He proposed that the United
States deliver arms, spare parts, and satellite intelligence to the
Iranian army—not the revolutionary guards. The Iranians would, in
turn, arrange the release of American hostages, call off terrorist
attacks against Americans, and avoid incidents in the Persian Gulf.
The situation was not very different from that of the FBI and
Fedora. If the NSC accepted Ghorbanifar as its agent, it had to
make him more credible with his principals—the "moderate"
faction—by delivering some signs of American support. And the
more they provided, the more they were committed to continuing
the cooperation.
In August 1985, at the urging of the National Security

Adviser,
Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan authorized Israel, which
served as a "cover" in case things went wrong, to secretly ship 508
TOW missiles to Iran.
Initially, the exchange went well. After the arrival of the final
installment of the weapons on September 14, Reverend Benjamin
Weir, one of the Americans kidnapped in Lebanon, was immediately released—demonstrating that Ghorbanifar had the
connections he claimed. Both sides thus got a payoff: Iran got U.S.
arms, President Reagan got a hostage back.
Ghorbanifar then undertook another demonstration of his bona
fides. He predicted that in their upcoming speeches in Teheran,
Iranian leaders would conspicuously avoid attacking America.
When the CIA checked the speeches, it found that he was right (the
Iranian leaders had gone out of their way to denounce the Soviet
Union instead). This confirmed, as far as the NSC was concerned,

that they were dealing with the right man.6 They apparently didn't
consider the other possibility: Ghorbanifar was acting as an agent
of the Iranian government, not a "moderate faction," in a deception
aimed at causing the White House to break its own embargo.

As the clandestine collaboration deepened throughout 1986,
with HAWK ground-to-air missiles being supplied through Turkey
and the NSC staff taking over operational responsibility for the
deliveries, the White House became increasingly committed to the
idea it was dealing with a "faction," not the Khomeini regime. With
each shipment and every clandestine meeting, the NSC staff's
interest in maintaining the bona fides of Ghorbanifar increased.
Meanwhile, given his leverage, Ghorbanifar pressed for more
deliveries of U.S. arms and intelligence to keep him in good stead
with his principals.7 At one point, after there was a delay in the

shipment of HAWK missiles, Ghorbanifar intensified the pressure
by claiming his principals in Iran—the Prime Minister and Oil
Minister—had promised the President that the missiles would
arrive, and any further delays might completely discredit them and
the moderate faction. He thus confronted Colonel Oliver North,
who was supervising the deliveries for the White House, with a
dilemma. Stopping the deliveries would bring about the very result
the White House most feared: the likely takeover by the Soviet backed
faction. Moreover, Ghorbanifar hinted that the operation
might be exposed by hostile factions in Iran, thus severely
embarrassing President Reagan. As in all
tacit partnerships, there was the ultimate threat of blackmail.
North, to avoid this breakdown in the partnership, had to
advocate Ghorbanifar's case. In a note to McFarlane, he pointed
out: "Ghorbanifar's earlier game plan delivered Weir. He has
proposed we 'deliver something' so that he can retain credibility

with the regime in Teheran." North also drew up a somewhat
disingenuous list of options designed to show that the NSC had no
real option but to play ball with Ghorbanifar. He concluded,
"Whether we trust Ghorbanifar or not, he is irrefutably the deepest
penetration we have achieved into the current Iranian Government."
The problem was that to outsiders not entrapped in this partnership,
Ghorbanifar appeared to be far less candid and, as the CIA
reported, "a fabricator . . . who had undertaken activities
prejudicial to U.S. interests." In the lie detector test the CIA
administered, of the 15 relevant questions Ghorbanifar was asked,
"Deception [was] indicated in thirteen" and the other two answers
were "inconclusive." Specifically, the report accompanying the test
noted that Ghorbanifar "lied/fabricated his information on terrorist
activities"; "tried to mislead us concerning his relationship with the
rightist line inside Iran"; and, most importantly "showed

deception
on the question of whether he was in control of the Iranian
Government." The test also indicated that Ghorbanifar knew ahead
of time that hostages would not be released, as promised.[9] If this
test was accurate, as collateral events proved it to be, Ghorbanifar
was part of a major deception intended to make President Reagan
believe he was advancing an anti-Soviet cabal in Iran —when, in
fact, he was helping the Iranian government prosecute its war
against Iraq.
Nevertheless, Colonel North and his superiors continued to
advance Ghorbanifar's plan as if no doubts existed. In a memorandum
he prepared for the President's signature, North asserted,
"moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions
demonstrate their credibility in aiding Iran against Iraq
and in deterring Soviet intervention."[10] By delivering Iran the
wherewithal for this defense, he further suggested that the United

States could attain "a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the
Iranian governing hierarchy." In addition, he ironically pointed out,
as the deliveries accelerated, "a dependency would be established...
thus allowing the providers to influence near term events." What he
failed to point out was that the dependency was a two-way street.
With the President's approval of the memorandum, the CIA was
brought in to acquire weapons for the Iranians, set up Swiss bank
accounts, arrange for air transport, and forge documents. It also
was called in, over the protest of its deputy director, to provide the
Iranians with U.S. satellite photographs of Iraqi positions, and
clandestinely obtained manuals of the equipment Iraq was using.
The CIA also furnished secret data about Soviet deployments in
Afghanistan and elsewhere—even though it had determined that
Iranian methods of communication were "insecure," and the data

could reveal highly prized CIA "sources and methods" if intercepted by the Soviets. This intelligence nonetheless was
turned over to the Iranian "faction" in the spring of 1986 by the
NSC staff.
As the NSC staff traveled to Iran for meetings that summer, the
evidence became clear that they were not dealing with a conspiratorial cabal in Teheran but the Khomeini regime itself. No
other explanation could account for how the missiles and spare
parts were landed, paid for, test fired, and, as U.S. intelligence
intercepts showed, widely discussed throughout the government. It
seemed almost inconceivable that this was known only to Ghorbanifar's moderate faction, since the negotiations had been
exposed in some detail by Jack Anderson's story in The Washington Post on June 29, 1986. In any case, one month earlier,
the CIA Middle East analyst, Charles Allen, had learned that
Khomeini himself was well aware of the "state of play" of the
Iranian initiative. Allen concluded in a memorandum that

the Khomeini regime had three objectives: it "needed weapons," it
wanted to favorably conclude the war with Iraq, and it wanted to
re-establish Iran's "rightful place."[11]
It was clear that Ghorbanifar had presented all the parts of a
well-orchestrated deception. And the hostages had not been released
because the Iranian government evidently assumed it needed
them for bargaining chips to get further weaponry.
Even in the light of all this evidence, the NSC staff was not able
to acknowledge the "faction" was a deception. North, McFarlane,
Poindexter, and the other key participants had a definite interest in
not discrediting their deceivers. Not only would their arms-hostage
transaction be discredited, it might also raise questions about
money transferred to other causes, such as the Contras. Instead,
they held steadfastly in their memos to the illusion that they were
dealing with an independent "faction." When Ghorbanifar himself

became impossible to believe because of demonstrable lies he told
about collateral matters—such as terrorists' hit teams—and the
Iranian government appeared to collude with him in these
fabrications, the NSC staff shifted to one of Ghorbanifar's contact's
"relatives," whom they termed a "second channel," to the moderate
faction. Final proof of the deception came in November 1986
when, after a Shiite newspaper fatally exposed the negotiations, the
putative "cabal," instead of being arrested, continued in their
jobs—and Khomeini's favor.
What Khomeini had gained through this extensive deception
went beyond TOW missiles, HAWK missiles, spare parts, and
satellite intelligence. By exposing it to the world, he had undermined
the entire American embargo. If the United States would
sell missiles to Iran, why shouldn't our allies in Europe and Asia do
the same?
Despite the exposure, the NSC staff found it difficult to extricate

itself from the tangled web it had been enmeshed in by its tacit

partner. When the President discussed the matter in a televised

news conference two weeks later, he still clung to the idea, presumably based on a briefing, that his staff had been in

contact with "moderates." He said, testifying to the strength of the

bond of trust that this collaboration had produced, "We still have

those contacts . . . and we're going to continue on this path."12

As I studied these well-documented cases, it became clear to me

that deception is the product of the actions of both the deceiver and

the deceived. It ultimately depends for its success on the "mark"

not only believing the messages he receives from the deceiver but

being confident enough of his own judgment about them to reject

suspicions that would interfere with the deception working. This

trust blends deception and self-deception into one state of mind.

PART THREE
Winning Without Fighting

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
The Millennium War

"The prince should never attempt to win by force what he might
otherwise win by fraud."
—Machiavelli

There is no reason to assume, if there is to be a war between the
superpowers, that it is going to be either a nuclear or a conventional
conflict. There are other forms of nonmilitary adversary
relations. Machiavelli argued: why expend resources fighting,
when the same objective could be more cheaply obtained by
peaceful deception? The same logic applies with even greater force
in an age when weapons can destroy an entire society. Lenin
adopted this Machiavellian strategy of winning without fighting in

the early days of Soviet power. Lenin's slogan "Peace is a weapon"
provided the context for his concept of peaceful coexistence. A
state of peace was envisioned not as any agreement to maintain the
status quo but the continuation of class warfare by other means.
The objective remained the same, the destruction of capitalist
societies; the means changed. Lenin thus reversed Clausewitz's
dictum that war is the extension of policy by other means. Peace,
or at least what Soviet tacticians would call by that name, would
become the extension of warfare.
Nuclear weapons reinforced this logic. The United States
maintained a near monopoly over delivery systems up until the
early 1960s, and the Soviet strategy since at least Hiroshima has
been to avoid any direct military engagement with the United
States. For the past forty-four years, the Soviet Union, following
Lenin's dictate, has found "other means" for continuing its
expansion.

It annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as slices
of Poland, Germany, Rumania, Finland, and Japan with
the
approval of the United States and its allies; it seized
control of
Czechoslovakia—and later a large part of Afghanistan—
through
coups d'etat; and it acquired client states, such as Libya
and Cuba,
by supplying military, economic, and intelligence
assistance.
The conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union,
whether called a "cold war" or "peaceful competition,"
has been in
effect at least since 1945. At times, through proxies such
as North
Korea and North Vietnam, American military forces have
been
engaged; but no Soviet troops have ever directly been
involved in
warfare against American troops. The premise of this
book is that
this current low-level conflict will continue through the
millennium
without turning into either a nuclear war or even a
conventional
one. It will be, as Lenin envisioned it, a deception war.

In such a conflict, adversaries can be expected to constantly
attempt through peaceful means to disrupt each other's economic
and military alliances, misdirect each other's energy on chimerical
projects, and undermine each other's political and moral authority.
Victory will come not from any single decisive battle but from the
accumulation of gradual changes in the global balance of power.
At one point in this scenario, one superpower—either the United
States or the Soviet Union—might find it lacks the allies, resources, or will to compete with the other. This assessment itself
might be tantamount to losing— without fighting.
The tactics for winning such a deception war are fairly straightforward.
One side distorts the intelligence of the other. Specifically,
it alters its rival's perceived reality in such a way that the rival neglects its true interests and pursues bogus ones. For example,
it may mislead it to treat allies like foes and foes like allies.
Ever since the inception of the Soviet Union in 1917,

when it
was vastly outnumbered militarily by hostile nations
while having
access to virtually no modern technology, the nation has
depended
on fraud rather than force. Soviet strategy, at the height of
the Cold
War, as it was pieced together by U.S. intelligence,
appeared to
revolve around three main objectives: breaking up
Western
alliances; obtaining financial credits from Western nations
to buy
technology; and nullifying U.S. nuclear superiority by
self-limiting
treaties and other restrictions. The assumption is that if
the Soviet
Union could strip the United States of its alliances,
technological
edge, and nuclear superiority, it would become, if only by
dint of
its size and the deployment of its conventional military
forces, the
superior power.
The Soviets, to be sure, did not have an exclusive
monopoly
over the tactics of winning without fighting. In the late
1940s, the

United States sought to bring about a political implosion within the
Soviet bloc through what loosely went under the rubric of
"containment policy." It involved, among many other things, a
wide range of coordinated covert actions designed to create
ruptures between the Soviet Union and its allies in
Eastern Europe.
An Anglo-American task force parachuted arms and emigre agents
into Soviet-occupied territories to challenge the legitimacy of
Soviet rule; U.S. intelligence passed disinformation through its
double agents to provoke and discredit selected Soviet bloc
leaders; the Office of Policy Coordination (which later merged
with the CIA) attempted to create real and illusionary enemies for
Stalin by planting forgeries, spoofing radio broadcasts from
phantom traitors, and other such tricks. Meanwhile, radio stations
in West Germany attempted to stir up popular dissension and play
on nationalist and anti-Soviet sympathies. The idea was to

mislead
Stalin into taking actions that would further build up anti-Soviet
pressure in Eastern Europe. As it turned out, these deception
initiatives failed—as we have seen—
because, unknown to U.S. planners, Soviet intelligence had penetrated
these exile movements as well as the Anglo-American
coordinating unit through Kim Philby and other moles.
The scope of detailed planning in such operations is evident in
the deception scenario that the State Department, CIA, and
National Security Council developed in 1986 to overthrow the
Qaddafi regime in Libya. It was predicated on the stated strategy
that "any alternative leadership to Qaddafi would be better for U.S.
interests." The plan aimed at playing on Qaddafi's own "paranoia"
through a series of covert, diplomatic, military, and public actions
to increase Qaddafi's distrust of his military command—and vice
versa. The "key element," as a memo spelled it out, involved

combining "real and illusionary events—through a disinformation
program . . . with the basic goal of making Qaddafi think there is a
high degree of internal opposition to him within Libya, that his key
trusted aides are disloyal, that the U.S. is about to move against
him militarily." The memo, classified TOP SECRET/VECTOR,
proposed such illusions as having American submarines land
rubber rafts, money, and communications equipment, which would
make it seem to Qaddafi's security police that "a coup is planned or
underway." Meanwhile, to fuel his paranoia, U.S. deception
experts would fake radio and other signals that would make it
appear American planes were flying over Libya. When his air force
launched interceptors, they of course would fail to find the
phantoms. Simultaneously, disinformation would be planted that
America and France were preparing to launch an offensive from

Chad, spooking Libya's army. And articles would be planted
through background briefings in the press reporting "infighting
among groups jockeying for [the] post-Qaddafi era." The rumors
would be fanned by local diplomats. The idea was to keep adding
"events" until Qaddafi's intelligence system (which was organized
by East Germans), unable to find the nonexistent conspirators,
either became discredited or focused suspicion on innocent parties,
such as the General Staff. The plan then anticipated Qaddafi
becoming paranoid and
making wrong moves that would possibly bring about a real coup
d'etat by his military.
This deception plan was never put into effect because of a
breakdown in security. A member of the National Security Council
staff leaked the memorandum to The Washington Post. Once the
plan was compromised, it was obviously useless against Qaddafi.[1]
It must be assumed that both sides have ample intellectual

resources, and deception experts, to prepare similar plans that
could be used to destabilize a hostile leader, disrupt an alliance, or
mislead adversaries in other ways. The issue is how effective they
will be. The real problem is not the ingenuity of their initial
design—since such scenarios can usually be modified —but
whether the other side will detect them before they can be fully
played out (as was the case in Libya). Defense, not offense, is
therefore paramount in the deception war.
The order of battle for the deception war cannot be assessed
merely in conventional terms—i.e., divisions, tanks, ships, planes,
or missiles—but in this effectiveness of each side's intelligence
system. The success of deception for one side depends on the
failure of the other side's intelligence system. The issue is: are the
superpowers balanced in their ability to detect deception? If not,
does one side have the wherewithal to blind, dazzle,

beguile,
incapacitate, confuse, and mislead the other side's intelligence
apparatus? Can it penetrate the other side's operations, and thereby
render them transparent? Finally, can it use these advantages to
influence or control its evaluation of information? It comes down
to which of the superpowers has the ability, inclination, and "mind"
to detect fraudulent information that is put in its path. From what I learned at the deception conferences, the United
States may be at a distinct disadvantage in this type of warfare. The
growing commitment of its intelligence establishment to the multibillion
dollar satellites and other forms of technology has, as we have seen in the case of the telemetry double cross, left it
with little tolerance for the proposition that the data it collects
through these devices may be part of, rather than proof against, an
orchestrated deception. In keeping with the focus on information,
rather than on its provenance, counterintelligence has

been
systematically downgraded, a process that Admiral Turner
took
pride in accomplishing in his autobiography. The
resulting state of
mind at the CIA even at times rejects the concept of
deception
when one of its prize sources openly returns to his KGB
command
in Moscow, as we have seen in the case of Yurchenko.
The
unwillingness to confront the possibility of deception
creates a
serious gap in America's defenses.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN
The Weak Look

"Pretend to be weak, so that an opponent will grow
arrogant."
—Sun-tzu, The Art of War

In June 1988, writing in the journal of the Communist
Party,
Kommunist, Georgi Arbatov, a member of Gorbachev's
Politburo,
laid out a Soviet strategy for winning without fighting. He

noted:

"The 'image of the enemy' that is being eroded has been . . .

absolutely vital for the foreign and military policy of the U.S. and

its allies. The destruction of this stereotype ... is Gorbachev's

weapon." He reasoned, "neither the arms race, nor power politics in

the Third World, nor the military blocs, are thinkable without the

'enemy,' and without the 'Soviet threat.' " He also suggested that the

United States would acquiesce in this erosion of the threatening

image of the Soviet Union by confidently pointing out, "Of course,

this weapon is not secret but it does have tremendous power."[1] This

strategy is predicated on three assumptions.

1. The cement that held together the Atlantic alliance was the

perception, whether or not it was grounded in reality, that the

Soviet Union was a potential enemy. European nations pictured, in

other words, the Soviet Union as physically capable of either

directly attacking them with
tanks and bombers, cutting off their lines of
communication, or
subverting their political systems through stratagems. The
result
was the NATO Alliance, in which they militarily banded
together
with the United States and Canada. It allowed the United
States to
operate 278 military bases on their territory. It arranged
intelligence service protocols, in which they, along with
Australia,
Japan, Israel, coordinated their counterintelligence efforts
with that
of the CIA to keep Soviet bloc agents under close
surveillance and
cooperated in a global network for intercepting and
processing
Soviet signals. It mandated economic arrangements in
which they,
together with Japan, worked to deny the Soviet bloc the
war
materials, technology, financial credit, and industrial
wherewithal
it needed to strengthen itself. And it negotiated political
accords,
both formally and informally part of the "containment
policy,"

which aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its

influence outside of its own bloc.

2. If this threatening image is erased, or even sufficiently vitiated,

in the West, this alliance system would fall apart. Why should

these European countries who are, after all, economic competitors

with the United States pay a large part of their wealth to defend

themselves against a nation that is no threat? Why should they

maintain domestically unpopular military bases on their territory if

there is no enemy? Why should they allow American war planes to

land on their territory or practice maneuvers in their air space?

Why should they risk turning themselves into nuclear battlefields

for tactical weapons? Why should they embargo technology and

restrict their domestic manufacturers from getting a privileged

position in the Soviet bloc market? Why continue an anachronistic

containment policy when there is no reason to contain

Soviet
influence?

3. Without this alliance system, the United States would be
incapable of intervening in many areas of the world, or engaging in
"power politics," as Arbatov terms it. If the United States did not
have its refueling and weapon storage bases in NATO countries,
and lacked the right to
overfly them, its aircraft could not reach or resupply such allied
countries as Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan on any
dependable basis. Nor could the United States guarantee their
safety in a crisis. Under these circumstances, its allies would have
little alternative but to reach an accommodation with the Soviet
Union.

These objectives could be realized through a single deception:
misrepresenting economic weakness in the Soviet economy to the
extent that the United States, its NATO allies, and Japan will no

longer consider the Soviet Union to be a serious threat. By
projecting an image of such weakness abroad, the Soviet Union
could hope to undercut the rationale for maintaining the NATO
alliance, as well as to weaken public support for the stationing of
U.S. forces in Japan, West Germany, Korea, the Philippines, and
other countries. The idea that the Soviet economy is in such dire
straits, if not a total basket case, also provides a basis in the West
for believing that the Soviet Union will make concessions in
negotiations in order to get Western help in restructuring it. It is a
tactic no different from a retail store feigning an "out of business
sale" to make customers believe they are getting bargains or
airlines pretending to be on the verge of bankruptcy to win
concessions in their labor negotiations.
In 1985, Gorbachev himself helped launch this specter in his
book Perestroika (published in Russian and sixteen

foreign languages)
which, describing the Soviet economy as "ossified,"
proposed
sweeping reforms of the administrative structure of the
government in the name of efficiency. The main evidence
of this
collapsing economy consisted of the statements of Soviet
officials;
Soviet economic reports furnished to the CIA and
European
intelligence by Soviet controlled sources; a drumbeat of
stories in
the Soviet press supporting this theme; and private
briefings to
Western journalists, academics, and VIPs by Arbatov's
Institute for
the Study of the United States and a handful of
Gorbachev's top
staff. The key briefer for the West here was Abel
Aganbegyan, Gorbachev's personal economic adviser,
who supplied
impressive sounding data at the beginning of the
campaign in
1985 to Western economic authorities, foreign opinion
leaders, and
U.S. news media owners that economic growth in the
Soviet Union
since 1980 had been close to zero.2 The resulting image of

an
ossified, faltering, and hapless Soviet economy had great appeal in
the West.
On the right, it tended to confirm to die-hard anti-Communists
that they were correct in claiming that communism did not work.
On the left, it tended to support the view of those advocating
disarmament that, whatever its past policy, the Soviet Union now
needed peace. To pragmatists in the center, it suggested that
ideology no longer mattered since both superpowers were converging
in their political systems to solve economic and ecological
problems. To those in business, it promised a bonanza of trade. To
those in the administration, it justified their negotiations.
American national security policy accordingly adjusted to this
new image, as The Wall Street Journal reported in a front-page
story on August 11, 1988, entitled "Strategic Shift." It stated, based
on an impressive number of interviews with present and former

officials: "For the first time since the start of the Cold War, the
U.S. is redefining its concept of national security." It further
explained that the revision of policy, though "still in its infancy,"
proceeded directly from the change in the image that American
leaders had of their Cold War enemy. Specifically, American
officials cited "Russia's domestic problems," and they further
assumed that "Gorbachev's current drive to reform his economy
highlights the failings of communism."
As these officials now believed that both the Soviet economy
and communism had failed, they also could logically find that the
past U.S. policy of containing the Soviet Union was outdated. In
the new consensus, as summed up by The Wall Street Journal, the
policy of containment no longer "fit an era in which the Soviet
Union is struggling to restructure its ossified economy,
communism is in decline as an ideology, and the American public

worries more about economic competition from Japan or terrorist
attacks against the United States than superpower confrontation."
What emerged from these interviews was that the Reagan
administration, denied its image of an enemy threat, was turning its
attention from the activities of the Soviet Union to those of
America's principal allies.3 The image of an ossified economy thus
provided an acceptable rationale for doing what was politically
convenient—replacing Cold War containment policies with more
popular trade and anti-drug policies.
But is this alternative image, which has been projected on the
West so skillfully, consistent with the realities of the Soviet economy?
Even if the Soviet economy does not produce enough consumer
goods for a Western standard of living, is it no longer
capable of sustaining a military or political threat? There are many
measures of the output of an economy. By using gross national
product—the sum of the value of all the goods and

services with
which inhabitants are provided—the United States measures the
extent to which its economy services its people. It counts, in other
words, entertainment, car repair, weddings, funerals, and personal
commuting as part of its product. And here the United States has
far exceeded the Soviet Union. If everyone in America, for
example, decided to dent and then repair their cars, the GNP would
increase by the national repair bill (though no one necessarily
would be better off). If, on the other hand, the yardstick of
industrial production is used—which measures the capacity of an
economy to produce the energy, materials, weapons, and
wherewithal necessary for a nation to expand, to fight a war, and to
dominate and intimidate other nations—the Soviet economy is not
stagnating but gaining against the United States.
In 1948, Soviet industrial production was one fifth that of the
United States; in 1988, it was three quarters that of the United

States. In other words, it had closed most of the gap.
Consider the key components in this race for industrial
superiority. Energy, which is the basis of all industry, is
an example
of the Soviet surge. In 1948, the Soviet Union produced
only
500,000 barrels a day, one tenth as much oil as the United
States.
In 1988, it produced 12 million barrels a day, or 50
percent more
oil than the United States. In 1948, the Soviet Union
produced less
than 8 million cubic meters of natural gas, which was
only 2
percent of what the United States produced (and not
enough
feedstock for manufacturing petrochemicals). By 1988,
the Soviet
Union produced almost 800 billion cubic meters of
natural gas,
which was nearly twice U.S. production. Its gas pipelines
network
will deliver 48 billion cubic meters a year to Europe in the
1990s,
making the Soviet Union the main supplier of heating and
industrial fuel to most European nations.
The Soviet economy has also surpassed the United States
in

producing the basic structural materials. In 1948, for example, the
Soviet Union produced only 25 million tons of steel, which was
only one quarter as much as the United States produced. In 1988, it
produced 162 million tons, which was twice as much steel as the
United States produced. In 1948, it produced only 700,000 tons of
aluminum, one tenth as much as the United States. In 1988, it
produced over 3 million tons, about equal to U.S. production. It
produced more cement, copper wiring, and titanium.
The Soviet economy has also benefitted from the accelerating
transfer of technology from the West, especially after the 1971
detente, in which it received machine tools, dry docks, and computers.
This modernization allowed the Soviet Union to move ahead of the United States in such categories as shipbuilding,
tractor assembly, space launches, and factory construction. It also
provided the Soviet Union with the largest truck production facility

in the world, the Kama River industrial complex.
In 1948, the Soviet non-agricultural labor force was 20 percent
smaller than that of the United States. By 1988, it was 10 percent
larger. And, whatever other inefficiencies it had, production was
not lost because of strikes, work stoppages, or acts of industrial
sabotage. (In the United States in 1988, over 10 million man days
were lost because of strikes.)4
In 1988, the CIA belatedly determined that the data supplied the
Western media and academic sovietologists in private briefing two
years earlier by Abel Aganbegyan was wrong. The CIA found that
the zero growth claimed to have occurred in the pre-Gorbachev
years of the Soviet economy had been "unrealistically low." But
why would Gorbachev's briefer purposely understate the expansion
of the Soviet economy? The tentative explanation the CIA offered
for this distortion was that it had been intended to help Gorbachev

in his "domestic politics." This was not the first time that the
Soviets had led the United States to underestimate Soviet
production. Earlier the CIA had been similarly misled by Soviet
assessments of its future petroleum production. It had obtained
these technical reports through its own and West German sources.
They suggested that Soviet oil fields were rapidly deteriorating and
would run dry in the early 1980s. The CIA report based on this
data, which predicted the Soviet Union would be an importer of
oil, proved to be wrong. The Soviet Union in 1988 was the second
largest exporter of oil, after Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, the Soviets have been able to dedicate an ever larger
portion of the product of their economy to military and state
purposes compared to the United States—despite the rhetoric of
Glasnost, which suggests that the Soviet Union needs to give its
people more consumer goods, and consequently is less of
a threat.

In reality, according to the best CIA estimates, the Soviet Union
has increased the proportion it spends on guns and decreased the
proportion it spends on butter, even under Gorbachev in the 1980s,
from 10 to about 12 percent of its GNP, which is more than twice
the proportion spent by the United States.[5] And even these
conventional comparisons tend to underestimate Soviet military
capacity, since many civilian categories, such as merchant ships
and airlines, contain equipment designed for and fully integrated
into the Soviet military forces.
Even when confronted with a catastrophic earthquake in Armenia
in December 1988, the Soviet air force continued to fly an average
of 200 to 300 bombing missions a day in Afghanistan. The result is
that the Soviet military has dramatically increased its power since
the onset of the Cold War.[6]
Take air defense, for example. In 1948, the Soviet Union was
completely vulnerable to attack. It had no nuclear forces

or intercontinental
bombers to retaliate against or deter such attacks. It
was literally encircled by U.S. bomber bases in Africa,
Europe, and
Asia, and U.S. spy planes overflew its territory at will.
By 1988, the situation had drastically changed. The
United
States no longer had a nuclear monopoly, a tactical air
defense, a
string of air bases, civil defense bunkers, or even safely
deployed
land missiles.7 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had a
sophisticated tactical air defense system that could be
used against
bombers, reconnaissance planes, or even submarine-
launched
missile warheads. It also had deployed around Moscow an
antiballistic missile defense system, and, in other
locations, giant
phased-array radars capable, with the proper software, of
coordinating mobile rocket launchers and smaller truck-
mounted
radar trackers into a more extensive antiballistic missile
system.
And it had built underground bunkers, serviced by private
railroads, large enough to accommodate the entire
policymaking
apparatus of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has similarly moved ahead of the United
States in the space race—at least in its capacity to lift tons of
equipment into orbit. It presently has in orbit radars, powered by
nuclear reactors, which appear capable of spotting the signatures of
U.S. submarines.
Nor is there any reason to assume that the Soviet decision to use
its economy to increase its military capacity rather than its standard
of living has weakened its hold over its own people. A 1988
econometric study by the RAND Corporation suggests that the
Soviet Union, and its allies, have instead organized their societies
so that they require that fewer goods be channeled to
consumers than in non-Communist nations. And the higher proportion
of national income spent on police and military is inherently
part of the system through which Communist parties maintain control.8
While the Soviet leadership may well want to increase the future

efficiency of its industry and develop new technological capacities,
by virtually any present empirical measure—economic, military, or
political—the Soviet Union is a greater threat today than it was in
1948. The erasure of the image of a Soviet threat is therefore based
not on how many barrels of oil the Soviet produces, nor on the size
of its armed forces, nor on its capacity to lift nuclear reactors into
space, nor on the increasing number of foreign bases to which it
has access, but rather on the claims of its own leadership that it is
no longer a threat. These claims may be sincere, of course. They
might also be part of a strategy for winning without fighting.
To look ahead in the deception war, it is useful to look backward.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
The Sixth Glasnost

Glasnost—a Russian concept that originally meant publicity or

notoriety—has been an effective instrument of Soviet policy since
the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was first used by
Lenin, who realized that power proceeded from denying others a
veil of privacy for their decision making. Hence, Glasnost, or
"public airing," became a weapon for the Communist Party.1 By
forcing local officials to engage in a process of "criticism and self-criticism"
in which they had to confess to their own mistakes or
point to those of others, Lenin made all government officials and
lower-ranking Party members increasingly vulnerable to Party
discipline and purges. In so doing, he strengthened the hold of the
Party hierarchy while at the same time increasing the appearance of
free speech. As he noted, "Glasnost is a sword which itself heals
the wound it inflicts."2
This miraculous sword could also be used as a powerful instrument
of deception. To the extent that these controlled bouts of
self-criticism were seen by foreign eyes as unrestricted

freedom of
criticism, it created the illusion of a budding democracy. As in all
deceptions, a single indicator of a phenomenon—in this case,
criticism—is represented as the phenomenon itself, an open
society. The logic went: Democracies allow public criticism of
officials; the Soviet Union allows public criticism of officials;
therefore the Soviet Union is a democracy.
Glasnost served a further, more practical purpose. In order for
the press in the Soviet Union, which is entirely controlled by the
Communist Party, to serve as an effective means of delivering
messages to foreign audiences, the illusion had to be created that it
was independent. By fostering the impression of a free speech and
a free press, Glasnost lent credibility to government-controlled
newspapers that otherwise would be regarded by foreign newsmen,
and their audiences, as mouthpieces for the straight Party line. It

provided the Soviet government with the means of altering its
image abroad. It could be used to establish a set of convenient
peepholes for journalists, academics, and other Kremlin-watchers
through which they could see selected pictures of Soviet society.
From its inception, the Soviet leadership was justifiably concerned
with its image abroad. Lenin, to get his revolution accepted
by both capitalist governments and socialist parties abroad, had to
represent it as something it was not: a constitutional union of
democratic states. Its very name, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, was a fiction designed to make it appear that the Soviet
Union was not a state, run by the Kremlin, but a grouping of
autonomous "Republics" governed by elected "Soviets" of workers.
The Soviet Constitution was similarly a fiction. It described a
government, complete with a Presidium, Supreme Soviet, and

court system; but they existed in name only. Even the ministries
were merely fronts for the agencies of the Communist Party. Lenin
also fabricated entire activities of the notional "Republics" to
impress foreign audiences. At one point, he even staged a
breakdown in relations between one of these "Republics," the Far
Eastern Republic, and Moscow, in order to encourage the
American and Japanese governments to believe it was a dissident
republic, and to provide it with munitions and equipment.
These early deceptions had little staying power, however. What
modest credibility staged press releases about Soviet democracies
had was quickly undermined by Communist spokes-
men crudely stating that news releases should be used for agitation
and propaganda, or "agitprop." This crisis of credibility came at a
time when the Soviet Union faced a desperate economic situation.
By 1921, industrial production had fallen to about one fifth of
the level it had been in 1913, and total national income, even in

inflated rubles, was only one third the prewar level.3
Factories were
shut for lack of spare parts; the railroads were paralyzed
by lack of
fuel, oil fields had stopped production because of lack of
drilling
bits, trucks and tractors had run out of tires, and farmers
lacked the
fertilizer and equipment to produce food to export to the
cities.
Moreover, the Soviet revolutionists could not import the
equipment
they needed. The United States, Britain, France, and
Japan not only
had intervened in the civil war on the side of the anti-
Communists,
but now embargoed the export of these desperately
needed items
from the Soviet Union. And even if they could buy them
from
other countries, the Soviets had no way of paying for
them. The
Western Allies had frozen Russia's foreign gold reserves,
and
denied them credits.
Lenin recognized that the survival of the Soviet
Revolution now
depended on changing this situation. The Soviet Union

had to get

nations that perceived it as an intractable enemy to ship it the

necessary equipment and materials to revive its economy. To do

this, Lenin had to alter their image of the Soviet Union from a

hostile to potentially friendly nation. The instrument was Glasnost.

THE FIRST GLASNOST: THE NEP

In the spring of 1921, Lenin proclaimed to the world a 180-degree

reversal from the policies that had alienated the Western powers.

He explained this change as the evolution of communism. He

announced that "war communism," in which Soviet citizens had no

freedom, rights, property, or even money, had come to an end. It

would be succeeded by the second phase of

communism, called the New Economic Policy, or NEP, in which

there would now be a gradual return to a free market economy.

Individuals would be allowed to own property; peasants

would be
allowed to own their land; small and medium businesses could be
owned by workers and entrepreneurs in the form of cooperatives;
and large industries would be reconstituted as publicly owned
"trusts." Money would again become legal tender, debts would be
recognized, and, wherever possible, the profit motive would be
reinstituted.
Moreover, this economic "restructuring" would be accompanied
by political liberalization. Individuals would be allowed to travel
within Russia without permission, to emigrate, and to participate in
local politics. Even emigres abroad would be offered amnesty.
Taken together, these measures suggested that the Soviet Union,
despite its rhetoric about revolution, was slowly but irreversibly
moving toward an accommodation with capitalism.
The message implicit in NEP was: The desired reversal of
communism would be accelerated by trade with the West. It was

thus in the interest of the Western Allies to supply, rather than
deny, trade credits to the Soviet Union.
Feliks Dzierzhinski, as head of the OGPU, the security service
of the Communist Party, was charged with getting this message
convincingly through to the West. Dzierzhinski had already established
the Trust deception which, it will be recalled, allowed
him to send messages through the medium of putative dissidents to
eleven Western intelligence services. Lenin also appointed him
head of the NEP's Supreme Economic Council. From this dual
vantage point, Dzierzhinski could control the covert as well as the
open channels to the West. While the former was used to convince
the West that the Revolution was faltering, the latter was used to
show how democracy was surfacing.
Here Dzierzhinski activated a number of underground "opposition"
newspapers, such as New Russia, which were read by,
and cultivated working relations with, Western journalists in

Moscow. They echoed the theme that the Soviet Union was in a
period of exciting change. At the same time, Dzierzhinski had his
OGPU agents arrange tours of the "underground" for Russian
emigre writers who had fled to the West. They were allowed to
return to the Soviet Union, to interview recently released political
prisoners, and to witness dissident meetings. They then reported
back to their readers in first-hand accounts on how censorship on
books, art, plays, and cultural criticism had been suspended under
the NEP.
The Soviet leadership was even willing to manipulate its institutions
to further this effect. For example, in 1922, the Commissar
for Foreign Affairs enthusiastically proposed to Lenin: "In case the Americans would insist on representative institutions ...
we can deceive them by making a small ideological concession
which would not have any practical meaning."[4] Lenin had no

problem with falsifying institutions in the Soviet Union that were
fictions to begin with. As he privately explained to the Communist
leadership, the new policy "did not mean peace with capitalism but
war on a new plane."
Within this Glasnost atmosphere, the Soviet Union also opened
a "path," as Lenin called it, to the corporate business community in
the United States that helped facilitate the Soviet Union's acquisition of credit, commodities, and technology, and also gave
American lobbyists, public relations firms, and politically influential contacts a powerful incentive to support Soviet objectives.
Lenin pointed to the potential of this path during an acrimonious
debate he had with other Bolsheviks soon after the Revolution.
After he had hyperbolically asserted the Communists would
triumph by hanging the capitalist nations, one skeptical colleague
interrupted, and, referring to the critical shortages of war material
in Russia, asked where the Communists would get enough

"rope"
for such a massive hanging. Lenin answered: "The capitalists will
sell it to us." Moreover, they would sell it on credit.5
Underlying Lenin's quick reply was a powerful insight. Although
foreign capitalists were the ultimate target of communism, they were also, in the short run, its most promising allies. The
explanation to this paradox was simple enough: Western corporations had a concrete interest in helping Lenin break the
diplomatic and economic isolation that the Western governments
had imposed on the Soviet Union—because they wanted the Soviet
Union's business. Lenin dangled in front of capitalists the sort of
opportunity they could not easily find in their own free markets: a
government-guaranteed monopoly. It would take the form of
"concessions" in which foreigners would invest the capital in
Russian ventures—and reap a large share of the profits.
The immediate problem for Soviet strategists was to convince
Western businessmen, who had seen the Bolsheviks seize

their
property without compensation in 1917, that now, four
years later,
it was safe to accept these "concessions." The problem
was
compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union was
virtually bankrupt—
and Soviet ideology eventually required nationalizing
private
property.
To get around such formidable obstacles, Lenin suggested
a
program of misdirection that would focus the attention of
the
audience on the future promise of a Soviet Golconda
—while
distracting it from the inherent risks. Specifically, Lenin
ordered
his staff to find an American businessman who could be
awarded
the first concession under the NEP and, by parading
before other
American corporations, convince them that it was prudent
and safe.
It was much the same strategy as slaughterhouses using
Judas goats
to lead the cattle in. Lenin noted: "What we want to show
and have

in print... is that the Americans have gone in for concessions." He
added, showing his appreciation of the lobbying role corporations
play in the United States, "This is important politically."[6]
The American chosen for this role was Armand Hammer.[7]
Although he was then only a twenty-one-year-old medical student
visiting Moscow, his father, Julius Hammer, was well known
to Lenin. Julius Hammer had been a founder of a radical wing of
the American Communist Party, and, in this capacity, had met
Lenin and other Soviet leaders before the Revolution. After Lenin
seized power in 1917, Julius Hammer, who became the exclusive
agent for Soviet trade with America, helped supply the Soviet
government with embargoed goods by laundering them through a
third country—the short-lived Republic of Estonia. He also made
the Soviet government a silent partner in his Allied-American
Corporation, through which this business was funneled. Although

an American citizen, Hammer was appointed the Soviet
commercial attache in New York, and worked closely
with a
Soviet official named Ludwig Martens in organizing trade
arrangements, and evasions of the American embargo.
By late 1921, these relationships between Hammer and
the
Soviet government were investigated by the Department
of Justice,
and Martens was unceremoniously deported. Shortly
thereafter,
Julius Hammer himself was jailed on supposedly
unrelated charges
stemming from an illegal abortion he had performed, and
he was
sent to Sing Sing for three years. This prison sentence left
his son
Armand with the task of sorting out the tangled strands of
the
Allied-American Corporation.
Armand Hammer had little problem making contact with
the
Soviet strategists. As soon as he arrived in Moscow, he
called
Ludwig Martens, his father's former associate, who was
now
working directly for Lenin's intelligence chief, Feliks
Dzierzhinski,

on the Supreme Economic Council, and, even more to the
point, was directly in charge of the effort to open the path
to
Western business. Martens brought Hammer to Boris
Reinstein,
who was in charge of organizing "International
Propaganda" for
Lenin. Then, with Reinstein's endorsement, Hammer was
allowed
to meet Lenin, who approved awarding him the show
concession to
"advertise" Soviet opportunities.
Since the purpose of this exercise was not to mine ore
from the
concession but to use it as bait for other potential conces-
sionaires, Lenin instructed Martens in October 1921 to
immediately
give Hammer's corporation a contract for a concession,
"even if it is a fictitious one." He suggested it could be
"asbestos or
any other Ural valuable or whatever you will."[8]
Lenin then wrote to Joseph Stalin, the newly appointed
General
Secretary to the Communist Party, asking that he and
other
Politburo members fully "support" this notional venture
with
Armand Hammer. He explained, "This is a small path to

the
American business world and this path should be made use of in
every way." The emphasis was added by Lenin, who used "in every
way" as a term of art suggesting this path could be used for covert
action, influence agents, and intelligence. A copy of the letter was
sent to Dzierzhinski as well as Stalin.9
After receiving this concession in 1922, Hammer set out to
publicize it in America (as did Boris Reinstein's propaganda bureau).
Hammer went from industrialist to industrialist in America,
extolling the virtues—and potential profit—of investing in the
Soviet Union. Hammer told these businessmen that Lenin had
openly admitted to him that "Communism does not work," and that
now the Soviet Union needed capitalists to repair the system. By
1925, Hammer had succeeded in recruiting no fewer than thirty-eight
prestigious corporations, including the Ford Motor Company,

into investing in Soviet enterprises. As the "path" gradually
expanded to a superhighway for doing business with the Soviet
Union, another three hundred foreign companies signed up for
concessions. There followed a vast infusion of machinery, trucks,
spare parts, ships, planes, and even whole factories—all financed
by Western credit.10
In supporting this path, Dzierzhinski demonstrated that the
Soviet Secret Service was capable of using covert channels to
Western intelligence, such as double agents, false defectors, and
sham communications, to reinforce and give credibility to the
government's overt channels. As Lenin had accurately predicted, as
long as the capitalists were told what they wanted to hear, they
would tacitly accept rather than expose the deception. The message
they wanted to hear was that the USSR was a potential gold mine.
The Soviet government also used diplomatic channels to

reinforce
the Glasnost message that the Soviet Union was evolving into
a moderate government. Instead of calling for world revolution, as
they had done prior to 1921, Soviet diplomats and trade delegations now stressed peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Foreign
Ministry, using codes it knew were being deciphered by England,
instructed its overseas agents to cease support for anti-West
subversion. It also claimed that the Communist International, or
Comintern, which Lenin headed, was a separate entity, not under
its control.
This Glasnost message was accepted partly because it coincided
with what Western governments wanted to believe. It was convenient
to assume that the Soviet Revolution was a failure if only
because it ended the pressures to take military action against
Moscow. And it was in the interest of Western governments to
believe that trade with the Soviet Union would weaken, rather than

strengthen, the revolutionary elements in the government. In any case, the NEP succeeded in breaking the effort to isolate
the Soviet Union. Every major country except the United States
normalized its diplomatic relations with Moscow, the trade embargo
was abandoned, Germany helped rearm the Red Army, and
no fewer than twelve foreign Communist parties joined the
Comintern during this period. The Soviet Union also got the credits
it needed to refurbish its industry.
Finally, in 1929, having accomplished its purposes, the NEP
was abruptly ended. All private enterprises were nationalized;
foreign concessions were canceled (and most foreign investment
was expropriated without compensation); agriculture holdings were
seized and farms collectivized. ("Perestroika" meant in this context
the forced merger of private farms into state collectives.)[11]
Censorship was reimposed; dissident movements were quashed; non-Party newspapers were shut down; and, within

weeks, all traces of NEP disappeared.

THE SECOND GLASNOST: THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION, 1936-37

The next Glasnost offensive was more short-lived. Stalin suggested
in the mid-1930s that the Soviet Union should move in the
direction of restructuring its economy along capitalist lines, if
necessary. He called these radical reforms
"reconstructions," or
Perestroika. They included profit incentives that were determined
not by any Marxian need but by individual efficiency in increasing
production. He explained: "There was no point in overthrowing
Capitalism in 1917 . . . if we do not succeed in enabling people to
live in a state of prosperity." To support this picture of a rapidly
changing Soviet state, he proclaimed that the Soviet Union was
returning to a Western-style constitutional government.
The new 1936 Constitution had all the trappings that

suggested a
democracy in Western eyes.12 It guaranteed, on paper at least, that
there would be freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom of assembly. There would also be elections where citizens
would be able to use secret ballots.
While the foreign press, which was the immediate target of these
announcements, expressed some skepticism that this constitution
would turn the Soviet Union into a democracy overnight, it
accepted that Stalin was moving in the right direction. Even Time,
which had been an avowed opponent of communism, grudgingly
reported: "Last week Russia, having come of age, allowed her
people all the fun and trapping of a real national election ... to vote
not in public by a show of hands but in private in a red-curtained
booth, by secret ballot, according to their own convictions." It
raised questions about "How capable Russia's ignorant masses are

of assimilating democratic doctrine . . . and
how capable Joseph Stalin is of permitting them to do so,"
but
concluded that these constitutional changes, despite their
limitations,
suggested Stalin "had evidently revised his theory" about
communism.13
The liberal constitution was only the opening shot in this
campaign
to make the Soviet Union appear similar to European
states.
It gave credibility to Soviet journalists, trade officials,
diplomats,
and other spokesmen who could claim to their foreign
counterparts
that they now could speak candidly, and critically, about
the Soviet
system because they were protected by the new
guaranteed
freedom of speech, press, and so forth.
Stalin, meanwhile, used embassies in neutral countries
and
diplomatic chatter at the League of Nations to further
reinforce this
theme. Agents of influence such as President Edvard
Benes of
Czechoslovakia—who was secretly in the debt of Soviet
intelligence,

if not the pay—were mobilized to pass discreet messages,
disguised as diplomatic insights, to British, French, and
Polish
diplomats. At a more subterranean level, messages that
dovetailed
with these were put directly into the hands of Western
intelligence
services by a supposedly anti-Soviet emigre organization,
based in
Bulgaria, called "the Inner Line." Although this group
originally
had worked against the Soviet agents in Europe, and
served as a
security service for other anti-Communist groups, it had
been taken
over by Soviet intelligence officers by the thirties. Like its
immediate predecessor, the Trust, the Inner Line now was
a
controlled channel for disinformation.
The thrust of these messages was that Stalin was a
pragmatist,
not an ideologue; a nationalist, not an internationalist; an
administrator,
not a revolutionist; a manager, not an exporter of
terrorism. It was therefore possible for the West to do
business
with him.
Through Benes and other diplomatic channels, it was

reported
that Stalin's actual foreign policy, as distinct from his Communist
rhetoric, involved developing alliances with capitalist countries
opposing Hitler. Stalin's celebrated call for "socialism in one
country" was seen as a face-saving rationalization for ending the
Leninist policy of intervention and subversion abroad.
To further advance this idea, Stalin made a number of concrete
demonstrations to foreign leaders that he was willing to make
changes. For example, he openly pledged not to support the
American Communist Party or any other group that advocated the
overthrow of the American government, even though such a
promise backed away from the principles of a Communist
International. But it made it easier for President Roosevelt, who
finally had recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, to extend credits
and trade preferences in Moscow. Moreover, Communist parties
abroad were even allowed to criticize the decisions of

Moscow,
which added to the appearance that they were becoming independent.
Previously, Communist parties had been considered to be Stalin's
agents in foreign countries. Now they could claim to be independent and patriotic institutions. This made more plausible
their demands to participate with non-Communist parties in
"popular front" governments. Stalin also benefitted: by advancing
the legitimacy of local Communist parties, he laid the conceptual
groundwork for Euro-Communism.
This Glasnost offensive came to an end with Stalin's purge of
the Communist Party in 1937-38. All the constitutional guarantees,
electoral demonstrations, foreign policy pledges, and diplomatic
promises were revealed to be shams. The promised Perestroika
turned into the "Great Terror." Then, in 1939, Stalin's alliance with
Hitler, which was supported by the Euro-Communist parties,
wrecked the illusion that these parties were independent

entities.

THE THIRD GLASNOST: THE UNCLE JOE PARTNERSHIP,
1941-45

After Hitler invaded Russia in June 1941, Stalin revived Glasnost
in the form of a Soviet partnership with the United States and
Britain that would bring democracy and peaceful cooperation to
the postwar world. He again sent out the message that the militant
phase of communism had now ended.
As a further demonstration of good faith in 1943, he dissolved
the Comintern, which had been one of the famous Soviet organs
dedicated to promoting Marxist-Leninist revolution abroad. By
then, however, it had only symbolic significance; the coordination
of Communist parties was now done by the International Department
of the Communist Party. In an equally symbolic gesture,
Stalin expunged from the national anthem references to
international revolution. He also restored the rights of the

Russian
Orthodox Church, proposed the liberalization of censorship and
other controls, and permitted Russians to own private plots to grow
food. And he agreed to joining the United Nations after the war
ended.
Even though these were only token gestures, they were accepted
as evidence of change by Anglo-American leaders who wanted the
alliance with Stalin to be more palatable to the public. Churchill,
for example, responded by drafting a letter to Stalin, noting: "We
feel we were right in interpreting your dissolution of the Comintern
as a decision by the Soviet Government not to interfere in the
internal political affairs of other countries."
These messages were delivered by diplomats and intelligence
officers stationed in neutral countries in the form of "slips" or
planted stories. For example, one British intelligence report in
1944, which it later turned out was assembled by a Soviet

agent,
stated that Russia had based its postwar recovery on "a structure of
trade that would allow a slower pace of re-industrialization and the
import of consumer goods—and, through political collaboration
with a view to establish real security in the West."14
Again, this was what the Allies wanted to believe: the Soviet
Union would be buying goods from the West—not threatening it
with subversion. This justified massive economic and military aid
through the Lend-Lease program, which the Red Army
needed to remain in the war against Hitler. Harry Hopkins,
President Roosevelt's adviser, wrote after the meeting with Stalin at
Yalta in 1945: "We really believed in our hearts that this was the
dawn of the new day we had been praying for. . . . The Russians
had proved that they could be reasonable and far seeing, and there
wasn't any doubt in the mind of the President, or any of us that we
could live and get along with them peacefully for as far

into the
future as any of us could imagine."[15] The British Foreign Office
similarly concluded: "The old idea of world revolution is dead."[16]
Encouraged by such optimistic assessments of a Soviet partnership,
the United States and Britain sanctioned de facto Stalin's
earlier annexation of the three Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia—as well as his postwar plan to annex parts of Poland,
Prussia, Rumania, Finland, and Japan. They also accepted in this
spirit of goodwill the concept of a Soviet sphere of influence over
much of Eastern Europe.
The euphoria hardly outlasted the end of the war. The Soviet
takeover of Czechoslovakia, sponsorship of the civil war in
Greece, and occupation of part of Iran, among other things,
brought this entente to an abrupt end. The Iron Curtain, as a
metaphor, replaced the spirit of Glasnost.
THE FOURTH GLASNOST: DESTALINIZATION, 1956-59

On February 24, 1956, at the XXth Party Congress in Moscow,
Nikita Khrushchev launched yet another Glasnost offensive based
on economic and political reforms. He blamed Stalin, who was
dead, for the present problems. He argued that the "cult of the
personality" that Stalin created had perverted the Communist
Revolution and led to the loss of individual freedom.
Khrushchev thus equated ending Stalin's "cult of the personality"
with the restoration of democracy in the Soviet Union.
Although the publication of this speech was portrayed as an
intelligence coup in the United States by the CIA, its message was
hardly secret.17 Khrushchev had copies of the speech distributed to
over 2 million Communists in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc,
and according to Angleton, no fewer than six different Communist
diplomats, under Soviet control, offered it to the CIA as well as to
other Western intelligence services. The "leaking" of this

secret
speech set the basis in the West for the most sweeping Glasnost
offensive since the NEP.
Then Khrushchev announced, with great fanfare, reforms that
appeared to constitute what approached another Russian
Revolution—equivalent, as The New York Times reported, to "the
spring break up of ice on a Siberian River."18 He proclaimed that
competition would play a major role in restructuring agriculture
and industry. And, in a well-publicized experiment, economically
autonomous teams would be allowed to act like private businesses.
This return to capitalism was then made the subject of a film,
released abroad under the title Man of the Soil.
The Soviet press, amplifying the return-to-capitalism theme,
published numerous stories about private millionaires, underground
businesses, and the thriving black market.19 In addition, there were drives to eradicate alcoholism, nepotism, and corruption.
The economic reforms were accompanied by political

reforms.

Russian Church leaders were allowed to travel abroad; Moscow
artists were permitted to hold exhibitions of abstract paintings;
poets like Yevtushenko were allowed to give readings in the
United States; and Solzhenitsyn was allowed to publish works
critical of the Soviet Union under Stalin, such as One Day in the
Life of Ivan Denisovich. Soviet dissidents were allowed to have
contact with the Western press. Academic enterprises, such as the
Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, were
similarly given a new role as sources of "news" for American
journalists.[20]

Khrushchev also decided to again make use of the business
path to build support for his Glasnost. He turned to Lenin's original
choice, Armand Hammer, who had in 1957 taken control of
Occidental Petroleum, a minuscule company in Los Angeles with

no real assets.

By 1961, Occidental, which was listed on the Stock Exchange,
had become a sufficiently large energy company for Hammer to
return to the Soviet Union under the imprimatur of the U.S.
Commerce Department to, as he put it in a press conference,
"inquire into opportunities for increased peaceful trade."[21]
In Moscow, Khrushchev warmly applauded Hammer, in a
speech to Communist leaders, for the role he had played under
Lenin's New Economic Policy in the twenties, and further, while
reminiscing about him, justified the policy of luring capitalists to
Russia as a means of advancing the revolutionary cause. He stated,
in terms that left little room for doubt: "The measure our
government took under Lenin's initiative yielded good results; it
contributed to the success of socialism in our country." He asked
rhetorically, "Was the New Economic Policy a retreat?" He then
answered the question, No—it had only appeared to be a retreat.

"Now it is clear to all that it was an attack by socialism on capitalism."[22] In other words, the NEP was a successful deception.

In a private conversation with Hammer, in which there was not
even a translator present, Hammer reported that Khrushchev
complained about inefficiencies in the Soviet economy, and then
stated, in an almost word for word repeat of Stalin's earlier
message to the West, "If we cannot give our people the same
standard of living that you give your people under the Capitalist
system, we know that Communism cannot succeed."[23] Again, as he
did with Lenin, Hammer was given the message to repeat that the
Soviet leadership was admitting the failure of communism, and
making internal economic reform its highest priority.

When Hammer returned to the United States, he sought an
audience with President Kennedy to report on what Khrushchev
had told him. The message, as he also announced to the press, was
that the Soviet Union could provide a bonanza of profits

and jobs
for American business. "If you give us credit. . . . you will keep
your plants busy," he quoted Khrushchev as saying.24 Hammer
explained that Khrushchev had confided in him that "Communism
was sure to fail" unless it could provide its people with more food
and consumer products. The Soviet Union thus had to change from
a wartime to peacetime economy to save the Revolution.
Although it was the same message that had been sounded in the
NEP (and by the same American capitalist), it was a message
American business—and labor—still wanted to hear. The Soviet
Union could, in Khrushchev's estimate, furnish America with a
million new jobs.
Whatever success it had in projecting the image of a more
moderate and non-threatening state, this Glasnost did not prevent
the Soviet leadership from carrying out its other strategic goals. In
1959, as Golitsyn later revealed, it radically reorganized the KGB,

so that it would be capable of securely carrying out long-term

deceptions (a reorganization confirmed in the late 1960s by U.S.

Communications Intelligence). At the same time, it also created the

special strategic deception staff, GUSM, under military command.

Soon afterwards, as we have seen in the telemetry double cross, the

Soviets began projecting an image of missile incompetency

through biased electronic signals and double-agents' disinformation

while perfecting highly accurate missiles. These missiles gave the

Soviet Union the ability to destroy America's land-based missiles

in a surprise attack, although U.S. intelligence did not realize it for

almost a decade. And then, in Cuba in 1962, Khrushchev attempted

to change, if not the balance of power, U.S. confidence in its ability

to defend itself by covertly deploying intermediate-range missiles

in Cuba. But by this time such events as the shooting down of an

American U-2, the mass arrest of Soviet dissidents, and the
erection of the Berlin Wall had ended this Glasnost.

THE FIFTH GLASNOST: DETENTE, 1970-75

The fifth Glasnost, initiated by Leonid Brezhnev, supplied the
context and goodwill atmosphere for the Soviet policy of Detente.
If the Soviet offer to restrict strategic arms, negotiate mutually
beneficial accords, and relax internal tensions was to be made
credible, Brezhnev had first to establish that the Soviet Union no
longer seriously aspired to change the East-West status quo.
The "public airings" of issues helped explain to relevant audiences
in the West why the Soviets had abandoned its prior aim of
world revolution. The central theme was that the Soviet government
was now run not by ideologues but by technocrats who
had no interest in adhering to the Leninist doctrine of
class warfare.
Instead, like technocrats in the West, they wanted to

expand and
rationalize their industrial base. They wanted, in short, to substitute
butter for guns.25
Soviet scientists sent to international conferences, such as Pugwash,
told their Western counterparts about how they were coming
into increasing conflict with Communist ideologues. These
dovetailing reports, elicited and analyzed by CIA debriefers, advanced
the idea that, under Brezhnev's leadership, the scientific technical
elite was winning the battle.
During this same period, Georgi Arbatov's Institute intensified
its program of briefing Western academics, journalists, media
executives, and congressmen on the effect of technocratic changes
in Soviet society. These backgrounders directed attention to
differences purportedly developing between the outdated but still
mandatory rhetoric of the Revolution and the actual policies of the
new Soviet leaders. Briefers at the Institute told their

subjects that
Brezhnev's real agenda, whatever he said for internal
consumption,
was getting the Soviet economy working. To make
progress, he
recognized the need to relax the controls on Soviet
scientists,
engineers, and other members of the Soviet meritocracy,
and to
import Western methods and ideas. Dissidents in Moscow
who
were scientists and engineers were per-
mitted to speak to foreign correspondents. Even if they
had no
mandated brief and merely spoke their mind, their
complaints
about inefficiency and bureaucratic restrictions would
support the
justification for a technocratic revolution.
As this Glasnost progressed in the mid-1970s, Brezhnev,
like
Stalin before him, promulgated a new constitution for the
Soviet
Union. It too granted freedom of speech, press, assembly,
meeting,
and public demonstration—as well as the right to
education,
medical treatment, and employment. The Soviet Union

even signed
the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which appeared to legitimize an
opposition to Communist rule.
This technocratic revolution line was also fed by Soviet diplomats
into intelligence channels. At the UN, the double agents
code-named Top Hat and Fedora suggested to the FBI that
Brezhnev's qualifications as an engineer were being given prominence
to placate Soviet engineers and scientists who were fed up
with ideological red tape. In 1969, both Soviet diplomats reported
that they had received new "priority" questionnaires from their
Soviet controllers demanding they find out about the American
Chemical-Biological Weapon (CBW) program.
Fedora, after being recalled to Moscow for a briefing, then told
the FBI that Soviet intelligence was being put under this pressure
because the Soviet military had determined that the United States
had an almost unbeatable lead in chemical-biological weapons. It
was thus demanding the budget for a crash program to

catch up.

But the Politburo did not believe that the Soviet economy could

afford to spend the money. Fedora claimed to be caught in the

battle between doves, who demanded further intelligence, and

hawks, who wanted to build chemical and biological weaponry.26

(This message that the United States had won the race gave Nixon

a further reason for making a dramatic decision that had been

under consideration. He unilaterally ended U.S. production of

CBW weapons.)

But the Soviets did not have to rely on chancy public or intelligence

channels to get the main message of detente through

to the White House. They had at their disposal a superb vehicle for

laser-beaming messages to strategic planners in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State

Department, and the National Security Council without the intermediation

and scrutiny of the counterintelligence staffs in the

CIA and Pentagon that test the more ordinary

communications sent
from the enemy camp. This channel was the arms control process.
Whatever else they might accomplish in terms of actually limiting
or reducing the strategic weapons of either the United States
or the Soviet Union, arms control negotiations have provided the
Soviets with a means of educating an elite American audience
about Soviet defense policies, which, up until then, it had learned
about mainly through espionage, satellite images, signals interceptions,
and military displays paraded by the drag strips in Moscow. In these negotiations, the Soviets could tell this audience
the meaning of the jigsaw pieces that they had collected in years
past through conventional intelligence gathering. They could also
use this channel to test the technological abilities of American
intelligence by staging treaty violations to see if they could be
detected. They could learn what could and could not be seen. And

they could then use this channel to direct the attention of U.S.
satellites to events and developments in Soviet territory that Soviet
deception planners wanted seen. If, for example, Soviet negotiators
suggest that mobile missiles are being confined to a base in Eastern
Europe, they can be reasonably sure that U.S. intelligence will
point its cameras there, and that the resulting photographs will be
closely scrutinized. The Soviet negotiators, in other words, could
steer U.S. satellites to peepholes that would reinforce a message
sent through any other channel. And the messages need not be
limited to weapons. They could concern the nature of the Soviet
regime, the new leadership, and its desire for change.
The Soviet version of arms control was developed in the early
1960s under the direct supervision of N. R. Mironov, a close
associate of Brezhnev's.[27] As head of the Administrative Organs
Department of the Communist Party, Mironov had the

responsibility
for coordinating military, diplomatic, covert, and intelligence
actions aimed at furthering state policy. He was also, according to Golitsyn, Brezhnev's chief deception strategist and
had personally led to the successful drive in the late 1950s to
reorganize the KGB and International Department of the Communist
Party so that they could securely execute long-term disinformation
programs modeled on Lenin's NEP deception. General John Sejna, who acted as a liaison with the Administrative Organs
Department and Czechoslovakian military planners in the 1960s,
and who defected to the United States in 1968, explained in his
debriefings that Mironov initially envisioned using the arms
control process to delay U.S. military programs, disrupt the
relations between the United States and its NATO allies, and gain
some indication of how the West perceived of Soviet policies.
As the arms control channel developed, Mironov brought

in
another top deception planner. He was N. I. Savinkin,
who subsequently,
as deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department,
took over the job of making sure that the negotiations not
only dovetailed with but advanced Soviet objectives.
Since this
task required coordinating what military and ballistic
equipment
was seen by U.S. satellites and military attaches, he made
General
(later Marshal) N. V. Ogarkov—who had been in charge
of
GUSM, the Soviet General Staff's Directorate for
Strategic
Deception—the chief military representative to the SALT
arms
control negotiations.28 This put Ogarkov in a perfect
position to
ensure that what the United States was told through the
negotiations
would be confirmed by what it "saw" and "heard" through
its photographic and electronic surveillance of the Soviet
Union.
Arms control also was an effective two-way channel.
From it,
Soviet strategists could learn what the prevailing
American pre-

conceptions of Soviet strategies were. Soviet negotiators were in
fact told by the Americans precisely what they assumed Soviet
weaponry, strategy, and objectives consisted of—and asked, after
consultations with Moscow, to correct them if they were wrong.
This technique, described by SALT negotiators, was meant to
foster a common language about such issues as deterrence, mutual
assured destruction, first-strike capabilities, mobile missiles, and so
on. But it also helped Soviet deception planners to make
information more credible by keying it in to the preconceptions of
the American negotiators.
The more extended arms control negotiations become, the more
dependent the Americans have been on the Soviets for public signs
of support—such as official statements indicating progress or even
the scheduling of summit conferences. And as the talks progress,
the incentive has commensurately increased for American
negotiators to assume that their Soviet counterparts are

acting in
good faith. Otherwise, they would have to conclude that their own
efforts have been, at best, a waste of time. Further, they have
depended on the Soviets to provide them, by both words and deeds
(which could be conveniently photographed by satellites), some
corroboration of this presumed good faith. The Soviets, in turn,
needed to know precisely what words and acts would be taken as
evidence of their credibility. In other words, it was in both the
American and Soviet negotiators' interests to tacitly cooperate on
verifying hypotheses that the United States was relying on. Not
uncommonly, according to participants, the Americans would
suggest to the Soviets what further evidence had to be displayed—
or withdrawn—to make the Soviet position credible to the White
House, Congress, and the American media. By doing so, they
would also provide Moscow with feedback.29

The Soviets have encouraged this tacit cooperation by reinforcing
the notion that there is an internal struggle between "doves"
in the Foreign Ministry and "hawks" in the Soviet military. As
Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin told Henry Kis-
singer in 1971, the Americans could intervene on the side of the
doves by taking certain actions in the SALT talks. To his credit,
Kissinger realized that the Soviet suggestion did not coincide with
reality. As he notes in his autobiography, "the proposition that
elements of the Soviet government would squabble while dealing
with foreigners was cleverly geared to American preconceptions of
the 'doves' in the Kremlin fighting battle against 'hardliners.'"[30]
The assumptions about Soviet intentions advanced through the
arms control channel have affected much more than the
deployment of missiles. Nixon explained in his 1972 report to
Congress that the Soviet willingness to enter into arms accords

"indicates constructive intentions in political as well as strategic
areas," and that "progress in controlling arms can reinforce progress
in a much wider area of international relations."[31] What this
linkage led to was the reversal of America's postwar policy of
containing the Soviet Union. Instead of maintaining political,
military, and economic pressure on the Soviet Union, the new
detente now strove to relax this tension. Instead of questioning the
legitimacy of the Soviet rule over Eastern Europe, it recognized the
"organic unity" of the Communist bloc—Kissinger's deputy,
Helmet Sonnenfeldt, suggested that Communist bloc unity, rather
than dissonance, was in the long-term interest of the United States.
Instead of confronting the Soviet bloc, American forces were
withdrawn from areas of conflict, including Vietnam. And instead
of attempting to isolate the Soviet bloc, it was granted access to

Western credit, technology, and markets— at times on "most
favored nation" terms. Whereas earlier the United States had
attempted to intensify economic disaffection within the Soviet
Union, it now shipped out its own wheat to help the Soviet
government satisfy the populace.

As Brezhnev held out the carrot to American business of a tenfold
increase in trade by 1980, Hammer recruited the support of
some of the largest capitalist enterprises in the world to
detente. Through Occidental, he announced deals amounting to
over 28 billion dollars. (Most of these projects either did not
materialize or proved largely unprofitable for Occidental.)

The Soviet Union also appeared willing to allow Communist
countries in Eastern Europe to pursue independent relations with
the West and engage in their own versions of Glasnost. Rumania,
for example, advertised itself as a Communist nation that the West
"could do business with," according to Ion Pacepa who,

up until his
defection in 1978, served as acting director of Rumanian
intelligence and a personal adviser to President Nicolae
Ceausescu.
"To convince the West that Rumania was becoming a
Western oriented
country, independent of Moscow," Pacepa said,
"Ceausescu himself publicly attacked the Soviets,
unmasked many
of his predecessor's abuses, allowed the press to criticize
the party
bureaucracy, simulated a decentralization of the economy,
instituted dual candidates for local elections, and launched
a
campaign against alcoholism, corruption, and nepotism."
By 1975
the U.S. granted Rumania "most favored nation" status,
and within
three years, the West extended Rumania credits of $20
billion (or
nearly $1,000 per capita). Then, in 1978, after he
defected, Pacepa
revealed that the "independent line" was largely a sham
staged by
the Rumanian intelligence service under his direction. He
explained in a post-defection interview "Ceausescu's
Glasnost was
an . . . influence operation."[32]

Brezhnev also announced with great fanfare a unilateral troop
cut in Soviet forces in Europe. Accordingly, the Russian Sixth
Tank Guard Division, with its 10,000 troops and armor, moved out
of its base in Wittenberg, East Germany, presumably reducing
Soviet offensive power in Europe. In fact, as Western intelligence
determined only in 1981, the withdrawn division had distributed its
tanks and other equipment to other Soviet front line divisions in
Germany and then, although officially taken out of the Soviet order
of battle, it was re-established under a different name just across the Polish border,
where it received all new
equipment. The "withdrawal" thus actually added to rather than
reduced Soviet offensive capabilities in Europe.33
The test of this "linkage" concept came in Vietnam in 1973.
Kissinger believed that he could count on Soviet cooperation to
prevent North Vietnam from breaking the Paris Accords, which

would permit America to withdraw the last of its troops without
losing face. As Kissinger reports, Brezhnev told Nixon that he had
stopped "military deliveries to North Vietnam."34 If so, the North
Vietnamese Army would not be able to invade the South.
Suggesting a deal had been struck, Brezhnev added: "There may be
rifles but nothing of considerable significance. We will urge [the
North Vietnamese] to adhere to the Paris Agreement." Kissinger
concluded "we . . . had used detente to isolate Hanoi and extricate
ourselves from Vietnam."35
The judgment turned out to be wrong. Despite the negotiated
peace, the North Vietnamese Army—with tanks, ammunition, and
electronic intelligence supplied by the Soviet Union —blitzkrieged
through South Vietnam in the spring of 1975. North Vietnam took
over South Vietnam, and its army occupies most of Laos and
Cambodia. The Soviet Union, for its part, obtained the huge air and

naval base at Cam ranh Bay that the United States had evacuated,
which greatly extended the effective range of the Soviet Navy.
Brezhnev's Glasnost, and the assumptions that Soviet activities
could be taken at face value, were called into question by a secret
reassessment of Soviet strategy in 1976. What occasioned this
reassessment was a glaring discrepancy between CIA predictions
of the number of intercontinental missiles that the Soviets would
aim at the United States—and the reality. Rather than the few
hundred missiles the CIA projected, the Soviets deployed by 1973
well over a thousand warheads aimed at targets in the United
States. In 1974, Albert Wohlstetter argued in a series of highly
influential articles that the CIA's persistent underestimation of
Soviet missile deployments came, not from a lack of
contrary photographic intelligence of silo construction, but from a
mind-set among CIA analysts that began with the premise

that the
Soviets had the same deterrent strategy as the United
36
This "mirror-image" view of deterrence came from the arms
control channel. It held that the only rational use of nuclear
weapons was to deter, rather than win, a war. Consequently, the
Soviet Union, like the United States, would build, and deploy, only
the minimal number of missiles it needed to threaten—in the event
it was attacked—the assured destruction of the attacker. If this
logic of "mutually assured destruction," or MAD, was valid, the
Soviet Union could be expected to build no more than the number
of city-destroying missiles it needed to assure that the United
States would not start a nuclear war. Since the Soviet Union would
not need either numerical superiority, or highly accurate missiles
that could attack U.S. missile silos, the CIA had assumed that it
would not waste resources on them. The observed facts

were
interpreted accordingly, which led to the underestimates in the late
1960s.
This error caused such unease at the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB), which included some of the most distinguished experts on military technology, that its chairman,
Admiral George W. Anderson, suggested to President Nixon
that he appoint an independent group of experts to reexamine the
intelligence data. The idea, however, was strongly opposed by the
CIA, and Nixon, under tremendous pressure to resign because of
Watergate, rejected it. But when Gerald Ford replaced him in 1974,
he ordered the CIA to produce a review of how well it had fared in
estimating Soviet capacity in the past decade. According to Lionel
Olmer, the executive secretary of PFIAB, the consequent review
was "so condemnatory of the performance of the [intelligence]
community over ten years on those issues that it left no

room for
argument that something ought to be done."37
Admiral Anderson, at this point, revived his earlier proposal,
suggesting that two teams reanalyze the evidence. Team A would
be drawn from the CIA's own experts; Team B would be outsiders
selected by PFIAB, with the approval of CIA Director George
Bush. The experiment would test whether two different sets of
experts, analyzing the same data, would come to different
conclusions—and, if so, why? By July 1976, President Ford approved
that competitive analyses would provide the basis for a new
intelligence estimate of Soviet strategy, and Richard Pipes, a
Harvard professor of Russian history, was selected to head the
strategic review of Team B.38
The Pipes panel, which included a top group of experts on
military weaponry and strategy, then began, as Pipes put it, "a
broad and in depth survey of Soviet strategic policies, and programs."
The point of the exercise was to test the validity of the

prevailing assumption that Soviet nuclear strategy was identical to
America's own "MAD" strategy. It considered in this regard such
factors as Soviet missile accuracy, aiming points, deployment
patterns, and reload capacity. And it closely analyzed assertions of
military doctrine in Soviet military journals. It concluded that the
MAD theory did not fit the observed facts about the development
of the Soviet rocket force. This was supported by the two other
Team B technical panels, which demonstrated that the CIA had
underestimated the accuracy of the newer generation Soviet
missiles and that, once this error was corrected, these Soviet
missiles could be seen not as part of a MAD deterrent but as
weapons designed to destroy U.S. silos, with the least amount of
collateral damage. They were, in other words, war-fighting rather
than war-deterring weapons. In addition, it was calculated from the

positioning of the land-based Soviet missiles that they were aimed
not at American cities, which would have been consistent with a
MAD philosophy, but at U.S. military targets. Further, these panels
interpreted data indicating that the Soviets were developing or
deploying no fewer than eleven new systems of missiles as
inconsistent with the notion that Soviet strategy was based on
maintaining the status quo.
The Pipes panel concluded that this evidence was completely
in keeping with stated Soviet doctrine that "military missions are
driven by political missions, not the other way round." It asserted
that, if U.S. analysts avoided "mirror-imaging," or the assumption
that Russians and Americans had the same strategy, the available
evidence led to only one conclusion: The Soviet leadership, rather
than subscribing to MAD, was deploying nuclear weapons, like
any other military force, to achieve its national goals. As

Pipes
noted, "Soviet nuclear strategy had to be seen in context of grand
strategy."[39]
This was a radical departure from what the CIA's Team A had
concluded. Team A held that the Soviet leadership, believing
victory was unobtainable, had developed its nuclear force to deter
the United States from attacking the Soviet Union. It held that
Soviet nuclear weapons were based on MAD and therefore future
Soviet deployments were reactive to U.S. deployments.
The confrontation between these two different views of the same
evidence, which was not unlike the religious disputations in
medieval Europe, took place at CIA headquarters in Langley,
Virginia, on November 5, 1976. The audience included the fourteen
members of PFIAB and the Director of the CIA. After
considerable debate, Team A, unable to explain more recent Soviet
missile deployments in terms of MAD, more or less gave up the

battle. It then revised its report, and in agreement with Team B,
concluded that the observed facts of Soviet missile deployments
did not support the theory that they were a deterrent—or even
defensive in nature. This revised assessment, accepted by PFIAB
and CIA Director George Bush, thus became, at least briefly, the
official American view of Soviet strategy. It was encapsulated in
the 1977 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-11 3/8). This new
view completely contradicted the most fundamental assumption of
detente—that both sides sought only to maintain the status quo.
The conflict was resolved in the Carter administration by discrediting
not only Team B itself but the entire process of outside
review. The new CIA leadership, under Admiral Turner, made
what amounted to an ad hominem attack on the B team. Rather
than dealing with the fact that the report had been accepted by
Team A and the PFIAB, it called into question the

personal
integrity of its members, suggesting that they had used the "competitive
review" merely as camouflage to assert their own biased
view of Soviet intentions. The main source for this charge was a
CIA officer, John Paisley, who had been assigned to the B team as
a "liaison"—though actually, as it turned out, his job, according to
Pipes, was to monitor and control its work for the CIA. Paisley
himself was found shot to death in 1978, chained and weighted, in
Chesapeake Bay.*
By 1979, with the widespread arrests of Soviet dissidents, including
members of the Helsinki Watch Committee, the closing of
the underground newspapers, the resumption of Soviet covert
actions abroad, and the invasion of Afghanistan, the discrediting of
this Glasnost was complete.

THE SIXTH GLASNOST: THE GORBACHEV REVOLUTION,
1983-1989

After the XXVIth Congress of the Communist Party decided to
sanction a peace initiative in 1981, there was a false start. Yuri
Andropov, the new General Secretary, who was presented to the
media as a liberal in the Western mold—tall, athletic, Scotch drinking,
jazz-loving, English-speaking, and intellectual—became
terminally ill soon after assuming office, and died in February
1984.[40] The Glasnost offensive thus had to wait for his heir
apparent, Mikhail Gorbachev, to assume the mantle in 1985.
Gorbachev wasted little time in announcing reforms reminiscent
of the NEP. Like his predecessors, he advanced the thesis that the
Soviet system had to be radically restructured to meet the
pragmatic needs of the modern world. It needed to produce more
consumer goods to satisfy its citizens, import more technology to
modernize its industry, use free market incentives to increase the
output of farms and factories, and reform government to make it

less bureaucratically intrusive.

Gorbachev held that this massive Perestroika would require a
shift in Soviet industry from military to civilian priorities, cooperation
from the West in the form of credits and liberalizing
trade, and better motivation for workers in the form of profit
incentives and more personal freedom. To further rationalize the
economy, individuals would be permitted to join together to form
cooperative businesses, and farmers could lease for periods of up
to fifty years small plots of land.

In focusing world attention on these promised reforms, all the
past Glasnosts became prologue to this design. Censorship was
partly lifted—and the works of authors, artists, and musicians with
followings in the West became prominent. High-profile dissidents,
such as Andrei Sakharov, who had become symbols of Soviet
repression, were released from internal exile or prison. Refuseniks
were allowed to emigrate to Israel. Newspapers published

criticism
of government inefficiency. At the same time, the Soviets
permitted the publication of some twenty-five non-official
journals.
Even though these publications remained largely
dependent on the
government for access to printing plants, paper, financing,
and
distribution, they claimed to be editorially independent.
One of
them, Ekspress-Khronica, supplied to Western news
media a
compilation of government declarations, policy
implementations,
and public demonstrations that appeared to measure the
accelerating progress of Soviet reforms.[41]
While Gorbachev's Glasnost did not immediately afford
Soviet
citizens more civil liberties than had previous Glasnosts,
nor bring
about more substantial changes in ownership, incentives,
and
economic relationships than had these earlier
"Perestroikas," it
succeeded far more effectively in changing the image of
the Soviet
state. This success proceeded in large part from the
linkages it

forged to foreign media and academia. Unlike any previous

Glasnost, it persuaded foreign specialists that government controlled

organs were independent sources.

Consider, for example, how even the usually conservative Wall

Street Journal accepted this notion in a front-page story on the

"Glasnost's impact."42 The report, focusing on Izvestia, the national

newspaper of the Soviet government, stated that "the Communist

Party Central Committee apparently no longer gives orders about

everything that can and can't be published." This remarkable

assessment of Izvestia's independence could not be based on its

organizational structure. Izvestia is a government-owned and -

operated publication. Its editors are members of the Communist

Party, under Party discipline and, as such, required by the principles of "Partynost" to support the Party line. Even if they

wanted to publicly deviate, they could not without the approval of

the special committee of the Politburo, which scrutinizes their
work on a daily basis and on which they are dependent for their
continued tenure at the newspaper. The conclusion of The Wall
Street Journal that Izvestia has editorial freedom was drawn from
the paper's content, or more specifically, from the letters it carries
complaining about government services. Again, the very controlled
self-criticism that is the cutting edge of the Glasnost sword is taken
as evidence of a free press.
Before Gorbachev's offensive, foreign news media treated the
Soviet government-owned media as a propaganda arm of the
government. They further assumed that government spokesmen
who permitted interviews furnished them with nothing more than
pre-packaged briefs, and that private citizens who would talk to
them were restricted by secrecy laws from revealing any
newsworthy data. Now, under Glasnost, the assumption became

that they could get reliable data from these formerly suspect
sources.
This development not only made the job of American journalists
in Moscow much easier but it enhanced their status as Soviet
experts. They could rewrite stories they found in the Soviet press
(as was commonly done in countries with free presses). They even
could get Glasnost stories delivered to their hotels in English in the
form of a daily newsletter published by unofficial newspapers.
They could also interview Soviet spokesmen who were fluent in
English and presumably free to tell them on a background basis
their views about Soviet policy. These assumptions also raised the
credibility of Soviet universities, think tanks, and quasi-academic
research institutes and, in so doing, gave both journalists and
visiting academics other resources to shape their picture of Soviet
policy.

Even the word Glasnost was re-translated in 1986 by the Soviet
press agency Novosti to mean "transparency" rather than merely
publicity.43 This semantic change helped support the idea that the
new Glasnost news and academic media were not just publicizing
government-sanctioned releases but, like their counterparts in the
West, rendering government institutions transparent.
To determine the right kind of "spin control" to put on the
messages about sensitive subjects, such as the environment and
nuclear safety, the Soviets hired American public relations firms
which specialized in planting stories in the American media in the
form of news releases. They also provided feedback on the
response to different test balloons sent up through Glasnost.
Glasnost also benefitted heavily from the cooperation of the
Reagan administration, which had its own reason for not questioning
messages sent through these channels to the American
media. President Reagan had begun his administration by

describing
the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," Soviet arms
negotiations
as systematic "cheating," and Soviet summits as
"propaganda exercises." Subsequently, in his second term,
when he
described the Soviet Union as a promising "partner,"
signed arms
control agreements, and made summits a regular event on
his
calendar, he could only justify this radical change in
policy by
asserting that the Soviet Union itself was changing into an
open
society—which was the precise message of Glasnost.
The U.S. government thus not only accepted the Glasnost
line
but provided funds to support cultural, academic, and
journalistic
exchanges that offered photo opportunities—and
television
pictures—reinforcing the idea that the Soviet Union had
radically
changed. Tours were organized for famous American rock
singers,
like Billy Joel, who were then photographed in concert in
Russia.
When the films were shown on Western television, they

relayed
the predictable, if cliched impression of freedom, abandon, and
permissiveness. The State Department officially encouraged
American television networks to exchange programs and
presentations with Soviet networks which gave the Soviets the
opportunity to further the illusion that their system of government
was roughly the same as the American system. The ABC program
Nightline, for example, broadcast a three-hour exchange between
the American Congress and Supreme Soviet, suggesting an
equivalence between the two, even though, in reality, the latter is
nothing more than a ceremonial body that meets only twice a year
and has no legislative powers.
Moreover, the business path that Hammer had been assiduously
paving for 65 years developed into a bipartisan lobby for extending
Western credit and trade preferences to the Soviet bloc called the
U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council. One measure

of this
lobby's access to the Reagan White House was the appointment in
1987 of its former chairman, C. William Verity, as Secretary of
Commerce.
By 1988, the United States Trade and Economic Council
(USTEC), with the assistance of Armand Hammer, had arranged
for over four hundred American corporate leaders to attend
conferences in Moscow, where they were invited to banquets with
Soviet leaders, driven around with motorcycle escorts, and given
other kinds of red-carpet treatment they could not so easily get in a
capitalist country.44
Aside from such prestigious junkets, these American businesses
also received the opportunity to participate in a series of NEP-type
concessions. Just as he had in the NEP, Hammer took the lead in
organizing consortiums to invest in Russian chemicals, industries,
and mining. USTEC also encouraged the American corporate

establishment to trade with Soviet cooperatives, projecting that the
Soviet market could absorb 25 percent of American exports—even
though, in 1988, it actually accounted for only about 1 percent of
American exports. In exchange, USTEC arranged for hundreds of
Soviet executives to visit the United States and receive training at
American corporations in the art of management.
The business channel, even by the fact it existed, reinforced the
central message of the arms control and Glasnost channels — that
the Soviet Union was rapidly changing. The announcement by
Hammer that Occidental was entering a six billion dollar joint
venture with the Soviets to build a petrochemical complex near the
Caspian Sea, followed by a rush of announced 'joint ventures" by
other American corporations appeared to confirm that the Soviet
Union was in the process of abandoning part or all of the
Communist dogma. Why else would American corporations seek

to invest there? Each announcement also whetted the appetite of
other capitalists in Europe and Asia, as well as the United States,
who were anxious to find a new and protected market for their
product. And this competition for concessions gives
governments—especially if they are responsive to corporate
pressure—an additional reason to normalize their relations with the
Soviet Union. The business channel makes it progressively more
difficult for the United States and other Western governments to
block the admission of the Soviet bloc to the main international
economic organizations—such as the International Monetary Fund,
GATT, and the Bank of International
Settlements. These positions would further enhance the image of
the Soviet Union as a partner of capitalism, rather than a foe.
This sixth Glasnost was all the more impressive because the
underlying control structure of the Soviet Union had not substantially

changed. Soviet secrecy laws still prohibited discussions of state policies with foreigners. The Soviet press was still owned
by the state, or, in the case of the underground newspapers, totally
depended on it for newsprint and permits. Soviet research institutions, like Arbatov's Institute, were still supervised by units
of the Communist Party. Soviet government bodies were still
national fronts for units of the Communist Party. Dissident groups
were still under the KGB's electronic surveillance, which, if
anything, was made more effective by advances in intelligence gathering
technology such as computers, which could search out key words, numbers, and images, and listening devices that could
eavesdrop from a remote distance.
Nor, despite the images of permissiveness and democratization,
did individuals have any more freedom of action. Soviet citizens
still required permits to travel to other cities in the Soviet Union.
They also could not change residences or jobs, or even obtain a

telephone without permission. And, as a deterrent and ultimate
control mechanism, there were still concentration camps and
psychiatric confinement for political prisoners.
Moreover, other measures the United States employs to evaluate
developments in the Soviet bloc, such as photographic reconnaissance
from space and signals interception, sharply
contradict the picture painted by the stream of anecdotal stories,
briefings, and other data released under Glasnost. They show, for
example, that the Soviet Union has not decreased the size of its
prison camp establishment or the extent of the systematic
electronic surveillance of its own citizens and telephone system.
But such data showing that the control structure of the Communist
Party had been tightened, not loosened, from 1983 to 1988
were either put in abeyance as anomalies to be explained later or
dismissed as merely technical restrictions.
The sixth Glasnost has thus succeeded in creating a cooperative

atmosphere in which American conventional intelligence-gathering
can be overridden by Soviet self-reporting delivered through quasi official
media and academic sources. The CIA's reporting could be
interpreted on the basis of a context that has been supplied by
briefings from experts at Georgi Arbatov's research institute and
other newly accredited sources. It has also succeeded in switching
the sources for the Western media from its own diplomatic and
intelligence services to Soviet-based sources, which are represented as independent media.
The very independence that the Soviets have called attention to
in order to give Glasnost the requisite credibility has also served to
project a more favorable image for the Soviet Union—one of an
open society. Glasnost thus sets the stage for Soviet leaders to offer
Europe and Japan an economically-appealing and militarily nonthreatening
alternative to their security arrangements with the United States.

By 1989, at virtually no cost to Soviet power, the sixth Glasnost
had provided the Soviet leadership with not only the tens of
billions of dollars in credits it required to further expand its
industrial (and military) capacity but, if public opinion polls in
West Germany are any measure, an image in which the Soviet
Union, with its weak look, was perceived of as less of a threat to
Western Europe than the United States.

Epilogue: Angleton's Questions

In November 1983, I received a message on my telephone answering
machine from James Angleton suggesting that I call him
when I was next in Washington, D.C. I went the following week to
see him.
It had been nearly eight years since Angleton was forced out of
the CIA, but his interest in intrigue had not waned. His eyes
sharpened like those of a hawk when he fastened on the

details of
the event he was describing. It was the recent assassination of
seventeen South Korean officials during a state visit to Burma.
On October 9, 1983, while the President of South Korea, Chun
Doo Hwan, and members of his cabinet and staff were attending a
wreath-laying ceremony at the Martyrs Mausoleum outside
Rangoon, four powerful bombs were detonated by remote control.
They had been concealed in the roof of the shrine in such a way
that they had not been detected by either South Korean or Burmese
security.
Although President Chun escaped injury because of a momentary
delay in his schedule, the explosion killed thirteen of his top aides and four of his cabinet ministers. In a single well-planned
coup, a major part of the South Korean government had been
obliterated.
The assassins were caught the next day as they attempted to

leave the country. When Burmese police challenged them, the

three men tried to kill themselves with explosives. One died and

two survived badly wounded. Under interrogation, the survivors

admitted that they were captains in an elite unit of North Korean

military intelligence that specialized in covert actions. They further

explained that they had entered Burma September 22 on forged

diplomatic passports issued to them in North Korea. They said that

their orders included detailed instructions on how to carry out the

assassination, that they received the plastic explosives through the

embassy pouch, and, during the two weeks it took them to plant the

explosives, they had stayed at the residence of the North Korean

Embassy counselor. The police investigation confirmed their story.

Their personal documents, which had been expertly fabricated,

were vouched for by the embassy. They had access to secret

communications between the South Korean and Burmese
governments that could only be intercepted by a
sophisticated
intelligence service. The plastic explosives had been
manufactured
in Eastern Europe, and designed especially to fit into the
roof of
the shrine. The remote-control detonators used state-of-
the-art
electronics. And a reexamination of the surveillance of the
North
Korean Embassy showed that they were aided and
sheltered by
North Korean Embassy officials in Rangoon.
The evidence left little doubt that this assassination had
been
sponsored by North Korea and carried out by its
intelligence
service. "It is rare to find such a clear example of an act of
state,"
Angleton delicately said. He suggested that a political
assassination
involved not only the murder of an incumbent
officeholder but the
intimidation of his successors. It did this latter task by
demonstrating to them that they too were vulnerable to
the reach of
the assassin. He pointed out that in this case the North

Koreans had
shown the South Koreans that they could obtain their
leader's travel
schedule weeks in advance, penetrate his personal
security, and
plant lethal bombs in his path that could not be detected.
It
demonstrated "pure power." As in Mario Puzo's book The
Godfather, when the Mafia chief put a
horse's head in the bed of a recalcitrant film producer, the
point of
the exercise was not punishing the Koreans who were
blown up by
the bombs but inducing future cooperation from their
successors.
It quickly became clear that Angleton's real concern was
not
what had happened in Burma or even what would happen
in Korea
but the nature of the statecraft practiced by Soviet bloc
nations. For
him, there was still the nagging problem of what he called
"the
relationship."
"It may be politically convenient to assume that Soviet
bloc
intelligence services act independently of the Soviet
Union, especially

when it concerns an assassination, but what we don't really
know, or perhaps want to know, is what is the nature of the
relationship between the KGB and other Communist intelligence
services." He pointed out that the issue could not be peremptorily
disposed of. Golitsyn and other defectors had described an
extraordinary degree of coordination between these services,
guaranteed by a systematic Soviet penetration of the top ranks of
satellite services by the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. One role
assigned to the satellite services, according to these defectors, was
to afford the Soviet Union cover, distance, and deniability in
potentially embarrassing operations. In the case of North Korea,
Soviet intelligence had established, staffed, trained, and supplied
its service. Moreover, using a kind of a "barium test" in which
intelligence was especially concocted so that it could be traced as it

was passed from one intelligence service to another, the CIA had
been able to determine that the Soviets passed messages they
intercepted through their Pacific signals satellite concerning the
location of American ships in Korean waters to North Korean
intelligence. This sort of cooperation had continued, according to
Angleton's sources, up until the shrine bombing. "Remember, the
North Koreans needed, and got, very exact communication
intelligence."
Angleton then abruptly changed the subject to Edwin Wilson,
the former CIA officer who had been arrested for diverting
American technology to Libya. It was less of a digression from the
subject at hand than it initially seemed.
Wilson, lured by the prospect of making tens of millions of
dollars, had gone to work for the Libyans in the early 1970s.
Among other matters, he undertook to help organize covert

activities for the Libyan intelligence service. To this end, he used
his CIA contacts to buy the instruments of assassination, including
a special CIA mixture of plastic explosives called "C-4", miniaturized
timers used by the CIA, and unregistered weapons stolen
from special forces arsenals, and then smuggle them into Libya. He
even imported an entire sophisticated bomb factory, which had
previously been used exclusively by the CIA to manufacture
booby-trapped ashtrays that could innocently sit on a table for
months until the target arrived and then be detonated from a remote
location. He also recruited ex-CIA assassins, explosive experts,
and couriers to work for him in Libya, leading them to believe that
they were still working for the CIA when in fact they were working
for the Libyan intelligence service. The first three targets of
Wilson's assassins were Libyan exiles living in Egypt and France.
"It was a clever enough false flag recruitment," Angleton

continued,
with a glint of admiration for the opposition. Behind
Wilson's bogus CIA flag was the Libyan intelligence
service,
which was paying Wilson; and behind this Libyan flag of
convenience,
whether or not Wilson entirely realized it, was an old
KGB hand, Karl Hanesch, whose career Angleton had
closely
followed. Hanesch had been working for the KGB on
deception
projects for over a quarter of a century and had
specialized in
arranging politically embarrassing false flag
assassinations in
Germany. When Qaddafi came to power in 1966,
Hanesch was
transferred from the East German intelligence service to
the Libyan
intelligence service, where he became their key security
adviser. It
was, according to communication intercepts, a part of the
Soviet
bloc arrangement to provide intelligence aid to Libya.
Hanesch wasted little time in developing Wilson as a
plausible
"flag" for compromising others in American intelligence.
One of

his first recruits was Waldo H. Dubberstein, a top-level CIA
analyst who transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency, where
he prepared the daily intelligence briefing for the Secretary of
Defense. Dubberstein, who sold Wilson documents that were of
interest to Soviet as well as Libyan intelligence—and who
committed suicide in 1980 after being exposed—further demonstrated
the coordination between the KGB and the Libyan
service. Then, through Wilson's CIA connections, Hanesch was
able to assemble all the necessary components for assassinating
targets with CIA personnel and materials.
But why go to the expense and risk of smuggling them in from
the United States? These tools of terrorism were readily available
in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or the Soviet Union at a fraction
of the price, and they were just as effective. Angleton's answer was
that there could be only one plausible purpose for assembling this
extraordinary American-equipped apparatus: "To ghost

murder
trails leading to the doorstep of the CIA." The unique
value of
Wilson's C-4 explosives, timers, detonators, and ashtrays
was their
"signatures." They would indicate to investigators that the
assassinations carried out with these devices were the
work of the
CIA. In addition, in the event that Wilson's ex-CIA
operatives were
apprehended, they would further implicate the CIA
(especially
since they believed that they were still employed by the
CIA). It
would be a no-win situation for the Agency if the
investigation
became public. Even if the CIA could successfully
exonerate itself
from the assassination charges by showing it had been
framed, it
would have to explain manufacturing exploding ashtrays
and
employing free-lance assassins, which could prove almost
as
embarrassing.
Angleton's fascination with this complex case, and his
point,
was that the Wilson Affair was not exclusively the work

of the
Libyans. It was the product of well-orchestrated and solid
coordination
between the KGB, the East German security services,
and Qaddafi's intelligence services. The purpose of this
coor-
dination, in his view, was for the Soviets to use the
Libyans, who
were perceived as fanatic and wild, as a front in case the
assassinations
went wrong.
It was now clear what he was driving at. Had there been
the
same sort of coordination at the shrine in Burma? Had his
counterintelligence
staff been able to establish through barium tests,
marked cards, double agents, or other means the extent of
this
relationship?
He did not answer directly. Instead, he said elliptically,
"It's too
complicated to get into," which was his way of saying he
did not
want to discuss a subject. Then, to my surprise, he added,
with
some weariness in his voice: "It is a shame you never got
those
questions answered." It took a few minutes before I

realized that he

was referring to the questions he had dictated in 1976 for me to ask

Nosenko.

When I returned to New York the next day, I searched for and

found his thirteen questions. They were scrawled on 3 by 5 cards in

my Nosenko file. I recalled that Angleton had reeled them off after

many brandies and, at the time, they seemed to make little sense.

Now, as I rearranged them, I could see the thread running through

them.

ANGLETON'S QUESTIONS FOR NOSENKO

1. What happened to Rumyanstev when he tried to defect to the

U.S. in 1959? Why did you omit this in your debriefing in 1964?

2. Is there rivalry between the KGB's First and Second Chief

Directorates?

3. To what extent did the Second Chief Directorate know the

operations of the Thirteenth Department of the First Chief

Directorate?

4. What would Department Thirteen have known regarding
Oswald's defection? Would General Rodin have known?

5. What happens when the Second Chief Directorate recruits an
agent who returned to the West? Is he jointly handled?

6. Is an agent recruited by the Second Chief Directorate who is of
value prepared to be handled by a stranger? Would this be true of
an ideological agent as well as a mercenary agent?

7. To what extent do the First and Second Directorates coordinate
the activities of foreign services?

8. Why was a KGB officer named Shitov sent to Cuba as the first
Soviet Ambassador, under the pseudonym Al-exiev?

9. What was his role, if any, in coordinating Soviet and Cuban
intelligence operations?

10. Oswald was issued an entrance visa to Cuba from Havana
after he returned to the United States. Would this require the prior
approval of the Second Chief Directorate?

11. If so, would it be arranged in Moscow or Havana? If the

latter, would a Second Chief Directorate officer be called on to
participate in the decision?

12. Agee went to Cuba under aliases four times while writing his
book. Would he have seen Soviet intelligence in Moscow? Would
these meetings be coordinated with the KGB? Why was Colonel
Semenov, who knew Agee in Uruguay, there during Agee's trips?

13. What was Korovin doing in London in 1961?

The first question was no more than a trap question. Rumyanstev
had been a KGB officer in the Second Chief Directorate
in 1959 who attempted to defect to the CIA at the American
Exhibition in Moscow but was caught because he approached a
KGB officer at the exhibition who spoke fluent English and was
masquerading as an American official. He was executed in 1960
(although the CIA only learned about the aborted defection from
another defector in 1963). Since Nosenko claimed to have worked
on the Oswald case in the same small unit of the KGB's

Second
Chief Directorate as Rumyanstev in 1959, he would have
been well aware of what had happened. Yet he had not
mentioned
the incident to the CIA when he was debriefed in either
1962 or
1964. Angleton wanted to know how Nosenko explained
this gap.
The purpose of the next question had been explained to
me by
Golitsyn. It would have been standard procedure in the
KGB for
the First Chief Directorate's Department Thirteen to
consult with
Nosenko's Second Chief Directorate Department if
Oswald had
approached one of its officers. Nosenko claimed, after all,
that his
department had originally handled the Oswald case in
Moscow,
and, two months before the assassination of President
Kennedy, the
CIA had intercepted a telephone call in Mexico City in
which
Oswald was making contact with Sergei Kostikov, an
officer in
Department Thirteen. Angleton's questions were thus
designed to

force Nosenko to acknowledge that he and his department would
have to have been aware of any relationship between Oswald that
had developed, since Oswald would have been jointly handled.
The next three questions appeared aimed at focusing Nosenko
on Department Thirteen, and specifically on assassinations. As
Stephen de Mowbray had explained to me in London, a defector
from Department Thirteen had told British intelligence that its job
was conducting "wet affairs," which was a euphemism for
assassinations and sabotage. Angleton had been interested in the
KGB's capacity for organizing assassinations since the explosion
experts in the CIA's Scientific and Technical Division traced the
explosive used to destroy the airplane that flew UN Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjold from Africa to East Germany in 1961.
The sixth question was Angleton's key to the relationship he
sought. Before and after Oswald had contacted the Soviet

Embassy,
he had contacted Cuban Embassy officials in Mexico,
who
would have been considered "strangers." Golitsyn had
insisted that
if Oswald had been recruited by the Second Chief
Directorate,
especially as an ideological agent, it would not turn him
over to be handled by Cuban "strangers"—unless it had a
role in
the activity.
Angleton evidently believed Oswald's shuttling between
the
Cubans and Soviets in Mexico City required cooperation,
especially
since Oswald was eventually telegraphed a visa by the
Cuban Foreign Ministry in Havana. His next five
questions aimed
at further exploring the coordination that would be
necessary
between the KGB and the Cuban intelligence service for
this to
happen.
His twelfth question apparently was meant to prod
Nosenko into
talking about Soviet coordination of Communist
intelligence
services. Angleton believed that Philip Agee was a case in

point, as
he told me on another occasion. According to Angleton's view,
Agee had been initially recruited by the KGB while he was serving
with the CIA in Montevideo, Uruguay. His recruiter was Colonel
Semenov, the Soviet military attache in Uruguay. After Agee was
forced out of the CIA, the KGB used him to embarrass the CIA by
publishing exposes. But so as to afford itself "a modicum of
distance," as Angleton put it, the KGB worked through the DGI,
the Cuban intelligence service. Even so, whenever Agee made his
visits to the DGI in Havana, Semenov was sent to Havana to
oversee the joint operation.
Angleton's final question about the 1961 activities of "Korovin"
addressed the same pattern. "Korovin" was the pseudonym General
Rodin used on his diplomatic passport during his tour of duty in
Britain in the early 1960s. Rodin, as head of the London station of

the Thirteenth Department of the First Chief Directorate, was
directly responsible for the operations of Kostikov in Mexico, and
therefore would have had to authorize any contacts Kostikov had
with Oswald. And Nosenko had claimed to have examined the
relevant file after Oswald had contacted Kostikov in 1963. Rodin's
London station was apparently of great interest to Angleton.
According to a 1971 defector, Rodin insulated the Soviet Union
from blame in Britain and Germany by employing the Bulgarian
intelligence service or other cooperative intelli-
gence services to carry out the actual murders. Angleton no doubt
wanted through this line of questioning to lead Nosenko to describe
how Department Thirteen arranged these joint operations.
After reviewing these curious questions for nearly a week, and
the bits and pieces that seemed to fill in the gaps, I telephoned
Angleton. As he had done many times in the past, he refused to

talk about Oswald. When I began to tell him my interpretation of
the questions, he abruptly cut me off, saying they were "water over
the dam" and that I should "forget them"—as if I could. I never
understood whether his questions were really intended for Nosenko
or me, or whether they were merely an inebriated outburst.
Almost a year passed before I spoke to Angleton again. When
we lunched together at the Hay-Adams Hotel, I initially avoided
bringing up the subject of the Soviet bloc "relationship." But, to my
surprise, he began discussing it as if there had been no hiatus in our
conversation. This time he spoke about it in a scholarly, almost
detached way, as if he were discussing the pollination of orchids.
"Sun-tzu explained this strategy as succinctly two thousand years
ago as anyone can today: Hide order behind a cloak of disorder."
He pointed out that just as monolithic corporations often set up

subsidiaries with different names in different countries to
accomplish their purposes, so intelligence services, which
closely
coordinate their work, often find it advantageous to
appear to the
outside world to be divided into independent, and even
competing,
entities. He reasoned that at times the U.S. government
finds the
fiction that the Eastern bloc services are independent of
the KGB
"convenient" because it allows it to blame the Cubans,
Libyans,
Afghans, Bulgarians, or East Germans instead of directly
confronting the Soviet Union.
But how do we know they are really united, I asked.
"The business of intelligence services is establishing
precisely
what the relationship of their opposition is," he answered.
He
then pointed out that since 1948 the CIA, and its allied
services in
Britain, France, and West Germany, had been following
Soviet,
Bulgarian, East German, Libyan, Cuban, Hungarian,
Rumanian,
and Polish intelligence officers posted to embassies in
NATO

countries, as well as reading their mail, intercepting their coded
traffic, and tracing their flow of money and equipment. "We found
sufficient evidence of coordination over extended periods to satisfy
even the skeptics."
It was when Angleton attempted to apply this concept to governments
rather than intelligence services that he got into trouble.
He advanced the theory that the Soviet Union and China had faked
the disunity between them to dupe the West, which proved to be
wrong. Nevertheless, he clung to it, and stubbornly warned that it
would be the Soviets who would trump the American China card
by announcing a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Those with knives
out for him used this mistaken analysis to discredit and ridicule
him.
The final irony, which became clear only after his death, was
that Angleton was far less wrong in his prediction that the split
would be transitory than his premise that it had been

fabricated. In
1988, as cadres of Soviet technicians returned to China, and Sino-
Soviet military cooperation resumed, Gorbachev announced his
plans for a summit meeting in 1989 to end the split, leaving in the
lurch much of America's strategy that had been predicated on an
irreconcilable split between China and the Soviet Union.

Source Notes

PART ONE

CHAPTERS 1-7

There are no secret sources for this book. I do not believe it is
either necessary or fair to conceal from the reader where the
information for an assertion comes from. The identity of the source
is part of the context. Without it, the reader has only part of the
story.
The way in which sources are treated distinguishes different

forms of knowledge. Historical research requires every source be

made explicit so that assertions can be assessed by outside observers. Science makes similar demands. A scientist conducting

an experiment must disclose all the relevant data about its circumstances

so another scientist in another laboratory can replicate

and thereby test the experiment. Judicial knowledge is even more

strict in this respect. A lawyer must expose the names of all his

sources, and allow them to be cross-examined; otherwise their

testimony will not be accepted. It is even a requirement of espionage assessment. Intelligence officers must subject their spies

to counterintelligence scrutiny, or their reports are not accepted.

Only two forms of knowledge cross this principle: gossip and

journalism. The gossip purposely obscures his sources, saying in

effect, "Don't ask who I heard it from," to make the story more

titillating. The journalist obscures his sources out of self-interest,

claiming that unless he hides their identities, they will not

provide
him with further information. This claim assumes the sources are
acting out of altruistic motives. If, however, they are providing the
information out of self-interest—and much information comes
from publicists and other paid agents—then their motive is part of
the story.
I've never understood the journalistic argument for concealing
sources except that it is self-serving. While a source might talk
more freely if he need take no responsibility for what he says, he
also has far less incentive to be completely truthful. The only check
on the source's license to commit hyperbole, if not slander, under
these rules is the journalist himself. But the very premise of
concealing sources is that the journalist needs the cooperation of
the source in the future. This makes the journalist himself an
interested party.
Much of the writing about the CIA, FBI, and other

intelligence
services which has depended on cooperation from these
agencies
has been particularly blurred by source concealment. The
common
practice of authors, magazines, and publishers of making
it appear
that defectors have approached them by serendipity, when
in fact
they have come at the behest of the CIA or FBI, with
which they
have binding contracts restricting what they can say to a
prepared
brief, has made it more difficult to understand the job that
intelligence services actually do. But rather than
cultivating
sources for future writing through the gift of anonymity,
there is
also the need to clarify the material provided by past
sources
especially as the author's client is his readers, not his
sources.
The Angleton quotes come from interviews and
conversations I
had with him from 1977 to 1987. Whatever inhibitions I
had about
publishing this material while he was alive were lifted
when he

died in April 1987.

I have also spoken to many of the men who worked under him

on his counterintelligence staff. Ray Rocca provided me with the

staff's perspective on the Trust and other prewar Soviet deceptions.

Scotty Miler, whom I saw in New Mexico six times over a five-year

period, provided me with case histories of Gol-itsyn and Nosenko. I also spoke to Donovan Pratt, William Johnson, and

William Hood about Angleton himself. Only one former staff

member I spoke to provided a negative picture of Angleton, Claire

Edward Petty. He had made the case in 1975 that Angleton himself

would have been a prime candidate for recruitment by the KGB.

Aside from those on Angleton's staff, I learned a considerable

amount on the cases, especially Nosenko and Golitsyn, from the

foreign and American liaisons with whom Angleton dealt. The

former category, which includes Stephen de Mowbray (MI6),

Philippe de Vosjoli (SDECE), and Amos Manor
(Mossad), were
particularly helpful. The FBI liaison, Sam Papich,
although he had
been badly mistreated by Hoover, remained circumspect.
Thomas
Fox of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had recently
retired,
was more open with me.
William Sullivan, who had his own ax to grind, believing
that
Hoover had made him into a scapegoat, told me about
Fedora and
Top Hat, which opened many other doors.
My chief source on Nosenko was Pete Bagley. We met
together
in Belgium, France, England, and the United States. At
one point,
we considered writing a book together on moles which
never
materialized. Jack Maury, a former chief of the Soviet
Bloc
Division, described the anti-Bagley "sick think" view. The
Soviet
Bloc division was called the Soviet Russia Division prior
to 1965.
As it involved the same personnel and tasks, I have
referred to it

throughout the text as the Soviet Division. I also discussed the

Nosenko conflict within the CIA with Richard Helms, who described

his role in the case, as did Admiral Rufus Taylor, whom Helms ordered to clear it up.

Other CIA executives with whom I spoke about the Nosenko

case were Vincent Marchetti, a former Deputy Director, Gordon

Stewart, the Inspector General who investigated it, David Slawson,

who investigated Nosenko for the Warren Commission, and

Stanley Pottinger, the Justice Department attorney who investigated

the legality of Nosenko's confinement.

There were also supporters of Nosenko's, including Donald K.

Jameson, whom I interviewed five times; John Barron, the Washington editor of the Reader's Digest, who had become a

friend of Nosenko's and even attended his wedding; William Gunn,

who did public relations work for the FBI; Richard Heuer, CIA

analyst, who developed the view that the KGB had rules that would

preclude it from sending a Nosenko-type defector; and John Hart,
who unfortunately spoke to me only briefly over the telephone.
I did further research into Nosenko as a consultant on a BBC
television docudrama in 1985—86 called "Nosenko, KGB Agent."
When Richard Helms expressed surprise that one of the CIA's most
esoteric cases could be turned into popular fare, William Hood
joked, "The only thing left is a Nosenko ballet."
The most valuable public source on Nosenko is the published
Appendix to the Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassination,
U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Session,
March 1979. The quotes about confining Nosenko come from the
February 17, 1964, memorandum, "Nosenko: Current Status and
Immediate Plans," Vol. IV, p. 87. Nosenko's contract with the CIA
is revealed in pp. 67-70. Helms's testimony is in the same volume,
see pp. 1-250. The testimony of Bagley (under the title

"Deputy
Chief) is in Vol. XII, pp. 573-644. Volume XII also has testimony
from Nosenko, John Hart, and Bruce Solie, which provides
important perspectives on the case.
The transcripts of my interviews with Nosenko are available at
Boston University Library, as are Angleton's questions and
Golitsyn's answers to my queries.
I discussed the issue of the CIA using defectors as surreptitious
authors in "The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold," New Republic,
July 15, 1985, p. 35. The defector who told me a book had been
prepared for him by the CIA which he rejected was John Sejna.
The Trust has been the subject of a number of books and studies.
See Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (New York: Harper &
Row, 1960); V. I. Brunovsky, The Methods of the OGPU (London:
Harper, 1931); and Anatoly Golitsyn, New Lies for Old (New
York: Dodd Mead, 1983).

The version published under Kim Philby's name after he defected
to Moscow, which has to be assumed to be a product of the
KGB, is My Silent War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983). This
version has outcroppings in other books that relied on either
Philby's book or Philby himself as a source. See, for example,
Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, The Philby Conspiracy
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).
The Polish side of the WINS deception was described to me by
Michael Goleniewski, the former Deputy Director of Polish
Military Intelligence, who defected to the United States in 1961.
My interviews with him are in the Boston University Archives.
The conflict within the CIA, which did not emerge publicly until
the mid-1970s, can be found in my "The War Within the CIA,"
Commentary (August 1978); William Colby's Honorable Men: My
Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978);

Seymour
Hersh's "Angleton," The New York Times Magazine, June 25,
1978; and David Martin's Wilderness of Mirrors (New York:
Harper & Row, 1982).
For the "Chinese strategist Sun-tzu," see Sun-tzu, The Art of
War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981), p. 17. The book, which
is the bible of deception, was written by Sun-tzu, a general for the
King of Wu in China in about 500 B.C., along with commentaries
handed from one generation to another of Chinese leaders. The
Giles translation was made in 1905. For "When able to attack," see
ibid., pp. 15-18. For "categories of spies," see pp. 95ff. The
intelligence system of Sun-tzu also included two other categories
of spies: the "return" spy, who served as courier and paymaster for
inward spies; and the "local spy," who was a clan-
destine observer sent behind enemy lines to glean specific facts. In
The Chinese Machiavelli: 3,000 Years of Chinese

Statecraft (New
York: Farrar, Straus, 1976), Dennis and Ching Ping
Bloodworth
demonstrate that Sun-tzu provided much of the continuity
in
Chinese military doctrine.

PART TWO
8. THE DECEPTION CONFERENCES
1. The first conference I went to was called officially "Intelligence:
Deception and Surprise." It was held April 24-26, 1979, in
Cambridge,
Massachusetts, under the auspices of the International Security
Studies
Program of Tufts University. At that conference I met Roy C.
Godson, an
energetic professor from Georgetown, who invited me to participate
in his
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The first meeting took
place on
November 1, 1979, at the International Club in Washington, D.C. I
presented a brief paper there on deception that was later published in
a
book edited by Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s:
Analysis and Estimates (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,
1980).
I continued to attend these meetings over the course of the next two
years.
2. R. V. Jones had written of his work as a deception planner in
Most
Secret War (London: Coronet Books, 1979), as well as in "The

Theory of
Practical Joking," Bulletin of the Institute of Physics (June 1957), pp.
193-201. Barton Whaley wrote, among other things, Stratagem:
Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for
International Studies, MIT, 1969). In a 600-page appendix, he lists both
the tactical and strategic deceptions and shows that in the vast
preponderance of cases, they worked. Only 150 copies of this work were
made available. Michael I. Handel had written "Perception, Deception
and Surprise," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no. 19, The Hebrew
University (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1976).

3. For narcotics stings, see my book Agency of Fear (New York: Putnam,
1976). For the Navy scandal, see The New York Times, October 30,
1984, p. A21. The IRS undercover operations are described
in "Stinging Success," Barron's, October 8, 1984, p. 16. The undercover
operations of no less than three hundred Fish and Wildlife Service
employees in Operation Falcon were reported in The New York Times,
August 30, 1984, p. A15. A similar deception was used in 1984 to trap car
owners in New York City who falsely reported their cars stolen after they
had sold them, to collect the insurance money. Here the FBI set up a fake
business called G&N Storage and Towing, which offered to discreetly

buy cars for scrap. After the owners reported them stolen, they were confronted
with the actual car and charged with fraud. The New York Times,
"Car Insurance Fraud 'Sting' Nets 122 in City," December 18, 1984,
p. 1.
4. For the czarist agent provocateur system, see A. T. Vasilyev, The
Okhrana: The Russian Secret Police (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press,
1930). The Grand Duke was assassinated on the orders of the Okhranacontrolled
agent Yevno Azev. In 1893, Azev began his career as an agent
provocateur, and by 1901 had become the head of the "Combat Section,"
which undertook assassination and sabotage, for the Social
Revolutionaries—perhaps the most radical of all the anti-czarist groups.
Through his activities, the Okhrana not only had foreknowledge of the
group's terrorism but it was able to use it to discredit the entire dissident
movement. For a description of Azev's career, see Boris I. Nikolaevskii,
Azeff: The Russian Judas (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1934).
5. For the FBI's undercover operations, see Select Committee to Study
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final
Report, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1976, Book 2. Aside
from the FBI, the hearings it is based on provide a detailed picture of the
use of deception by the military and CIA to control domestic

dissidence.
James Q. Wilson, Professor of Government at
Harvard, received unique access to study the central files of both the FBI
and the Drug Enforcement Agencies in the late 1970s, and his book The
Investigators (New York: Basic Books, 1978) illuminates the logic and
strategy of employing agents provocateurs. William Sullivan, who was
Assistant Director of the FBI, explained to me Hoover's rationale for
maintaining the Communist Party in interviews I had with him in 1977.

6. For the British deception plan, see Anthony Cave Brown, Body-
guard of Lies (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). Also, the remedial
review of it by Michael Howard, Times Literary Supplement, May 28,
1976.

7. See Frederick Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1974), and Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (London:
Hutchinson, 1978).

8. On the German deception of Stalin, see Barton Whaley, Codeword
Barbarossa (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968).

9. On Stalin's deception of the Germans, see Frederick S. Feer,
"Incorporating
Analysis of Foreign Governments' Deception into U.S.
Systems," in Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s:
Analysis and Estimates. Feer, who attended some of the conferences, was
a former CIA officer.

10. For the Japanese deception, see Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi,
Zero: The Story of the Japanese Naval Air Force, 1937-1945
(London: Cassell, 1957), p. 37. Also, Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We
Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). Roberta Wohlstetter provides the
classic study about the transmission of intelligence during the attack itself
in her Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1962).

11. On the British "double cross system," see John Masterman, The
Double-Cross System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). The
subject was updated and expanded in 1981 by Nigel West in MI5
(London: Bodley Head, 1981).

12. For the German double cross, see the account of H. J. Giskes, who
organized it, in London Calling North Pole (New York: Bantam Books,
1982), pp. 2-89. See also Lauren Paine, The Abwehr (London: Hale,
1984), p. 134ff. For other German double-cross systems in Europe, see
West, op. cit., pp. 143—153, and Paine, op. cit., pp. 145-147.

13. For the Soviet double cross, see Chapman Pincher, Their Trade Is
Treachery (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 125. On the Soviet use
of military disinformation, see Frederick S. Feer, The Impact of Soviet
Misinformation on Military Operations: 1920-1979 (Marina del

Rey,
Calif.: Analytical Assessment Corp., 1979), pp. 12-13.

9. THE GOLDHAMER INVENTORY

1. Herbert Goldhamer's unfinished work is contained in Herbert Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977), and Joan Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: An Inventory of Additional Material in the file of Herbert Goldhamer (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1981).

2. For "little offensive capability," see William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (New York: Bantam Books, 1970).

3. See Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1980).

4. For "legacy of fear," see George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 90. In France, see Ladoslas Mysyrowicz, Autopsie d'une defaite (Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme, 1973), pp. 184-185.

5. See William R. Harris, "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means," mimeo (Washington, D.C., Consortium on Intelligence, April 24, 1980), p. 2.

6. See Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 194-198.

7. For "Winterbotham himself had feigned sympathy for Hitler," and the curious relationship between Winterbotham, De Ropp, and German intelligence, see Ladislav Farrago, The Game of the Foxes (New York:

David McKay, 1971), pp. 91ff.

8. The quote "Naturally we were aware . . . of all the major powers" is
from Heinz Riechoff, cited in Mihalka, op. cit., p. 61.

9. For General Joseph Vuillemen's exposure to a "vastly inflated figure
of German air strength," see Paul Stehlin, Temoignage pour l'histoire
(Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1964), pp. 82-92.

10. "Convinced that war would mean the ruin of Paris": see Donald
Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1975), pp. 86-93. Also Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Rise
of the Luftwaffe (New York: Dial Press, 1973), pp. 244-245.

11. On Goering's use of Lindbergh, see Leonard Mosley, Reichs Marshall:
A Biography of Hermann Goering (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou-bleday,
1974). See also the review of Mosley's book by J. D. Miller, Times
Literary Supplement, November 12, 1976, p. 1432.

12. On the "flying pencil" deception, see Mason, op. cit., p. 240.

13. On the "Amerika-Bomber" deception, see ibid., p. 372n.

14. The quote "In addition to the systematic bluff organized at [the] top
level . . . also willing self-deception" is from Heinz Riechoff, cited in
Mihalka, op. cit., p. 61.

15. Mason, op. cit., pp. 344-346. Mason points out that after the
German bombing of Rotterdam it was reported 30,000 people had been
killed. In fact, according to a body count, there were only 814 fatalities.

16. For British press coverage, see John Wood's Ph.D. dissertation,

"The 'Luftwaffe' as a Factor in British Policy, 1935-1939," (Tu-lane University, New Orleans, 1965). See also Mihalka, op. cit., p. 71.

17. The quote by Hitler on "bombs or ammunition" is cited by David
Irving, The War Path (London: Papermac, 1983), p. 74.

18. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 18.

19. For Hitler's quote about "our tail between our legs," see Irving, op.
cit., p. 46.

20. Mason, op. cit., p. 210ff.

21. On French liaison officers and British attaches in Paris, see George
H. Questor, Nuclear Diplomacy (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 97-98.

22. On the Munich negotiations, see Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price
of Peace (London: Hodder 8c Stoughton, 1979).

23. On Hitler's gain at Berlin, see Mason, op. cit., p. 244.

24. "Hitler himself made no secret": His speech is quoted by Z. A. B.
Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

25. "What only the Luftwaffe High Command knew": Mason, op. cit.,
p. 244.

26. The account of the purge, and the quote "a blow could be struck at
the leadership of the Red Army," comes from Walter Schellenberg, The
Labyrinth (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p. 25.

27. On Stalin's purge, see Bailey, op. cit., pp. 133ff.

28. For "staging a fake attack on a German outpost," see Schellenberg,

op. cit., pp. 48-54.

29. On the Ellis affair, see Chapman Pincher, Too Secret Too Long (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 440-456.

30. For the Venlo Incident, see Nigel West, M16 (London: Weidenfeld

& Nicolson, 1983), pp. 70-75. Also, for a first-hand account, Sig-ismund

Payne Best, The Venlo Incident (London: 1950). The latter was based on

his 1945 debriefing.

31. For "the British still clung to the hope," see West, MI6, pp. 75-76.

32. "Hitler launched surprise attacks": Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan,

Strategic Military Surprise (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,

1983), pp. 17-23.

10. THE NEW MAGINOT LINE

1. Bobby Ray Inman view of Soviet deception and "Potemkin villages,"

Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1987), pp. 474-475. For the NSA and the CIA assumed Soviet

data "came in relatively pure," ibid., p. 202.

2. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1985), p. 92.

3. The panel discussion on the allocation of funds at the Air Force Academy at Boulder, Colorado, on June 6, 1984, Panel B-4.

4. The Krasnoyarsk delay, p. 65. For the failure to photograph Soviet
fourth-generation missiles, see Angelo Codevilla, "Ignorance vs. Intelligence," Commentary (May 1987), p. 77.
5. William Kampiles: See Henry Hurt, "CIA in Crisis: The Kampiles
Case," Reader's Digest (June 1979), pp. 65-72.
6. See William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification,"
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Service of Strategic Deception," International Defense Review, vol. 18,
no. 8 (August 1985), pp. 1235ff.
9. World War II photographic capacity: My interviews with Amrom Katz,
1979.
10. On signals intelligence satellites, see Jeffrey Richelson, American
Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 222ff.
11. For the Christopher Boyce betrayal, see Robert Lindsey, The

Falcon
and the Snowman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).
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mimeo
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13. The quote is from Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla, The
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1. For Amrom Katz's role, see Merton E. Davis and William R.
Harris,
"RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation
Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology," paper (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1988).
2. For a fuller discussion of the logic of "National Technical
Means,"
see Amrom H. Katz, Verification and SALT (Washington, D.C.:
Heritage
Foundation, 1979).
3. See William R. Harris, Intelligence and National Security: A
Bibliography
with Selected Annotations (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for
International Affairs, 1968). His interests can be gleaned from such
other
of his writings as "Counter-deception Planning," paper (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University, 1972); "Soviet Maski-rovka and Arms
Control Verification," mimeo (Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Navy
Postgraduate
School, September 1985); "Breaches of Arms Control Obligations,"
mimeo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, September 22, 1983);
"A
SALT Safeguard Program: Coping with Soviet Deception Under
Strategic

Arms Agreements," paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1979); and
"Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by
National Technical Means," in Roy C. Godson, ed., Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Press, 1980), pp. 53-91.

4. Harris provided me with a non-classified computer printout of Soviet
scientific articles detailing the method the CIA assumed the Soviets were
using. They described a system in which the three
accelerometers on each axis would "vote," with the least accurate
dropping out and the measurement of the other two averaged
together.

5. For greater detail on NSA defectors Mitchell and Martin, see James
Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).

6. See West, MI6, pp. 28ff.

7. For a public account of crater deception, see "Soviet False Craters,"
The Washington Times, August 7, 1985, p. 1.

8. My book was Agency of Fear (New York: Putnam, 1977). Fox served
in the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence in 1973.

9. Whalen was paroled in 1972. See my "Spy War," The New York
Times Magazine, September 28, 1980, p. 102.

10. Fox also helped me to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act
the investigative report by General Joseph P. Carroll that revealed the
pilfering ring.

12. THE WAR OF THE MOLES

1. The Soviet bloc case officer was Pete Bagley. He told me about his
novel in 1977. Angleton commented on it five years later.
2. False flag compromises: Frederick Forsyth's novel The Odessa File
(New York: Bantam, 1974) is based on an actual case in which East
German intelligence officers assumed the identities of diehard
Hitlerites,
and even created a secret Nazi organization, to recruit West German
intelligence officers who secretly harbored pro-Nazi sympathies.
3. I found the study "Motivations to Treason" in the Teheran
Archive,
Vol. 51, p. 30.
4. Bagley did the CIA's damage assessment report on Felfe. I later
discussed the case with Angleton; the analysis of it in the text is
Angleton's.
6. The conclusion that there had been over one hundred defectors
comes
from the study done by Richards J. Heuer, a former CIA case
officer, and
the discussion of it afterwards at the Conference at the U.S. Navy
Postgraduate School in September 1984.
7. The best chronology on the Penkovsky case is by Joseph D.
Douglass,
Jr., "Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, Intelligence Coup—But Whose?",
mimeo, privately circulated (November 1981).
8. For Moellering quote and "blow back," see Woodward, op. cit., p.
473.
9. For Richard Craig Smith, see The New York Times, April 5,
1984,
and April 10, 1984.

13. THE DENIAL OF DECEPTION

1. Richards J. Heuer, Jr.: "understand the KGB better than any agency
of the U.S. government" and "If there is one thing more important to the
Soviets . . . it is protecting their own security". These quotes are from
discussions at the conference which I attended and Heuer's paper, "Soviet
Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception," mimeo (1985), pp.
26-30.

2. The source for the CIA's conclusion that it had never been deceived
by a Soviet double agent on any issue of strategic importance is David
Sullivan, who drafted Senator Helms's questions and supplied me with
their answers. Sullivan, a former CIA analyst and critic who was fired for
making CIA data available to Senator Henry Jackson, attended this conference.

3. For Admiral Turner's assessment about the "paranoia of the CIA's
counterintelligence staff," see his revealing autobiography Secrecy and
Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 72.

4. Vitaliy Yurchenko biography: CIA document (available in my
archives, Boston University). The investigation I did of the Yurchenko
case in 1985-86 was for Life and The Observer (London).

5. The original report on A. G. Tolkachev was by William Kucewicz,
"KGB Defector Confirms U.S. Intelligence Fiasco," Wall Street

Journal,
October 17, 1985.
6. Defections of Igor Gheja, Sergei Bokhan: Christian Science Monitor,
October 28, 1985, and The New York Times, October 1, 1985, and November 1, 1985. Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky: Time, September 23,
1985, p. 20, and The Washington Post, September 14, 1985. A number of
false stories were put out by British intelligence MI5, including one in
which he was whisked out of Moscow.
7. Secret 1973 CIA memorandum, entitled "Turning Around RED-TOP
Walk-ins": Teheran Archive, Vol. 53, pp. 28-29.
8. Wallop and McMahon: My interviews with Senator Wallop on December 5, 1985.
9. "The information [Yurchenko] provided was not anything new or sensational" is by President Reagan: "President Sees a Soviet 'Ploy,' " The
New York Times, November 7, 1985, p. 1.
10. Yurchenko's re-defection: "Washington Ponders Nosenko," The New York Times, November 9, 1985. For prohibition on contact, see my
interview with Scotty Miler, 1985. Also, "How Yurchenko Bade Adieu to
CIA," The New York Times, November 7, 1985.
11. The New York Times, November 6, 1985, p. A12.
12. "This whole thing was very good theater": "US Aides Split," The
New York Times, November 8, 1985, p. A10.
13. For Soviet map falsification, see "Soviet Officials Admit Maps

Were Faked," The New York Times, September 3, 1988, p. 1.

14. THE CONFIDENCE GAME

1. "Tendency of Naval officers and others who have taken part in negotiations, to become advocates of the integrity of the persons of whom
they secured the agreement." Amrom Katz, Verification and SALT (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1979), pp. 12-14.

2. "We have . . . probably 30 to 40 requests per year from Iranians and
Iranian exiles": President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report (New York: Times Books/Bantam Books, 1987), p.
106.

3. Ghorbanifar and Theodore Shackley: ibid., p. 106.

4. "We know the CIA . . . they want to tear us like Kleenex—use us for
their purpose and then throw us out the window.": ibid., p. 107.

5. "High individuals inside the Iranian government.": ibid., pp. 210-213.

6. Ghorbanifar's bona fides: ibid., pp. 205-207.

7. Ghorbanifar pressed for increased deliveries of U.S. Arms: ibid., pp.
224-244.

8. "Whether we trust Ghorbanifar or not, he is irrefutably the deepest
penetration we have achieved into the current Iranian Government.": ibid., pp. 193-4.

9. CIA lie detector results: ibid., p. 206-212.

10. "Moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in aiding Iran against Iraq and in deterring
Soviet intervention.": ibid., p. 215.

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12. "We still have those contacts . . . and we're going to continue on this

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PART THREE

15. THE MILLENNIUM WAR

1. See Woodward, op cit., pp. 473ff.

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NATO (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985).

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Cottrell, "The World Environment and U.S. Policy," Strategic Review,
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"Military Dimensions of Communist Systems," paper (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, June 1988), pp. 3-7.

17. THE SIXTH GLASNOST

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2. "Glasnost is a sword": ibid. Heller points out that Lenin used the expression "Glasnost" no less than forty-six times in his writing.
3. For 1921 Soviet industrial production, see Alec Nove, An Economic
History of the Soviet Union (London: Penguin Books, 1982).
4. Golitsyn, op. cit., p. 42.
5. "They will sell it to us": Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: New
Republic/Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1983), p. 8.
6. The quotes from Lenin are from Vol. 45 of V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970). "What we want to show and
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p. 347.
7. Hammer: for a fuller account, see;my "The Riddle of Armand Hammer," The New York Times Magazine, November 29, 1981, p. 69.
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Justice investigations: see my archives, Boston University. I

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8. "Even if it is a fictitious one": Lenin, op. cit., p. 347.
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Times, Letter to Editor, February 28, 1988.
12. On the 1936 Constitution, see Heller and Nekrich, op. cit., p. 319.
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1966), pp. 431ff.
14. "By technocrats and managers": Stephen de Mowbray, "Soviet Deception and the Onset of the Cold War," Encounter (July 1982), p. 8.
15. Alex de Jonge, Stalin (New York: Morrow, 1986), p. 434.
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black market, see Golitsyn, op. cit., p. 120.

20. Ibid., p. 125.

21. "Inquire into opportunities for increased peaceful trade": Finder, op.

cit., p. 142.

22. Ibid., p. 146.

23. "If we cannot give our people the same standard of living": Armand

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24. "If you give us credit. . . . You will keep your plants busy": Finder,

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Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

26. Fedora's message was told to me by William Sullivan.

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Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, Vol. I (Maclean, Va.:

Falcon Associates, 1986), p. 67. General John Sejna was debriefed by

Douglass and wrote an appendix to his book. Douglass also arranged for

me to interview Sejna.

28. The Soviet General Staffs Directorate for Strategic Deception: William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification,"

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Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 123.

32. Ion Pacepa interview by Michael A. Ledeen, Politique
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October 1988, p. 12. The draft was supplied to me by Michael
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34. "Military deliveries to North Vietnam": Kissinger, op. cit., p.
295.

35. "We . . . had used detente to isolate Hanoi and extricate
ourselves
from Vietnam": ibid., p. 1030.

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the
Strategic Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Strategic Institute,
1975).

37. "So condemnatory of the performance . . . ought to be done,"
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Communications and Intelligence (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for
Information Policy Research, Harvard University, 1980), pp. 179-
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38. Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth,"
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(October 1986), pp. 25ff.

39. "Soviet nuclear strategy had to be seen in context of grand strategy":
ibid., p. 33.
40. For Andropov, see my "The Andropov File," New Republic, February
7, 1983, p. 18.
41. Underground journals: The New York Times, January 12, 1988, p.
1.
42. Izvestia: Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1988, p. 1.
43. 1986 Glasnost translation: Heller, op. cit., p. xiii.
44. United States Trade and Economic Council: see my "Hammerization
of Reagan," Manhattan, Inc. (May 1988). Also, Peter Gum-bel,
"Soviet, U.S. Firms Agree," Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1988, p. 2.

APPENDIX A

James Jesus Angleton's proposed questions for KGB defector Yuri
Nosenko.
1. What happened to Rumyanstev when he tried to defect to the U.S. in
1959? Why did you omit this in your debriefing in 1964?
2. Is there rivalry between the KGB's First and Second Chief" Directorates?
3. To what extent did the Second Chief Directorate know the operations
of the Thirteenth Department of the First Chief Directorate?
4. What would Department Thirteen have known regarding Oswald's

defection? Would General Rodin have known?

5. What happens when the Second Chief Directorate recruits an agent
who returned to the West? Is he jointly handled?

6. Is an agent recruited by the Second Chief Directorate who is of value
prepared to be handled by a stranger? Would this be true of an ideological
agent as well as a mercenary agent?

7. To what extent do the First and Second Directorates coordinate the
activities of foreign services?

8. Why was a KGB officer named Shitov sent to Cuba as the first Soviet
Ambassador, under the pseudonym Alexiev?

9. What was his role, if any, in coordinating Soviet and Cuban intelligence
operations?

10. Oswald was issued an entrance visa to Cuba from Havana after he
returned to the United States. Would this require the prior approval of the
Second Chief Directorate?

11. If so, would it be arranged in Moscow or Havana? If the latter,
would a Second Chief Directorate officer be called on to participate in the
decision?

12. Agee went to Cuba under aliases four times while writing his book.
Would he have seen Soviet intelligence in Moscow? Would these meetings be coordinated with the KGB? Why was Colonel Se-menov,

who knew Agee in Uruguay, there during Agee's trips?
13. What was Korovin doing in London in 1961?

APPENDIX B

Secret CIA memorandum on defectors captured from the files of
the U.S. Embassy in Teheran

DECEPTION
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT
DATE: 9 January 1973
TO: Chiefs of Station and Base
FROM: Chief, SB Division
SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP
Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins
ACTION: Read and Retain for Reference
1. In recent months a number of REDTOP nationals have walked into
LNBUZZ installations seeking political asylum. Most have eventually
been processed as refugees or defectors and many of the latter have
provided useful information. A substantial number have been persuaded
to return to their homelands to work on our behalf and most of these are
now of very great value as long-term in-place agents. In some cases,
Stations have handled REDTOP walk-ins well; in others, extremely
valuable opportunities have been lost. These losses have generally
resulted from misunderstandings in field Stations about WOMACE

goals,
priorities and capabilities and from difficulty in communicating with the
walk-in. This dispatch and its attachments are designed to clarify our
aims, to acquaint field Stations with BKHERALD abilities to exploit
REDTOP walk-ins, and to enable officers to obtain essential information
from REDTOP nationals with whom they have no common language.

2. Putting aside the question of LNBUZZ responsibilities for asylum
seekers and for assistance to refugees, which have been covered
elsewhere in dispatches and airgrams, we are here concerned only with
individuals of intelligence interest. While defectors can and do provide
critical information, there are very few cases in which the same individual
would not have been of greater value if he had returned to his post and
remained in place, at least for a reasonable period. A "turn-around"
therefore should remain the first goal in handling a well-placed walk-in.
In addition, normally with Headquarters guidance, an attempt should
sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be
promising agent material even if, at the moment, he does not enjoy good
access. If a young and personable walk-in with strong motivation but

without immediate apparent access should walk in, we are prepared to
guide and assist him in his career, running him in place until he develops
the
access we need. Most such walk-ins would qualify only as refugees, not
defectors, which fact can be used as an argument in favor of turning around.
3. When we speak of turning the walk-in around to "work in place,"
we usually mean working in place after his return to his home country.
Obviously, if a REDTOP official stationed in your area can be turned
around, we would hope to exploit his position for intelligence purposes as
long as he remains stationed outside REDTOP. Other than in exceptional
cases, however, our ultimate objective is to have the walk-in return to his
home country and continue his agent relationship while working inside.
4. BKHERALD can and does run many resident agents inside the
REDTOP countries. We have the capability to mount and support such
operations over an indefinite period and we are currently able to exfiltrate
agents, in most cases with their families, from the REDTOP countries
when it is time for them to leave. To enable us successfully to turn walkins
into resident REDTOP agents, however, it is essential that all

BKHERALD officers who are likely to interview such persons should
have some familiarity with our procedures; and it is equally essential that
all field Stations have on hand the operational tools to obtain information
necessary to Headquarters to enable us to recommend courses of action.
In virtually all walk-in cases, the time available is extremely limited;
unless the case officer obtains at least the minimum information
necessary, unless Headquarters is notified immediately, and unless
Headquarters can respond quickly with guidance, we may find that time
has robbed us of the opportunity to turn the walk-in around. Field Stations
must, therefore, be prepared to handle walk-in cases in which there may
be no immediate opportunity of meeting again with the potential agent, as
well as those in which planning may be somewhat more leisurely.
5. General procedures used in "turn-arounds" are perhaps best illustrated
by outlining how typical cases have been handled recently when
time available is relatively limited:
a. In the initial meeting the individual is debriefed by the Station or
Base as to his motives, for biographic data and for necessary OI. If time
permits, additional questions relating to areas of particular Station or Base
interest could be included in this or subsequent debriefings prior to his
departure.

b. Headquarters is informed of the situation and provided with all pertinent details by [Immediate] NIACT or Flash cable precedence. In
this respect a series of short cables will frequently be more efficient than
one, more lengthy, cable.

c. Headquarters responds with guidance for both the Station or Base and the walk-in, including assignment of a particular SW receiving
system. The walk-in is instructed in recovery of this SW system and an
SW indicator is established. The walk-in is then told to return to his country and expect a letter (mailed securely in his own country by a BKHERALD officer) containing an SW message with instructions approximately two to three months after his return.

d. Headquarters then assembles a package containing covert communications materials, reporting requirements and other instructions,
which is dead dropped or otherwise secretly delivered to the agent in his
homeland.

e. An SW message is subsequently mailed internally to the walk-in giving him directions on how to retrieve the ops package.

6. The precise operational planning will vary, of course, with the situation; e.g., are the identity and access of the walk-in established, or is
he an unknown quantity? Is this a crash operation in which our time with
the walk-in is severely limited, or is there sufficient time to evolve a more
sophisticated and efficient operational plan? The answers to these questions will help determine such questions as whether to handle

him
initially via indirect, non-personal communications, or whether to move
him immediately into a communications plan involving more risky
commitment of our REDTOP area staffers. If time permits and the replies
to our questions so indicate, some turn-arounds may even be issued
materials for preparing SW messages before they return to their homeland.

7. The most important single requirement to keep in mind in the crash
situation is that we must have the walk-in's mailing address in his
homeland. By that we mean an address at which he can securely receive
internally posted mail; i.e., mail posted within his country. This might be
his home address or the address of a friend or relative who would not be
made suspicious by the arrival of mail for him. The most efficient method
of acquiring this information is to have him address a sample envelope to
himself in his own language,
assuring him that this is merely an exemplar which will not itself be used.
We also need to establish with the walk-in an SW indicator, perhaps a
name or a phrase within the body of the open text, which will tell him that
the letter contains SW. In its initial response, Headquarters will normally
indicate if SW is authorized, and which of the SW receiving systems

is to
be issued. If there is insufficient time for consultation with
Headquarters,
do not hesitate to issue the scorch or water developed system to any
promising walk-in. Under such circumstances, should a walk-in not
be
willing to accept either of these two systems, or if for any other
reason
they are not suitable, the station may also issue the microdot
receiving
system without prior approval from Headquarters.
8. In the case of the walk-in where circumstances give Headquarters
more time to provide guidance and expertise, the handling will be
somewhat different. If we have enough time and the individual has
sufficient promise, we will probably dispatch a staff officer
experienced
in the communications systems we use in the REDTOP area to train
him
directly for these highly disciplined communications. In this case,
we
might do away completely with the initial letter mailed inside the
REDTOP area to the agent and put him directly on personal
communications. Where we have enough time, but are dealing with
an
unknown quantity, we would probably be inclined to take that time
to
probe his motivations and his suitability as agent material. This
could be
done through cabled communications with Headquarters, or might
be
handled through a dispatch of a TDY officer from Headquarters.
9. To facilitate walk-in debriefing in both the crash and less hurried

situations, attachment "A" contains copies of a questionnaire in English
and the various REDTOP languages. A walk-in should be asked to
complete this questionnaire in his own handwriting, printing the answers
in capital letters. A transliteration table to [unreadable] letters is provided
for the CKPOLAR, VSYOKE and YKBAND alphabets to allow accurate
cabled reporting in his native language of an individual's responses. If
desired, cables can be keyed to the attachment's numeration, by referring
to this Dispatch. The questionnaire is divided into two Sections. Section I
relates to the walk-in's current situation, status, and biographic history.
Section II requests basic OI information which would assist in clandestine
communications planning. If time is available, the walk-in should be
asked to fill out Section II only after Section I has been completed and
Head-quarters has authorized the Station to proceed. In promising situations,
however, where time is short, stations are authorized to proceed with
Section II on their own initiatives. The value of these questionnaires is
that all necessary information may be obtained by an officer not fluent in
the walk-in's native language. Further, it assures that the most pertinent
questions will be asked even if the available time is limited and that,

by
virtue of the walk-in providing written answers to the questions,
ambiguities and inaccuracies are considerably reduced.

10. Attachment "B" contains forms in English and the REDTOP
languages to assist in the establishment of communication with the
walkin.
Included are questions concerning the individual's mailing address
in
his homeland and the type of mail he receives there, the
establishment of
an SW indicator, sets of instructions for the development or reading
of
several different agent SW receiving systems (including microdot)
which
do not require a specific developer, and SW carbon writing
instructions.
The agent-receiving instructions are accompanied by exemplars of
developed messages and prepared messages which will enable the
walk-in
to practice developing if time and circumstances permit. Microdot
receiving instructions include bullet lenses and exemplars of buried
microdots. Practice SW carbons are provided with the SW carbon
writing
instructions. The foreign language versions are provided in two
forms: on
standard stationery, and in reduced printing on water soluble paper.
The
latter may be given the walk-in for subsequent study at his leisure;
however, in no instance should he attempt to return to his country
with
these instructions.

11. The Attachment "B" instructions are more detailed than the

standard WOLOCK forms intended for use primarily in conjunction with

actual training by an SW technician. These expanded versions presuppose

situations in which the attending case officer can provide little or no

instructional assistance to the walk-in. However, it should be clearly

understood that while these instructions are as comprehensive as possible

their use cannot approach the effectiveness of training by a qualified SW

instructor. In most cases where time and circumstances permit, we would

prefer that a WOLOCK technician be called in to train the individual. By

the some token, Chiefs of Station or Base should avail themselves of the

opportunity, when a WOLOCK/CCB technician visits, to have case

officers thoroughly trained in the use of the systems provided so that they

can competently perform training if the need arises. As a minimum, all officers who

might handle a walk-in should experiment with exemplars provided in

Attachment "B". Additional copies for this purpose will be provided on

request. All field operations officers should be completely familiar with

these basic techniques.

12. Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates

that REDTOP services have not been using sophisticated and serious

walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of provocation

has
been more responsible for bad handling of walk-ins than any other
cause.
We have concluded that we do ourselves a real disservice if we shy
away
from promising cases because of fear of provocation. We are willing
to
run any apparently useful case for a reasonable period and can do so
in
such a way that little or no harm will be done if the case should turn
out to
be controlled. We are confident that we are capable of determining
whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide
information.
13. A legal matter involving "turn-around" inducement requires
special comment. Many walk-ins and defectors appear to be
adamant in
their insistence on guaranteed resettlement in WODUAL; Stations
are not
authorized to make such promises on their own; and Headquarters is
traditionally reluctant to grant such authority. In fact this problem is
more
apparent than real. An agent who serves us loyally "inside" for a
reasonable period of time (normally several years) will obviously be
well
taken care of when he wishes to "retire" and competent field
operations
officers will normally be able to make this clear without specific
promise
or resettlement in WODUAL. "The West" or "a friendly country"
are
acceptable. As a last resort, however, Headquarters will consider

making
a commitment to WODUAL resettlement when a walk-in's value appears
to justify it. However, Stations should make every possible effort to turn
around all walk-ins without such a commitment.
14. One final problem which has caused some difficulty is the fact
that traffic relating to a walk-in is not always received by interested
Headquarters elements on a timely basis. To expedite handling, as well as
to insure security, cable traffic should be slugged "RYBAT
PLAERONAUT" and sent by at least Immediate precedence. Use of a
higher precedence may be dictated by time considerations. At least during
the initial exchanges, the cable should not carry the EIRAS-
TIME indicator nor should there be any formal involvement with
WONICK until approved by Headquarters. The PLAERONAUT slug will
usually be used at least until all reasonable hope of turnaround is abandoned.
Robert P. TACEY

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About the Author

Edward Jay Epstein was born in New York City. He studied
government at Cornell and Harvard, where he received a Ph.D. in
1973. Both his master's and doctoral dissertations were published
as books. The former, Inquest, concerned the Warren

Commission;
the latter, News from Nowhere, the politics of television journalism.
He taught political science at Harvard, M.I.T., and U.C.L.A., and
since 1975 has investigated and written about subjects of interest to
him.